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Abstract
This dissertation contributes to the analysis of the macroeconomic impact of wealth inequal-
ity on imperfect capital markets. The analysis assesses its occurrence and consequences in a
general equilibrium framework with wealth heterogeneity among agents and a convex technol-
ogy. The essential point is that because of the commitment value of wealth on imperfect capital
markets, productive opportunities might vary along the wealth distribution via access to credit.
Thus, the larger the fraction of society whose financial constraint is binding, the more the cap-
ital allocation and the production outcome deviate from their full information counterparts. In
each of the three substantive Chapters, the setting is adapted to focus on a specific aspect of
the role of inequality: its impact on (i) growth when explicitly allowing for autarkic production,
(ii) efficiency when coupled with banking market power as an additional market friction and
(iii) the beneficence of international financial integration when countries are heterogeneous.
Chapter 2 dynamizes the basic model, in order to show how productive inefficiencies affect
the evolution of inequality and how they lead to a multiplicity of steady-states, which depend
on initial conditions. However, taking into account the possibility of autarkic production allows
identifying the existence of credit-constrained net lenders. The fact that they profit from high
interest rates countervails the poor’s pauperization, changes distributional dynamics and thus
the convergence to the bad steady-state.
Extending the static setting, Chapter 3 challenges what hitherto models typically take for
granted: perfect competition on the deposit and loan market. Among others, banking market
power triggers the existence of autarkic entrepreneurs in equilibrium, but might also help to
solve the imperfect information problem and consequently to restore the first-best outcome. In
this context, inequality is found to be constraining the scope of banking market power.
Likewise through the imperfect capital market lens, Chapter 4 finally scrutinizes the real
consequences of financial market integration. It dismantles credit rationing as a new cost of
financial market integration and shows that inequality provides higher absorptive capacities for
capital inflows after external financial liberalization.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Economic inequality has become of prime interest in economic and policy-making circles. Still,
the macroeconomic role of wealth inequality is far from being well understood. Inequality had
long been considered as a final outcome rather than as a major determinant of economic per-
formance.1 No earlier than in the 1990s, a new branch of literature emerged that reversed the
classical view on inequality in the spirit of Ricardo (1820). He had already called for ”an en-
quiry into the laws which determine the division of the produce of industry, amongst the classes
who concur in its formation”. A growing number of studies has meanwhile lent theoretical
and empirical support to a causal relationship running from inequality to the economic perfor-
mance.2 Especially three channels of influence have been put forward. A first channel evolves
from political economy considerations. Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Bertola (1993) or Persson
and Tabellini (1994) play on a poor median voter’s inclination to opt for higher tax rates in
order to promote redistribution or a high ratio of government expenditures to GDP. Yet, higher
taxes incur greater distortions, which dampen aggregate output. A second channel emerges
from social conflicts. While e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1996) build on reduced investment lev-
els ensued by political instability, Fajnzylber et al. (1998) draw on the high opportunity costs
caused by violence. Rodrik (1998), instead, blames the ability of political systems to efficiently
respond to external shocks. At last, a third channel centers on capital market imperfections.
Especially Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993) established the view that
when financial relations are hampered by imperfect information, an agent’s wealth becomes
crucial for gaining access to credit because of its commitment value. That is how wealth makes
productive opportunities vary along the wealth distribution.
The focus of this dissertation lies on the imperfect capital market channel. Asymmetric
information still remains the main impediment to the perfect functioning of financial systems
and so to an efficient allocation of financial resources. The research builds on a class of well-
established, but in part diverse contributions. Irrespective of the models’ particular details,
however, their key feature is that agents seek access to some productive, but risky activity that
1An exception marks Kuznets (1955) empirical generalization of inequality first increasing and then decreasing
in the course of development. It is meanwhile regarded as refuted (see e.g. Deininger and Squire, 1998).
2The empirical literature is reviewed in Section 3.2.
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requires them to make an initial investment (like e.g. for education or a special training, the
acquisition of patents, licences, land or machinery). Those deprived of sufficient own wealth
have to borrow in order to be able to start production at all, at least at an efficient scale.
But problematically, the lending relation is fraught with asymmetric information: the project
outcome and hence repayment crucially depend on the borrower’s labor input (moral hazard;
see e.g. Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Piketty, 1997; or Gru¨ner and Schils, 2007), individual ability
(adverse selection; see e.g. Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990; or Gru¨ner, 2003) or level of physical
output (see e.g. Banjeree and Newman, 1993; or Galor and Zeira, 1993). In all these models,
lenders then use the commitment value of initial wealth, so that richer agents can borrow
more. While collateralizing helps to mitigate information problems, it also leads to credit
rationing. Wealth acts as a selective device. Those who are too poor to put up the collateral are
prevented from seizing the most productive activity given their skills, that would have benefited
themselves and the economy as a whole. Imperfect information and incomplete contracts cause
a credit market failure. Loans that would have been profitable are not granted, which in
turn causes poverty to be more persistent and the economy’s production potential to not fully
being exhausted. Dynamizing this setting through bequests makes economic growth appear as a
process of distributional dynamics. Such inefficiencies may then also translate into the existence
of multiple steady-states, each depending on initial conditions. It is this path-dependence that
might drag countries into poverty traps.
This thesis centers on the examination of the role of wealth inequality on imperfect capital
markets in a general equilibrium framework with wealth heterogeneity among agents and a con-
vex technology. It confirms the implicit finding of most earlier contributions in that the scope of
credit rationing decreases with a higher fraction of society complying with the wealth require-
ment. The lower the fraction of society that is credit-constrained, the higher credit demand
and the less the equilibrium market rate of return,3 allocation of credit and aggregate outcome
deviate from their full information levels. Yet, this thesis goes one step further, questioning
typical assumptions and applying the mechanisms to new policy issues. It particularly poses
three key problems:
(i) What is the growth-impact of inequality on imperfect capital markets when explicitly
allowing for autarkic production?
(ii) How is the relationship between wealth inequality and the economic performance affected
by the variation of the competitivity structure on both sides of the capital market?
(iii) Given its own and its partner’s aggregate wealth and wealth distribution, when is inter-
national financial integration beneficial for a country?
Each subsequent Chapter of this thesis is devoted to one of these questions. Although the
Chapters are closely connected, they can be read independently of each other. All Proofs and
references are collected in the Appendixes and in the Bibliography respectively.
3A positive relation between inequality and the real interest rate has recently also empirically been confirmed
by Bru¨ckner, Gerling and Gru¨ner (2007) for three major OECD economies.
9The second Chapter exposes how Piketty’s (1997) evolutionary predictions in a Solow model
with credit rationing must be modified after loosening an implicit ad-hoc assumption of
his, i.e. the non-existence of autarkic production. Due to moral hazard in production,
some agents are too poor to get credit for an effort investment, but too rich to only make
the lower shirking investment. Contrary to Piketty (1997), the equilibrium therefore
involves credit-constrained net lenders for sufficiently high interest rates. The fact that
more agents profit from increasing interest rates alters the model’s dynamics: interest
payments release a trickle-down effect. The higher the interest rate, the higher the returns
for a certain middle class. This counteracts the pauperization of credit-constrained agents
and leaves the worst case steady-state substantially attenuated. This insight prepares the
ground for long-term growth- and equity-enhancing policy interventions.
However, the universality of the results for the static setting might be confined, as it follows
hitherto models in assuming perfect competition on the capital market for lenders and bor-
rowers alike. In order to overcome these limitations, the third Chapter therefore builds
on the static framework of the second Chapter, but introduces banks on both sides of the
market and then varies the competitivity specification. This allows to study how banking
competition on the market for deposits and loans affects equilibrium financial contracts,
credit rationing, firm sizes, agents’ incomes, aggregate output and surplus. The results
challenge the received view that asymmetric information and imperfect competition be-
tween banks necessarily adversely affect the economic outcome. They so give rise to many
novel policy implications. As credit rationing tends to contain aggregate effort costs, it
might help to allocate capital more efficiently, even under perfect competition. Banking
market power might then deteriorate or further enhance efficiency. Any conclusion subtly
depends on the prevailing wealth distribution - except for under double-sided discrimi-
nating monopoly. Drawing on a pecuniary externality and a capital reallocation benefit,
it improves on the competitive outcome irrespective of the wealth distribution and is so
the most likely banking regime to restore first-best efficiency.
Finally, the fourth Chapter seeks to use the insights derived before, in order to give a new
perspective on international financial integration. It assesses the mechanisms through
which financial market integration affects the pattern of international capital flows and
the domestic economic performances when explicitly accounting for wealth inequality on
imperfect capital markets. Balancing the impact of a firm size and a credit rationing effect
on the net credit position and aggregate production will help predicting the distribution
of gains and losses among and within countries on the basis of a country’s aggregate
wealth and its distribution. Altogether, the results contribute new explanations for some
empirical puzzles. They also bear important implications for policy making, supranational
treaty design and financial stability.
Altogether, the major message this thesis aims to deliver is the following. An explicit provi-
sion of wealth inequality not only alters some common results of the literature, but also helps
to reconcile theory and evidence in the presence of an imperfect capital market. The findings
improve our understanding of the functioning of capital markets and allow a substantiated
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derivation of appropriate regulations and policy measures. However, more research is needed
in this area. New promising lines to explore might be applying this reasoning to new fields
(e.g. monetary policy) or adding new features (esp. the problem of adverse selection or a richer
contractual framework allowing borrowers e.g. to resort to a variety of -also unsecured- financial
products and multiple lenders).
Chapter 2
Growth and Inequality under
Credit Rationing with Autarkic
Production
2.1 Introduction
In a seminal contribution on the macroeconomic impact of wealth inequality, Piketty (1997)
introduces credit rationing into the Solow model with a closed capital market. Consequently,
growth is determined by agents’ ability to borrow in order to finance an entrepreneurial invest-
ment. Piketty’s main contribution is to derive the existence of multiple stationary interest rates
and wealth distributions. In particular, he obtains two kinds of long-run equilibria, depending
on whether credit rationing will be eliminated or persistent. The latter fundamentally relies on
the fact that initially high interest rates will be self-reinforcing through higher credit rationing
and lower capital accumulation.
However, as investment projects are fully divisible, this paper completes agents’ option space
by explicitly taking into account the possibility of self-financing a smaller than the optimal
project size (henceforth called autarkic production).1 This helps to reveal the existence of
credit-constrained net lenders for sufficiently high interest rates. That is how it unearths the
existence of credit-constrained net lenders for sufficiently high interest rates. Then, increasing
interest rates do not exclusively benefit the rich and so will not univocally lead to lower wealth
mobility. Dynamics change and the set of potential realizations of Piketty’s low-wealth second
steady-state has an upper limit. It follows that the worst case scenario for an economy may be
less severe than predicted by Piketty (1997).2
1I thank Robin Boadway, Antonio Ciccone, Hans-Peter Gru¨ner, Andrea Prat, Elisabeth Schulte-Runne,
Kenichi Ueda, Evguenia and Viktor Winschel as well as seminar participants at the University of Mannheim
and the ENTER Jamboree in Brussels for valuable discussions and helpful comments.
2Aghion and Bolton (1997) study a similar setting, but with a fixed investment size. Then, the poor are credit-
constrained and therefore forced to become lenders. However, the uniqueness of their convergence result crucially
depends on them making additional high demands on productivity and the saving rate. These assumptions help
11
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The paper at hand is organized as follows. While Section 2.2 relaxes the implicit ad-
hoc assumption in the original model, Section 2.3 scrutinizes how this impacts on the static
equilibrium. Therefrom, Section 2.4 derives the evolutionary results. Section 2.5 concludes and
points out some long-term growth- and equity-enhancing policy implications. All Proofs are
sent to Appendix A.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Restating the Original Model
Piketty (1997) models a closed economy with an infinite, discrete time horizon t = 0, 1, ...,∞,
which is populated by a continuum of dynasties of mass 1. In each period t, every dynasty is
represented by an agent i, who is risk-neutral, maximizes expected current period income Iit
and walks through the following chronology of events during his one-period life:
At the beginning of the period at date t−, agent i is born and endowed with one indivisible
unit of labor effort that he can only invest in his own project and initial wealth wit ∈ [0, w¯t] ⊆
R+. The latter is the only source of heterogeneity among agents. Denote Gt (w) the cumulative
wealth distribution as the measure of agents with wealth less than w at date t. Then, aggregate
wealth is equal to average wealth and given by Wt =
R w¯t
0
wgt (w) dw.
When agents start their risky projects at date t, they need to choose (i) a capital investment
k and (ii) an effort level e ∈ {0, 1}. There is free access to a production technology f (k), which
is strictly increasing and concave (i.e. f 0 > 0, f 00 < 0). It also satisfies the standard INADA
conditions (i.e. f (0) = 0, f 0 (0) = ∞, f (∞) = ∞ and f 0 (∞) = 0). Once sunk, k cannot
be recovered. Output is stochastic at the individual level: with probability q, the project
succeeds and yields an outcome f (k), whereas in case of failure, the outcome is 0. Crucially,
there is moral hazard in production. By providing effort, which comes at a cost of e = 1, the
entrepreneur can increase the probability of success to p with 0 < q < p < 1. Given a market
rate of return r, a diligent [resp. a shirking] entrepreneur’s expected project profit then amounts
to
π (r) = pf (k)− rk [resp. π0 (r) = qf (k0)− rk0], (2.1)
so that the optimal investment, henceforth denoted k (r) [resp. k0 (r)], must be such that
pf 0 (k (r)) = r [resp. qf 0 (k0 (r)) = r]. (2.2)
It follows that k (r) > k0 (r) for all r. Let y (r) [resp. y0 (r)] be the expected profit given the
optimal investment k (r) [resp. k0 (r)] and assume that at least for r = 1, a diligent entrepreneur
to rule out a multiplicity of steady-state equilibria, because they ensure that capital accumulates sufficiently
fast to remove any difficulties from persistent credit rationing. Contrariwise, Piketty (1997) and the study at
hand also study this case, which gives rise to the second steady-state.
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always generates a higher surplus than a shirking one - even if effort costs are properly taken
into account.
Assumption 1: y (1)− 1 > y0 (1) . (A1)
This way, (A1) implicitly defines a crucial r¯ (q) > 1, such that only for all r ≤ r¯ (q), it holds
that y (r)− 1 ≥ y0 (r), i.e. that exerting effort (e = 1) is preferred to shirking (e = 0). It is the
other way round for r > r¯ (q).3
However, if an agent i owns less [resp. more] than the optimal investment given r, he may
want to raise [resp. lend] the remainder.4 Besides a costless storage option, there is a perfectly
competitive capital market that enables agents to smooth their capital needs. Also considering
that agents cannot end up with negative cash-holdings at the end of their lives, yields standard
debt contracts in equilibrium. These are characterized by a repayment of tf = 0 in case of
failure and of ts = r [k (r)− w] /p for an effort contract [resp. ts0 = r [k0 (r)− w] /q for a non-
effort contract] in case of success. Yet, as effort remains unobservable, the lender anticipates
that after the effort contract has been signed, a borrowing entrepreneur only provides costly
effort, if the incentive constraint holds:
(IC): p [f (k (r))− ts]− 1 ≥ q [f (k (r))− ts] . (2.3)
Substituting the repayment schedule uncovers that (2.3) is only satisfied for borrowers who are
wealthy enough to make at least an initial contribution of ω (r)
w ≥ ω (r) := p/r (p− q)− [pf (k (r))− rk (r)] /r. (2.4)
This stems from the fact that the more an agent has to borrow in order to reach the efficient
scale, the larger the fraction of marginal returns from effort he has to share with his lender and
so the lower his incentives to provide costly effort.5
At the end of their lifetime at date t+, agents realize their initiated projects’ returns and
settle their financial claims. Each agent gives birth to exactly one child, consumes and dies. The
initial generation starts out with a scarce aggregate capital endowment of W0 < k0 (1) < k (1),
which is distributed according to G0 (w). Subsequent generations inherit a fixed fraction s of
their parent’s end-of-life wealth, i.e. bit = wit+1 (wit) = swit. Aggregate wealth in t+1 therefore
amounts to Wt+1 = sYt (Gt (w)), where Yt (Gt (w)) represents the economy’s aggregate output
in t.
2.2.2 Loosening an Implicit Ad-Hoc Assumption
With firms being technically operable at all capitalization levels k > 0, there is no reason to
make production contingent on entrepreneurs’ access to the capital market. That is why we
now relax this implicit assumption of Piketty’s (1997) and explicitly allow agent i to also open
a fully self-financed firm of size k = wi.6 For this autarkic firm, incentive compatibility
(ICa): ya − 1 ≥ ya0 (2.5)
3As q measures the outside option of diligent agents, effort pays off the less, the higher q, so that dr¯ (q) /dq < 0.
4Exclude simultaneous lending and borrowing, since agents cannot gain from it anyway.
5Hence, as self-financers of k (r) stay full residual claimants on all returns from their effort, e = 1 always
pays off for them for any given r ≤ r (q).
6Because of f ’s concavity, agent i with wi < k (r) will not choose to invest less than wi.
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yields that diligence only pays off, if the agent i’s wealth amounts at least to
w ≥ w˜ := f−1 (1/ (p− q)) . (2.6)
2.3 Static Equilibrium with Credit Rationing
For simplicity, the analysis is first cast in terms of static considerations. After having derived
optimal individual decisions, these will be aggregated to obtain the capital market equilibrium.
2.3.1 Optimal Individual Decisions under Moral Hazard
Given the prevailing market rate of return r and his wealth endowment wi, each agent has
to decide upon how to feasibly and income-maximizingly allocate his wealth on (i) an en-
trepreneurial investment (and if necessary adequate borrowing), (ii) lending and (iii) costless
storage. The solution to this problem is depicted in Figure 2.1 and requires to combine two
steps of analysis. First, drawing on agents’ access to credit expressed in ω (r), Piketty (1997)
proves that there is a q0, such that for 0 < q < q0, ω (r) is strictly increasing in r. Furthermore,
he shows that there exists a r(q) < r¯ (q) such that if r ≤r(q), it will be that ω (r) < 0, so that
all entrepreneurs would deliberately provide effort, irrespective of their initial wealth.7 Second,
we use the concavity of ω (r), the convexity of k (r) and k0 (r), (A1) and w˜ to determine the
relative position of these functions’ graphs. Although autarkic firms with varying firm sizes
other than the optimal firm sizes k (r) and k0 (r) will not materialize in equilibrium, they serve
as an anchor, in particular at r = r¯ (q) for deriving k0 (r¯) < ω (r¯) < w˜ < k (r¯) (also see the
Proof of Lemma 2.2). That is how three crucial interest rate cut-off levels materialize: r
¯
(q),
r¯ (q) and r˜ (q). Piketty (1997) is lacking the last one, which lies at the intersection of k0 (r) and
ω (r).
Figure 2.1: Solution to an individual agent’s investment problem given r
Thus, optimal individual decisions are as follows: For any given 1 < r <r
¯
(q),8 (2.4) ω (r) <
0, so that even agents with no wealth prefer to work diligently (area A). The same is true for
7Indeed, with (A1), pf (k (1)) − k (1) > p/ (p− q) for sufficiently small q, so that ω (r) < 0 for sufficiently
small r.
8For r < 1, agents would only invest k(1) [resp. k0 (1)] and store any remainder.
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self-financers with wi ≥ k (r) (area B). However, if r
¯
(q) < r ≤ r¯ (q), the lender must require
the borrower to put up ω (r) > 0 in order to break even. This stake ensures that the borrower
faces the proper incentives to be diligent. If the agent has wealth wi ≥ ω (r), he receives the
needed funds for the effort investment k (r) (white area C). Whereas, if wi < ω (r), the lender
anticipates that the borrower will shirk. Then, the project becomes unsustainable at the effort
scale k (r) and only guarantees the lender an expected return of r at the lower non-effort scale
k0 (r).9 That is how borrowers with wealth wi ∈ [0, ω (r)) find themselves credit-rationed, i.e.
they are not offered effort, but only non-effort contracts (areasD and E).10 Finally, if r > r¯ (q),
credit repayments become so high that effort-provision does not pay off for any project anymore.
No matter how rich they are, all agents invest k0 (r) and deposit any remainder (area F ).
Lemma 2.1 [Piketty (1997), Proposition 2](A1) implies that there exists a q0 ∈ (0, p) such
that for any q ∈ (0, q0), there exists r (q) ∈ (1, r¯ (q)) such that:
(i) For r ≤ r (q), there is no credit rationing: all agents with wi < k (r) obtain sufficient
credit to make the first-best optimum investment k (r).
(ii) For r (q) < r ≤ r¯ (q), there is some credit rationing: there exists ω (r) > 0 with dω/dr >
0, ω (r) → 0+ as r → r (q)+, such that if wi ≥ ω (r), agent i obtains sufficient credit to make
the first-best optimum investment k (r). Yet, if wi < ω (r), agent i is credit-rationed and only
invests k0 (r).
(iii) For r > r¯ (q), all agents with wi < k0 (r) obtain sufficient credit to make the first-best
optimum investment k0 (r).
Going further than Piketty (1997) in explicitly accounting for autarkic production k = wi,
reveals that two types of credit-constrained agents can exist: net-borrowing and net-depositing
ones. Whilst for r < r˜ (q), agent i with wi < k0 (r) < ω (r) prefers to open a shirking firm and
to raise any required funds k0 (r) − wi through a low-effort contract with ts0 (area D), things
chance for r˜ (q) < r ≤ r¯ (q). Then, agent i with k0 (r) ≤ wi < ω (r) can afford to self-finance
the low investment k0 (r) and prefers to deposit any remainder wi− k0 (r) (area E). Thus, not
only the very rich with w > k (r) deposit (area B), but also credit-constrained agents i with
ω (r) > wi > k0 (r) (area E). As this is fundamentally different from Piketty (1997),11 Lemma
1 must be amended:
Lemma 2.2 There exists a r˜ (q) ∈ (r
¯
(q) , r¯ (q)) such that k0 (r˜) = ω (r˜) and k0 (r) < ω (r) for
r > r˜ (q). Then, for any given r ∈ (r˜ (q) , r¯ (q)), agents with wi ∈ (k0 (r) , ω (r)) become credit-
constrained net lenders. They open autarkic shirking firms of size k0 (r) and lend wi−k0 (r) at
rate r.
9To see why (2.3) IC cannot be satisfied for any investment level k below the first-best level k (r) recall the
fact that an entrepreneur’s payoff in case of success is already maximal for the optimal investment. Hence,
incentives to shirk increase for any suboptimal investment level.
10With first-best information, i.e. if effort was observable, effort firms would also be opend up in areas D and
E. On top, credit-constrained agents always obtain a non-effort credit contract for investing k0 (r), since they
cannot further cheat on the lender than e = 0.
11Piketty (1997) explicitly states, e.g. in his footnote 19, that k0 (r) > ω (r).
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2.3.2 Capital Market Equilibrium
Aggregating individual decisions allows to derive the capital market equilibrium.
Definition 2.1 A capital market equilibrium consists of a market rate of return r∗ and indi-
vidual decisions as described in Lemmata 2.1 and 3.6 such that decisions are optimal given r∗
and gross capital demand D (r∗) equals supply S (r∗).
While S (r) is given by total aggregate wealth W , D (r) amounts to the sum of all agents’
investments intended at rate r.12 On these grounds, it follows:
Corollary 2.1 In equilibrium, the market rate of return r∗ and aggregate output Y ∗ are as
follows:
(i) If pf 0 (W ) ≤ r (q), first-best obtains. All agents choose the high investment k (r∗) = W
and exert effort. r∗ and Y ∗ only depend on aggregate wealth W : r∗ = pf 0 (W ) ≤ r (q) and
Y ∗ = pf (W ).
(ii) If qf 0 (W ) > r¯ (q), first-best obtains. All agents choose the low investment k0 (r∗) =W
and shirk. r∗ and Y ∗ only depend on aggregate wealth W : r∗ = qf 0 (W ) > r¯ (q) and Y ∗ =
qf (W ).
(iii) Otherwise, there is credit rationing ω (r∗) > 0. A fraction G (ω (r∗)) of the agents
shirkingly invests k0 (r∗), whereas all others diligently invest k (r∗). r∗ and Y ∗ depend on
aggregate wealth W and its distribution G (w):
r∗ ∈ (r (q) , r¯ (q)] s.t. W = G (ω (r∗)) k0 (r∗) + [1−G (ω (r∗))] k (r∗) (2.7)
and Y ∗ = G (ω (r∗)) qf (k0 (r∗)) + [1−G (ω (r∗))] pf (k (r∗)) . (2.8)
For r (q) < r∗ ≤ r¯ (q), the impact of hidden information becomes evident: The scope of credit
rationing depends on the distribution of wealth among agents and restrains D (r∗), which in
turn lowers r∗ as well as Y ∗ compared to as if there was no problem of moral hazard.13 The
market outcome is constrained Pareto optimal. Aiming at maximizing aggregate output and
facing the same information restrictions than the agents, a social planner would also achieve
Y ∗.
2.4 Impact on the Dynamic Results
After having tracked individual transitions, the evolution of the economy and of the wealth
distribution are analyzed.
2.4.1 Individual Transitions
In the most interesting case of an equilibrium interest rate in period t of rt ∈ (r
¯
(q) , r¯ (q)],
transitional equations take the form of
wit+1 (wit) =
(
s [γ + rt ·max {0, wit − k (rt)}] for wit ≥ ω (rt)
s [γ0 + rt ·max {0, wit − k0 (rt)}] for wit < ω (rt)
(2.9)
12With W < k0 (1), r∗ > 1, so that the storage option becomes unattractive for all agents.
13Also, D0 (r) = G (ω (r)) k00 (r)-[k (r)− k0 (r)]G0 (ω (r))ω0 (r)+[1-G (ω (r))] k0 (r) < 0.
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with
γ =
(
f (k (rt))− rt ·max {0, [k (rt)− wit] /p} with probability p
0 with probability (1− p)
γ0 =
(
f (k0 (rt))− rt ·max {0, [k0 (rt)− wit] /q} with probability q
0 with probability (1− q)
They are concave by f ’s concavity.14 Allowing for the emergence of credit-constrained net
lenders (i.e. for r˜ < r < r¯ (q), agents with k0 (rt) < wi < ω (rt) in area E in Figure 2.1), entails
that transit functions must take into account agents’ safe capital incomes and therefore differ
from Piketty’s (1997).
2.4.2 Steady-States
The individual wealth trajectories (2.9) and the equilibrium interest rate schedule (2.7) estab-
lish a non-linear aggregate transition function Gt+1 (Gt). Kicked off by G0, Piketty (1997)
proves that the resulting infinite sequence of Gt and rt approaches these variables’ long-run
steady-state values. Indeed, with (A1), q ∈ (0, q0) and by f ’s concavity, for any possible long-
term interest rate r∞ ∈ [1, r¯ (q)], individual transitions (2.9) wit+1 (wit) determine a linear,
globally ergodic Markov process, that converges towards a unique stationary wealth distribu-
tion Gr∞ (w).15 Then, r∞ is a long-term steady-state interest rate of the dynamic system
(Gt+1 (Gt) , rt = r (Gt)), only if it equals the equilibrium interest rate r (Gr∞) coming along
with its stationary distribution Gr∞ (w). Notice that with 0 < q < p < 1, project outcomes’
indeterminacy will prevent inequality from ever vanishing.16
On this note, two kinds of steady-state obtain: one without and one with persisting credit
rationing, henceforth labelled (Gur∞ (w) , r
u
∞) and (G
c
r∞ (w) , r
c
∞) respectively. As compared to
Piketty (1997), the analysis at hand does not have to alter the first in substance, whereas the
contrary is true for the second.
2.4.2.1 The No-Credit-Rationing Steady-State
Piketty (1997) shows that there exists an aggregate wealth saving propensity s0 = s0 (q), such
that s ≥ s0 together with (A1) and q ∈ (0, q0) ensure that if r0 ≤ r¯ (q), rt will also remain below
r¯ (q). Whereas if r0 > r¯ (q), rt will only temporarily remain above r¯ (q). Consequently, wealth
accumulates over periods, permanently putting downward pressure on r∗t . This progressively
shifts lending terms in favor of a smaller and smaller pool of borrowers. It also attenuates
credit rationing little by little, so increasing the share of borrowers that provide effort and
make the high investment k (r). If thereby, the interest rate (transitionally) materializes above
r˜ (q), credit-constrained net lenders emerge. But as it is straightforward to see from (2.9)
14For rt ≤r
¯
(q) [resp. rt > r¯ (q)], when all agents are diligent and invest k (rt) [resp. shirk and invest k0 (rt)],
the transitional function reduces to the upper [resp. lower] branch.
15If it was that ω (1) > 0, the map from current wealth to future bequests would be non-monotone, ruling
out the application of Hopenhayn and Prescott’s (1992) findings.
16Yet, (2.9) wit+1 (wit)’s concavity implies that family lineages are not trapped, but can hop between any
two possible wealth levels with positive probability in a finite time.
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wit+1 (wit), their safe interest incomes only account for a faster realization of the steady-state,
but leave Piketty’s steady-state unaffected in essence. This allows to restate a combined version
of Piketty’s (1997) Proposition 1 and 3 :17
Proposition 2.1 With (A1), q ∈ (0, q0), s ≥ s0, but irrespective of G0 (w), there is a unique
credit-unconstrained steady-state of the dynamic system (Gt+1 (Gt), rt = r (Gt)) with Gr (ω (ru∞))
= 0 and ru∞ = r (G
u
r∞) ∈ [1, r¯ (q)] associated to G
u
r∞ (w). More precisely, r
u
∞ = pf
0 (W∞),
Y u∞ = pf (W
u
∞) and W
u
∞ = sY
u
∞.
2.4.2.2 The Credit Rationing Steady-State
However, Piketty (1997) claims the coexistence of a second steady-state for the same param-
eter values, that may arise if the economy does not grow sufficiently quickly to drive interest
rates down to r∞ ∈ [1, r
¯
(q)], where Gr (ω (r∞)) = 0. He obtains that compared to this no-
credit-rationing steady-state (Gur∞, r
u
∞), this second steady-state (G
c
r∞, G
c
∞) is associated with
a higher interest rate rc∞ >r¯
(q) > ru∞, a dominant stationary distribution G
c
r∞ (w) > G
u
r∞ (w)
and a lower aggregate capital stock W cr∞ < W
u
r∞. Most importantly, it involves a persistently
positive fraction Gr (ω (rc∞)) of credit-constrained agents and only arises if two conditions si-
multaneously hold:
1. The steady-state fraction of credit-constrained borrowers Gr (ω (r)) increases sufficiently
in the interest rate r: dGr (ω (r)) /dr > 0. There are two ambiguous effects at play. On
the one hand, higher r lead to an interest-income effect : they make it more unlikely to fall
in the credit rationing interval, since rich net lenders have high interest incomes even if
their investment projects fail. On the other hand, higher r cause a credit-constraint effect :
they make it more difficult to escape the credit rationing interval (0, ω (r)), since ω (r) is
higher and since, as Piketty (1997) claims, credit-constrained agents are net borrowers,
i.e. k0 (r) > ω (r). Therefore, the net effect of higher r on Gr (ω (r)) is only positive, if
the second effect prevails, i.e. if higher r depress the rich’s downward mobility less severe
than the poor’s upward mobility.
2. The equilibrium interest rate r∗ rises in the fraction of credit-constrained agentsG (ω (r∗)):
dr∗/dG (ω (r∗)) > 0. For this to be true, an additional assumption has to be made (in
the form of (A2): f (k) /kf 0 (k) increases with k) and a critically low level of q has to
be derived (henceforth denoted q1 with q1 < q0), below which capital accumulation is
sufficiently perturbed for r∗ being increasing in G (ω (r∗)).18
Taking a closer look at these two conditions in the light of Lemma 2.2 reveals that while
the fulfillment of the second remains unaffected by the emergence of credit-constrained net
17Note that this steady-state is the same than under first-best (i.e. when effort was observable, removing the
need for credit collateralization).
18d (f (k) /kf 0 (k)) /dk > 0 ensures that the average product of capital of unconstrained agents is higher than
that of constrained: pf (k (r)) /k (r) > qf (k0 (r)) /k0 (r). This in turn assures that the fact that the constrained
agents accumulate less than the unconstrained (i.e. sqf (k0 (r)) < spf (k (r))) dominates the fact that they also
demand less k0 (r) < k (r), so that after all, a higher fraction of credit-constrained agents indeed pushes up the
equilibrium interest rate. Also see the first part of Piketty (1997)’s Proof of his Proposition 4.
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lenders, that of the first troubles. The reason for this is that although k0 (r) > ω (r) is the
crucial element in Piketty’s (1997) argumentation,19 we find it to only be valid for r < r˜ (q)
and rather the contrary for r˜ (q) < r < r¯ (q). Consequently, Piketty’s (1997) dynamics are valid
up to r < r˜ (q) and reverse thereafter, because then, the interest-income effect will dominate
the credit-constraint effect. Intuitively and as contrasted in Figure 2.2, the existence of credit-
constrained net lenders adds a third branch in the middle of individual trajectories. That is
how the the lineages’ wealth accumulation process is accelerated, which in turn reduces the
number of consecutive periods until family lineages finally reach the critical threshold ω (r).
Figure 2.2: Individual transitions with credit rationing for r
¯
(q) < r < r˜ (q) (left); with credit
rationing and credit-constrained net lenders for r˜ (q) ≤ r ≤ r¯ (q) (right)
Against this background, we can immediately infer that the steady-state interest rate and
the associated share of credit-constrained agents have an upper limit. Even if the parameter
constellation was such that the economy started out at r∗ ∈ (r
¯
(q) , r˜ (q)), where k0 (r) > ω (r),
and q < q1, the economy would only temporarily be set on the path of increasing interest
rates. As soon as r∗ ∈ (r˜ (q) , r¯ (q)), it follows that k0 (r) < ω (r), triggering decreasing interest
rates. Thus, the dynamic system converges to rc∞ ≤ r˜ (q) and its corresponding Gcr∞ (w).
This also implies that in contrast to Piketty’s (1997) predictions, the steady-state fraction of
credit-constrained agents Gr (ω (r)) cannot converge towards 1.20 All in all:
Proposition 2.2 With (A1) and (A2), q ∈ (0, q0), there is a credit-constrained steady-state.
It is located at rc∞ with r
c
∞ ∈ (r¯ (q) , r˜ (q)] and associated with G
c
r∞ (w). It involves a persistent
fraction of credit-constrained agents Gr (ω (rc∞)) < 1, Y
c
∞ < Y
u
∞ and W
c
∞ < W
u
∞.
19See the last but one paragraph in Piketty (1997)’s Proof of his Proposition 5. If is was always hurt, so that
k0 (r) < ω (r) holds, he points out himself in footnote 19 that this would destroy the second steady-state and
restore uniqueness.
20Although k0 (r)→ 0 for q → 0 prevents credit-constrained dynasties from accumulating much wealth from
low-investment production, those with wi ∈ (k0 (r) , ω (r)) earn the more safe capital income from lending as soon
as r ∈ (r˜, r¯ (q)), in turn accelerating the achievement of the cut-off level ω (r). Note that for wi ∈ (k0 (r) , ω (r)),
especially low q (d [wi − k0 (r)] /dq < 0) and high r (dr [wi − k0 (r)] /dr > 0) reinforce this effect, so that
Gr (ω (r)) cannot converge to 1.
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper shows that relaxing Piketty’s (1997) implicit ad-hoc assumption of a non-existing
autarkic production option reveals the existence of credit-constrained net lenders for sufficiently
high interest rates in equilibrium. Although higher interest rates make the poor suffer from a
lower project profit (due to increased credit rationing and tightened financing conditions), they
also make them benefit from a higher capital income. It is this latter countervailing effect that
fundamentally alters dynamics and prevents the credit rationing steady-state from becoming
as severe as predicted by Piketty (1997).
Yet it only is the accurate knowledge of the evolution of aggregate wealth and its distribution
that allows the derivation of policy recommendations. The most obvious starting-point thereby
offers the crucial return rate r˜ (q) that this paper derives as the upper market rate of return that
the bad steady-state converges to. It is straightforward that policy measures that reduce the
level of r˜ (q) will foster long-term growth and occupational opportunities across all wealth levels.
More concretely, the government could levy a profit tax on credit-constrained entrepreneurs (i.e.
on all shirking and autarkic entrepreneurs) at the end of period t out of which it pays a lump
sum transfer to all agents at the beginning of period t + 1. The tax would scale back the
optimal non-effort investment and induce credit-constrained agents to increase their savings.
These earn a save remuneration and allow credit-constrained lineages to quicker accumulate
wealth over time than by risky non-effort entrepreneurship alone. That is how they can faster
comply with the wealth requirement and open less risky, higher return effort firms. After all,
aggregate output as well as agents’ incomes are fuelled and inequality is diminished. r˜ (q) will
be shifted to the left, which leaves the bad steady-state substantially improved.
However, maximizing aggregate output and thus growth might not always be a desirable
economic objective. As the next Chapter shows, it might come at the cost of an inefficient use
of aggregate effort.
Chapter 3
The Impact of Banking Market
Power on Credit Rationing,
Efficiency and Income
3.1 Introduction
Many economists have tried to look into the origins and the impact of wealth and income
inequalities. Although neoclassical models typically leave no room for the marginal product of
an individual in an occupation to reflect any endowment effects, Frank Knight already pointed
out in 1923, that ”ownership of personal or material productive capacity is based upon a complex
mixture of inheritance, luck and effort, probably in that order of relative importance”. This
model features all three factors -inheritance, luck and effort- but will focus on if this causal
trilogy must be amended by banking market power.1
For this purpose, this paper reverts to a closed capital market model. Agents are heteroge-
neous with respect to their initial wealth. They seek to raise funds in order to capitalize a firm
operating with a convex technology. Yet, due to effort being an invisible, but crucial production
input, credit is fraught with moral hazard. It forces lenders to offer incentive-compatible con-
tracts. As these involve a collateral requirement, poor agents are denied full credit.2 Allocative
inefficiency is hampered, which in turn dampens the real interest rate, incomes, output and
ultimately growth. However, this static version of Piketty’s (1997) reformulation of Solow’s
(1956) seminal growth model will be crucially amended - above all by targeting aggregate sur-
1I thank Thorsten Beck, Bruno Biais, Paolo Fulghieri, Hans-Peter Gru¨ner, Martin Peitz, Elisabeth Schulte-
Runne, Kenichi Ueda, Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Evguenia Winschel and conference participants at the Annual
Congress of the European Economic Association in Budapest, the Spring Meeting of Young Economists in
Hamburg, the Annual Meeting of the Scottish Economic Society in Perth, the ENTER Jamboree in Brussels
and seminar participants at the University of Mannheim for valuable discussions and helpful comments.
2While it takes an inheritance of USD10.000 to double a Brit’s chance to start a business (see Blanchflower
and Oswald, 1998), the poor in developing countries are often entirely excluded from the credit market (see
Laffont and Matoussi, 1995; Sial and Carter, 1996).
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plus as the sum of agents’ incomes and by a variation of the competitive structure of the jointly
modelled input (deposit) and output (loan) market of financial intermediaries. That is how the
asymmetry of information literature is integrated into the literature on the effect of the banking
market structure on the determinants of firms’ access to finance.3
Besides a comprehensive comparison of the efficiency properties of various banking regimes,
this paper produces some original results. First, even under perfect information, a coordination
failure among borrowers deters the market outcome from achieving first-best efficiency. Second,
adding asymmetric information might then be efficiency-enhancing, as it entails credit rationing,
which countervails excessive aggregate effort provision and so contains aggregate costs of the
unobservable production input. Third, the interplay of banking market power and inequality
matters for efficiency. Credit rationing is not a generic property of credit markets hampered by
moral hazard and limited liability. Its occurrence and scope hinge upon the market structure,
which determines a bank’s ability to extract enough surplus from a contract to break even.
Consequently, simple deposit or loan market power aggravate credit rationing, firm size hetero-
geneity and deadweight losses. This not only owes to higher loan costs, but also to a return
rate wedge that induces the creation of suboptimally capitalized autarkic firms. Thereby, the
Herfindahl index turns out to be an incomplete summary measure of bank competition. Higher
inequality decimates simple market power and lets the outcome tend towards that under com-
petition. Fourth, discriminating market power alleviates efficiency losses, since it nullifies the
return rate wedge. While a discriminating monopsony restores the competitive outcome, a dis-
criminating monopoly still keeps to higher rationing. Preserving all marginal project returns,
it seeks to avoid excessive effort provision among the firms it finances and might so ameliorate
the competitive outcome. Fifth, unlike all other banks, a discriminating double-sided monopoly
(henceforth called monemporist4) further improves on the competitive outcome and might the
likeliest restore first-best efficiency. It does so, if a capital reallocation benefit outweighs higher
costs of poor borrowers’ effort contracts. This benefit arises from smoothing firm sizes in the
presence of a decreasing marginal product of capital. Intuitively, the result stems from the fact
that competition prevents banks from apportioning contracts, from accounting for the realloca-
tion benefit and from internalizing effort firms’ pecuniary externality on firms’ effort decision.
Instead, banks are coerced into lending indiscriminately to all entrepreneurs above a certain
wealth level. Sixth, double-sided competition might lead to monopoly outcomes at the benefit
of depositors.
All in all, this paper contributes a new explanation for the predominance of uncompetitive
banking markets in environments characterized by high informational frictions and low as well
as unequally distributed pledgeable wealth. Think e.g. of local moneylenders in developing
countries, credit unions in China and in the West at the beginning of the Industrial Revolu-
tion,5 banking branch regulation in the U.S. up to the 1970s or the rather recent emergence
3We, however, omit monitoring, screening and relationship banking as hitherto drivers of any positive rela-
tionship between banking power and access to finance.
4The term goes back to Nichol (1943).
5Hicks (1969) and North (1981) put down the start of the Industrial Revolution to the ability of a more
developed financial system to finally overcome large-scale investment requirements for using technologies that
had already been known for some time.
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of incubators in the New Economy. As this paper studies the outcome in a variety of capital
market regimes, it also implicitly reviews regulators’ and policy makers’ potential to mitigate
the macroeconomic impact of inequality on the economic performance by their choice of an
appropriate banking market regime and by the design of distributive policies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature,
before Section 3.3 outlines the basic model. Against the first-best case in Section 3.4, Section
3.5 assesses the impact of informational and competitive frictions. Section 3.6 summarizes
implications for banking regime design and policy making. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes. All
Proofs are in the Appendix.
3.2 Literature Review
This paper merges two, until now separated branches of the literature.
The first deals with the macroeconomic impact of inequality on capital markets. It
arises from two key ingredients: an up-front, sunk investment6 and a problem of asymmetric
information. Thereby, the project outcome and hence repayment either depend on borrowers’
labor input (moral hazard; see e.g. Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Piketty, 1997; or Gru¨ner, 2001),
individual ability (adverse selection; see e.g. Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990; or Gru¨ner, 2003) or level of
physical output (see e.g. Banjeree and Newman, 1993; or Galor and Zeira, 1993). Although most
of these models assume a fixed-size capital outlay and a given interest rate, this paper follows
Piketty (1997) in that capitalization levels are chosen optimally with respect to an endogenously
determined return rate. This allows to separate the effects of credit market imperfections from
the supplementary assumption of non-convex technologies. Then, especially the poor become
entrepreneurs and firms can be operated at all scales - in contrast to Piketty (1997) also with own
wealth only. This can give rise to equilibria with autarkic entrepreneurs and credit-constrained
net lenders. Furthermore, while most previous contributions’ focus lies on aggregate output,
this paper’s lies on aggregate surplus. It better captures productive efficiency and agents’ income
situation, since it fully takes into account the costs of both, visible and invisible inputs.
Aiming at mitigating the impact of inequality on efficiency, two remedying policies have
widely been put forward. One centers on political wealth redistribution. As shown by e.g.
Gru¨ner (2003) or Gru¨ner and Schils (2007), the equalization of opportunities across households
can improve both, efficiency and equity. This paper uncovers new applications for distributive
measures. The other corrective policy calls on governments to foster informal financial institu-
tions because of their ability to use monitoring and sanctions that guarantee unsecured loans; or
to run NGO microfinance projects (such as the Garmeen Bank of Bangladesh and Banco Sol of
Bolivia). These solve many of the informational and enforcement problems through endogenous
group formation and peer monitoring (see e.g.Morduch, 1999; Besley and Coate, 1995; Ghatak,
1999; or Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). This paper, instead, challenges a typical assumption
of hitherto models: perfect competition among banks for depositors and borrowers. Banking
market design then emerges as a novel policy tool.
6Like e.g. for the acquisition of education, training, patents, licences, land or machinery.
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On the empirical front, Kuznets (1955) was the first to observe that in the course of de-
velopment, inequality was first rising and then falling. While there is meanwhile consensus
on inequality causally impacting on the economic performance (see e.g. Deininger and Squire,
1998), a controversial debate still runs on the sign and significance of the relationship (also see
the surveys by Benabou, 1996; Ferreira, 1999; and Perotti, 1996 and newer contributions such
as e.g. Banerjee and Duflo, 2005 or Bru¨ckner, Gerling and Gru¨ner, 2007).
The second strand of the literature remains undecided on the effects of banking mar-
ket power on access to credit. Some models derive a positive or nonlinear link based on
information asymmetries and agency problems. Marquez (2002) shows how efficient borrower
screening vanishes with competition, since it makes borrower-specific information more dis-
persed. In Cetorelli and Peretto (2000), an informational externality generates a free-riding
problem that leads to a trade-off: the fewer the number of banks, the greater the incentives for
banks to incur screening costs and, hence, the larger the proportion of funds that is efficiently
allocated to high-quality borrowers. Dinc¸ (2000) confirms a nonlinear relationship. He analyzes
how the degree of competition impacts on the bank’s incentive to keep its commitment with a
borrower when his credit quality worsens. Petersen and Rajan’s (1995) monopolist also faces
more incentives to establish long-term lending relations with young borrowers. This owes to
the monopolist’s ability to intertemporally share in profits and thus risk. But for all that, e.g.
Pagano (1993) or Guzman (2000) still obtain that monopoly’s drawbacks prevail (i.e. the re-
duction of quantities and appropriation of the profit). In contrast, whilst neglecting monitoring
and screening, this paper shifts attention to inequality and its interplay with banking market
power. In a similar, though only bilateral setting with a fixed investment size, Malavolti-Grimal
(2001) receives the same level of credit rationing for a competitive and a monopoly regime. She,
however, fails to model the deposit side and her monopolist takes as given a standard two-tools
debt contract. Yet, when she introduces a probability of financing as an additional contract
tool (which facilitates the satisfaction of the borrower’s participation constraint and exacerbates
that of the lender’s), a monopolist might also ration credit more than a competitive bank. In
this paper, such conclusions will depend on the wealth distribution, which also entails that
agents get ranked according to their wealth. Although for adverse selection and an exogenous
loan size, such a ranking also materializes in Besanko and Thakor (1987). Their monopoly bank
does not use collateral as a signal of credit-worthiness, unless it is sufficiently valuable to make
the loan riskless. It rather sorts borrowers by setting the interest rate such that the bad type
leaves the market.
Also empirical evidence is ambiguous. A positive link is found by e.g. Petersen and Rajan
(1995), Bonaccorsi and Dell’Ariccia (2000), Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), whereas anecdotal
support comes from e.g. Gerschenkron (1965) and Mayer (1990) for big German and Japanese
banks. Contrariwise, a negative link is uncovered by e.g. Black and Strahan (2002), Shaffer
(1998), Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995), Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) or King and Levine
(1992, 1993). Beck at al. (2004) only confirm a negative link for countries with low levels of eco-
nomic and institutional development. Rather complementary, e.g. Beck et al. (2000) or Rajan
and Zingales (1998) find broader and deeper financial markets to be strongly associated with
the economic performance. In the light of this paper’s findings, however, these empirical results
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might be heavily biased. The reason is that they completely neglect inequality, discriminating
market power and the allocation of bank profits.
3.3 The Model
Consider a closed economy populated with a continuum of agents i ∈ [0, 1].
3.3.1 Agents, Endowments and the Sequence of Events
Risk-neutral agents live for one period and maximize total expected income ui.
At date 0, agents are born as prospective entrepreneurs with initial wealth wi, access to the
same production technology and one indivisible unit of labor effort that they can only invest
in their own one-man business. At date 1, agents decide upon how to optimally allocate their
wealth on (i) an entrepreneurial investment k, (ii) interest-bearing deposits wD with a bank and
(iii) costless storage wS . The capital market opens, enabling them not only to deposit funds
with, but also to raise further funds from the bank. Entrepreneurs start a risky and either
(i) self-financed, (ii) leveraged or (iii) autarkic project, for which they have to choose a level
of capitalization k and of effort e ∈ {0, 1}. At date 2, the returns of the initiated investment
projects are realized and financial claims are settled.
3.3.2 Technology and the Entrepreneur’s Problem
The technology F (K,L) exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to aggregate capital
and labor inputs K and L. With only potential one-man firms, production can be studied at
the per-capita level: f (k) = F (K/L, 1) is strictly increasing and concave in the capital-labor
ratio k = K/L (i.e. f 0 > 0, f 00 < 0). It also satisfies the standard INADA conditions (i.e.
f (0) = 0, f 0 (0) =∞, f (∞) =∞ and f 0 (∞) = 0). Once sunk, k is not recoverable anymore.
We introduce idiosyncratic risk by allowing the output to be stochastic at the individual
level: with a probability of q, the project succeeds and yields an outcome f (k); whereas if it
fails, the outcome is 0. At a cost of e = 1, effort provision increases the probability of success
from q to p with 0 < q < p < 1.
Before opening a firm, the entrepreneur must decide on k and e. For a start, consider a
financially unconstrained and diligent [resp. shirking]. Taking the market rate of return r as
given and with an expected project profit of
pf (k)− rk [resp. qf (k0)− rk0], (3.1)
he chooses the optimal investment k, henceforth labelled k (r) [resp. k0 (r)],
such that pf 0 (k (r)) = r [resp. qf 0 (k0 (r)) = r]. (3.2)
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Likewise, y (r) [resp. y0 (r)] denotes the expected profit given k (r) [resp. k0 (r)]. k (r) and k0 (r)
are differentiable, strictly decreasing and convex functions in r. For all r, k (r) > k0 (r) and
k (r) steeper than k0 (r). In order to make the model work, we must assume that at least for
r = 1, diligence generates a higher surplus than shirking - even if effort costs are properly taken
into account:
Assumption 1: y (1)− 1 > y0 (1) . (A1)
This way, (A1) implicitly defines a crucial r¯ > 1, such that y (r)− 1 ≥ y0 (r) holds for all r ≤ r¯.
Only then exerting effort (e = 1) is individually preferable to shirking (e = 0). It reverses for
r > r¯.7 Hence:
Lemma 3.1 Given a market rate of return r ≥ 1, a financially unconstrained entrepreneur
behaves as follows:
(i) If r ≤ r¯, he provides effort and invests k∗ = k (r) s.t. pf 0 (k (r)) = r.
(ii) If r > r¯, he shirks and invests k∗ = k0 (r) s.t. qf 0 (k0 (r)) = r.
3.3.3 Aggregate Economy
Individual wealth w is the only source of heterogeneity among agents. It is continuously dis-
tributed on [0, w¯] ⊆ R+ according to g (w). G (w) then represents the cumulative wealth
distribution as the measure of agents with wealth less than w. And aggregate wealth W =R w¯
0
wg (w) dw equals average wealth. For simplicity, we assume that capital is scarce by letting
W be smaller than the aggregate of entrepreneurs’ intended investments if capital costs were
zero:
Assumption 2: W < k0 (1) ≤ k (1) (A2)
The economy’s aggregate surplus U is the sum of agents’ total expected incomes ui, which
consist of deposit remunerations and project profits, plus eventual bank profits. Thus, U also
equals aggregate output Y (i.e. the sum of agents’ outputs) minus aggregate effort costs.
3.3.4 Capital Market
There is a capital market that allows agents to smooth their capital needs given a deposit rate
rD and a loan rate rL.
3.3.4.1 Information and Financial Intermediation
While effort provision e remains an entrepreneur i’s private information, his initial wealth wi,
project input ki and output (0 or f (ki)) can be verified using a specific screening technology.8
Access to this technology is prohibitively costly for individuals, but not for banks. That is why
banks intermediate the supply of credit S (rD) and the demand for credit D (rL). Banks are
7Effort pays off less, the higher the outside option of diligent agents, i.e. dr¯/dq < 0.
8Wealth is likewise unobservable in e.g. Malavolti-Grimal (2001) and output costly to verify in e.g. Townsend
(1979). Alternatively, banks can also arise for diversifying idiosyncratic risk on behalf of risk-averse agents (as
e.g. in Townsend and Ueda, 2006).
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risk-neutral and do not have funds of their own or operation costs.9 They transform deposits
into loans under different banking market regimes, each described in detail below.
3.3.4.2 Financial Contracts
On the deposit side, banks offer deposit contracts CD (w) = (rD) to agents with wealth w. With
idiosyncratic, independent shocks cancelling out on the loan side, CD (w) specifies a safe deposit
rate rD per unit lent and leaves depositor i with R (w). A bank j earns an intermediation profit
of ΠD,j = rL − rD.
On the loan side, banks offer two-tools credit contracts CL (w) = (wc, t) to agents with
wealth w. To be financed, borrowers have to pledge an initial equity contribution wc.10 After
project completion, they receive a transfer of t in case of success and nothing in case of failure.11
t is a function of rL and wi.
A bank j, however, is only active if it makes non-negative profits with each single deposit
and loan contract (which is a much stronger requirement than from across all contract partners
as e.g. in Jaffe and Russel, 1976):
(IRBD): ΠD,j ≥ 0 and (3.3)
(IRBL ): ΠL,ji ≥ 0 [resp. ΠL,ji0 ≥ 0]. (3.4)
Note that (3.3) IRBD entails rD ≤ rL. Moreover, the deposit and the loan market are interrelated
through an availability constraint, ensuring that bank j does not lend out more funds than it
acquires:
(ACB): Sj (rD) ≥ Dj (rL) . (3.5)
3.3.4.3 Firm Types and Contractual Constraints
No agent can increase his lifetime income by simultaneously depositing with and borrowing from
the bank (also see Proof of Lemma 3.3). We therefore emanate from all agents considering to
approach one side of the capital market only.
The deposit rate rD is the reference rate for a self-financing and an autarkic entrepreneur.
In contrast to the first (whose behavior is described by Lemma 3.1), the second cannot afford to
self-finance the optimal investment given rD. Either refusing or being denied access to credit,
he uses his wealth to open a suboptimally capitalized firm of size ka,i ≤ wi. This makes him
earn ya − 1 = pf (ka,i) − rDka,i − 1 with effort [resp. ya0 = qf (ka0,i) − rDka0,i without]. An
autarkic agent i prefers to provide effort if
(ICa): ya − 1 ≥ ya0, (3.6)
9As a by-product, Section 3.5.2 also implies the outcome with positive operation costs.
10Like e.g. in Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997), collaterizable wealth is modelled as ”cash”, which is netted out
at contract conclusion. Such an equity participation is neither asymmetrically valued by the contracting parties
(as e.g. in Barro, 1976), nor a non-liquid fixed asset against which an agent borrows the entire set-up costs (as
e.g. in Buraschi and Hao, 2004).
11This reward scheme represents the toughest punishment for a shirking borrower, who is protected by lim-
ited liabiality (i.e. who cannot end up with negative cash holdings at date 2). The course of initial output
appropriation is innocuous with view to the results.
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which holds if rD ≤ r¯ and if he owns at least ka,i ≥ w˜ := f−1 (1/ (p− q)). Otherwise, the net
profit generated from investing wi does not cover moral hazard costs 1/ (p− q). Remark that
at rD = r¯, k0 (r¯) < w˜ < k (r¯). Altogether:
Lemma 3.2 An autarkic entrepreneur is an agent i with with wealth less than the optimal
investment given rD ≥ 1, who behaves as follows:
(i) If rD ≤ r¯ and wi ≥ w˜ := f−1 (1/ (p− q)), he provides effort and invests his entire wealth
i.e. ka,i = wi < k (rD).
(ii) Otherwise, he shirks and invests ka0,i = min {wi, k0 (rD)}.
Given the loan rate rL, instead, a borrowing entrepreneur i accepts bank j’s effort credit
contract CL (w) [resp. non-effort credit contract CL0 (w)] in order to optimally capitalize a firm:
kL (rL) if e = 1 [resp. kL0 (rL) if e = 0]. It leaves them with expected net profits of
vi = pt− rDwc − 1 (3.7)
and ΠL,ji = p [f (kL (rL))− t]− rD [kL (rL)− wc] (3.8)
[resp. v0i = qt0 − rDwc0 and ΠL0,ji = q [fkL0 (rL)− t0]− rD [kL0 (rL)− wc0]]. When designing
financial contracts, banks have to respect three sets of constraints. First, there is incentive
compatibility (IC). As borrowers can deliberately, but invisibly elevate the success probability
by working hard, banks must specify loan transfer payments such that the net surplus is higher
with effort than without:
(IC): pt− 1 ≥ qt. (3.9)
Thus, only a transfer of t ≥ 1/ (p− q), covering at least moral hazard costs, induces post-
contractual effort. Second, in order to make agents participate, banks must guarantee them at
least the net profit of their outside option. The individual rationality constraints of the depositor
ensure that depositing yields more than simple storage (IRD1) and autarkic production (IRD2).
Those of the leveraged entrepreneur guarantee that borrowing is more profitable than depositing
(IRL1) and autarkic production (IRL2):
(IRD1): rD ≥ 1 (3.10)
(IRD2): ya − 1 < 0 [resp. ya0 < 0] (3.11)
(IRL1): vi ≥ 0 [resp. v0i ≥ 0] (3.12)
(IRL2): vi ≥ ya − 1 [resp. vi ≥ ya0, v0i ≥ ya0, v0i ≥ ya − 1] (3.13)
Third, the bank has to respect non-negativity constraints regarding agents’ deposits (ND),
equity contribution (Nc) and transfer (Ns):
(ND): wi − ki − wS,i ≥ wD,i ≥ 0 [resp. wi − k0i − wS,i ≥ wD,i ≥ 0] (3.14)
(Nc): wc ≤ wi − wD,i − wS,i [resp. wc0 ≤ wi − wD,i − wS,i] (3.15)
(Ns): t ≤ f (kL (rL)) [resp. t0 ≤ f (kL0 (rL)) ] (3.16)
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Balancing constraints and anticipating rD ≥ 1,12 allows to contain the decision problem and to
fix if agents become financial surplus or deficit units:
Lemma 3.3 Given 1 ≤ rD ≤ rL, agent i’s wealth wi confines his option space:
(i.) If wi is larger than the optimal investment given rD, he self-finances the optimal invest-
ment given rD and deposits any remainder at rate rD.
(ii.) Otherwise, he either (ii.a) borrows any lacking funds for the optimal investment given
rL or (ii.b) simply autarkically invests wi without approaching the capital market on either side
(except for if rD > r¯ or if wi < w˜, when he only invests min {wi, k0 (rD)} and deposits any
remainder at rate rD).
Consequently, (3.15) Nc is only relevant in case (ii.a) and (3.14) ND in case (i.) and
eventually (ii.b). If (IRD2) is violated, (IRL2) implies (IRL1).
3.3.4.4 Capital Market Equilibrium
Regardless of the banking regime, agent i decides how much to devote to investment ki, deposits
wD,i and storage wS,i in view of a profile of deposit and loan contracts Cˆ (w)=(CD,1 (w), ...,
CD,n (w); CL,1 (w), CL0,1 (w),..., CL,n (w), CL0,n (w)) offered by n ≥ 1 banks. The latter
have the same beliefs about how agents decide when they are offered Cˆ (w): B(Cˆ (w)) →
(k, e, wD, wS), whose components are n-dimensional vectors. Following Gru¨ner (2003), common
beliefs must be compatible with individual maximization in the following sense:
Definition 3.1 The beliefs B(Cˆ (w)) satisfy the optimality-by-agent criterion, if they are
compatible with the following behavior: (1.) Agents who decide to accept a contract, choose the
one that offers them the highest expected payoff. (2.) Agents who are indifferent between the
following options pick each of them with equal probability: (i) contracts offered by several banks,
(ii) effort or shirking, (iii) types of entrepreneurship (self-financed, leveraged or autarkic), (iv)
entrepreneurship in either form, deposits or storage.
This being said, the symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the economy can be
formally characterized:
Definition 3.2 A capital market equilibrium consists of (1.) a deposit contract C∗D (w)
and (2.) a loan contract C∗L (w) for each wealth class w offered by n ≥ 1 banks in the mar-
ket, (3.) beliefs B(Cˆ (w)) satisfying the optimality-by-agent criterion and (4.) agents’ equilib-
rium decisions (k, e, wD, wS)
∗
s.t. neither banks, nor agents have an incentive to deviate: (i)
There is no excess capital demand or supply. Total capital investment
R 1
0
©
k∗i + k
∗
a,i + k
∗
L,i
ª
di
equals unstored wealth W −
R 1
0
wS,idi. (ii) Actual behavior is rational and so as expected:
(k, e, wD, wS)
∗ = B(Cˆ (w)). (iii) Given beliefs B(Cˆ (w)), C∗D (w) and C
∗
L (w) are equilibrium
contracts in the respective market form. If new banks are not hindered from entering the market,
there is no incentive for them to do so.
12Hurting (IRD1), rD < 1 < r¯ is not sustainable. As k (1) > w˜, the rich with wi > k (1) would diligently
invest k (1) and store wi − k (1). All others would autarkically invest wi, since for wi ≥ w˜, pf 0 (wi) > 1 and for
wi < w˜, qf 0 (wi) > 1. Thus, to incite deposits, rD ≥ 1.
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3.4 Equilibria under Perfect Information
In order to establish a benchmark, we exceptionally assume away the problem of asymmetric
information: effort is observable and contractable at no cost.
3.4.1 Omniscient Social Planner
A social planner aims at realizing the economy’s maximal aggregate surplus U . For this purpose,
given aggregate wealth W and Lemma 3.1, he must choose a rate of return r and a fraction of
non-effort firms α (W ) ∈ [0, 1] at size k0 (r) along a fraction of effort firms (1− α (W )) at size
k (r):
max
r
U = α (W ) qf (k0 (r)) + (1− α (W )) [pf (k (r))− 1]
s.t. W = α (W ) k0 (r) + (1− α (W )) k (r)
(3.17)
As formally derived in the Appendix, the solution depends on two critical return rates, hence-
forth denoted rˆp and rˆq (with rˆp < rˆq < r¯). Thereby, rˆp [resp. rˆq] is the cut-off rate for which
U is still larger for α = 0 than α = ε [resp. α = 1 than α = 1− ε] with ε > 0, but infinitesimal
small. Accordingly, if W is sufficiently large [resp. low] to give rise to pf 0 (W ) ≤ rˆp [resp.
qf 0 (W ) ≥ rˆq], the planner empowers effort firms of size k (rˆ) =W [resp. non-effort firms of size
k0 (rˆ) = W ] only: αˆ (W ) = 0 and the optimal return rate is rˆ = pf 0 (W ) [resp. αˆ (W ) = 1 and
rˆ = qf 0 (W )]. Otherwise, the planner makes coexist effort and non-effort firms. Maximizing
(3.17) gives
rˆ s.t. k0 (rˆ) / [k0 (rˆ)− k00 (rˆ)] = [W − k (rˆ)] / [k0 (rˆ)− k (rˆ)] , (3.18)
so that 0 < αˆ (W ) = [W -k (rˆ)] / [k0 (rˆ) -k (rˆ)] < 1. For r ∈ (rˆp, rˆq), αˆ (W ) is a linearly
decreasing function in W . This, as displayed in Figure 3.1, leaves the average firm size
kˆ (r) := α (W ) k0 (r) + (1− α (W )) k (r) stepwise convex in r.
Figure 3.1: The average firm size kˆ (r) implemented by a social planner
With (A2) ruling out storage, we can fully characterize the Pareto-optimum:
Proposition 3.1 In the first-best equilibrium, the rate of return rˆ depends on aggregate
wealth W :
(i) If pf 0 (W ) ≤ rˆp, all agents are made run effort firms of size k (rˆ)=W . Thus, rˆ = pf 0 (W )
with rˆ ∈ (1, rˆp].
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(ii) If qf 0 (W ) ≥ rˆq, all agents are made run non-effort firms of size k0 (rˆ)=W . Thus,
rˆ = qf 0 (W ) with rˆ ∈ [rˆq,∞).
(iii) Otherwise, a share of agents 0 < αˆ (W ) < 1 is made run non-effort firms of size k0 (rˆ)
and (1-αˆ (W )) effort firms of size k (rˆ). Thus, (3.18) gives rˆ with rˆ ∈ (rˆp, rˆq).
In case (i), the planner realizes an aggregate surplus of Uˆ = Yˆ − 1 with aggregate output
Yˆ = pf (W ). It is lower in case (iii), when Uˆ = Yˆ − (1− αˆ (W )) with Yˆ = αˆ (W ) qf (k0 (rˆ)) +
(1− αˆ (W )) pf (k (rˆ)) and even lower in case (ii), when Uˆ = Yˆ = qf (W ).
3.4.2 Market Outcome
We now assess the allocation of the social planner against that of a perfectly competitive capital
market under perfect information.
3.4.2.1 Financial Contracts and Individual Decisions
Banks take the deposit rate rD and hence contracts CD (w) = (rD) as given from a competitive
loan market. In a Bertrand manner, they then compete away the intermediation margin by
their simultaneous offer of loan contracts to agents of different wealth classes.13
Lemma 3.4 In a competitive market equilibrium, banks make zero profits.
A positive return rate wedge can therefore not exist with zero intermediation costs. r :=
rD = rL applies to deposit and loan contracts alike, so that:
Definition 3.3 Given a return rate r∗ ≤ r¯, deposit contract C∗D = (r∗), beliefs B(Cˆ (w))
and Lemma 3.3, a loan contract CL (w) = (wc, t) is a Bertrand equilibrium effort loan
contract, if it solves the problem of an agent i with wi < k (r∗):
max
t,wc,kL
vi (r∗) = pt− r∗wc − 1 s.t. (k, e,wD, wS) = B(Cˆ (w)),
(3.4) IRBL : ΠL,ji = 0, (3.13) IRL2 and (3.15) Nc.
Banks just break even by offering standard debt contracts. These entail a success reward that
encompasses the total output minus whatever it takes to cover interest payments in expected
terms: t = f (ki)− r [ki − wc] /p. Borrowers then find it optimal to mimic self-financers. They
choose kL = k (r) and, with an equal return on the project and on deposits, wc = wi. Hence,
full information loan contracts do not restrict any agent’s access to credit. They enable agents
of all wealth classes to behave as described in Lemma 3.1:14
Lemma 3.5 For a given return rate r ≥ 1, the solution to the individual contracting prob-
lem with perfect information and loan market competition is:
(i) For r ≤ r¯, agent i with w < k (r) borrows k (r)− wi at rate r/p.
(ii) For r > r¯, agent i with wi < k0 (r) borrows k0 (r)− wi at rate r/q.
13Under single-sided competition, banks can always raise enough deposits at a given rate rD to meet loan
demand. As Section 3.5.5 exhibits, this changes under double-sided competition, i.e. when banks additionally
have to compete for deposits.
14No-effort loan contracts only require to rewrite Definition 3.3 for a return rate r∗ > r¯.
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3.4.2.2 Capital Market Equilibrium and Aggregate Output
The equilibrium market rate of return r∗ equalizes gross capital supply S (r∗) and demand
D (r∗). While S (r∗) amounts to aggregate wealth W minus the funds devoted to storage,
D (r∗) adds up all agents’ investments intended at rate r∗. The latter can sectionwisely be
obtained from Lemma 3.5.
For a given r ≤ r¯, borrowing constraints are absent. No agent is hindered to invest k (r). It
follows that D (r) = k (r) and that MPCe = pf 0 (k (r)) = r. (A2) then ensures r∗ > 1, which
makes costless storage unattractive: w∗S = 0 and S (r) =W . After substitution, S (r
∗) = D (r∗)
transforms to
k (r∗) =W , so that r∗ = pf 0 (W ) .
The dispersion of wealth levels G(w) does obviously neither affect the allocation of capital
across agents, nor D (r) or r∗: every agent simply invests average wealth W . For this purpose,
poor agents cover a deficit of k (r∗)−wi by borrowing from rich agents, who deposit a surplus
of wD,i = wi − k (r∗). Due to zero bank profits, aggregate output Y ∗ = pf (W ) is totally
split among agents. Each of them ends up with a wealth-dependent gross capital income rwi
and a wealth-independent project profit pf (W )− rW − 1, so that U∗ = Y ∗ − 1. Analogously
proceeding for r > r¯ gives k0 (r∗) =W and U∗ = Y ∗ = qf (W ).
For r = r¯, however, k0 (r¯) ≤ W ≤ k (r¯). There is either too much or too little aggre-
gate wealth for all agents to make the same investment. Given W , banks’ supply then only
contains a fraction α∗ (W ) ∈ (0, 1) of non-effort and (1-α∗ (W )) of effort contracts such that
W = α∗ (W ) k0 (r¯) + (1-α (W ∗)) k (r¯). But as (A1) y (r¯) − 1 = y0 (r¯) leaves agents indif-
ferent between investing k0 (r¯) without effort and k (r¯) with effort, they pick each contract
with equal probability. After all, Y ∗ (r¯) = α∗ (W ) qf (k0 (r¯)) + (1-α∗ (W )) pf (k (r¯)), but
U∗ (r¯) = Y ∗ (r¯)− (1-α∗ (W )) = pf (W )− 1 = qfW .
Figure 3.2: The average firm size k∗ (r) with a competitive capital market
As illustrated in Figure 3.2, the average firm size k∗ (r) will always equal W . We also see
from the comparison with Figure 3.1 that in equilibrium, the market’s only resembles the social
planner’s capital allocation for r∗ /∈ (rˆp, r¯). Otherwise, there is an over-provision of effort, which
hampers aggregate surplus U . This is because in contrast to the planner, privately optimizing
agents do not internalize the pecuniary externality that they put on each other when they open
an effort firm: effort firms require higher capital inputs, which put an upwards pressure on
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the equilibrium market rate of return via higher capital demand and so lower all firms’ optimal
sizes. Although effort firms’ output is still higher than non-effort firms’, the difference decreases
convexly in r and finally ceases to outweigh aggregate effort costs for rˆq < r¯ (also see the Proof
of Lemma 3.1).
That is how effort costs e = {0, 1} cause a coordination failure among creditors: as their
impact on U∗ is not captured by r∗, too many agents find it individually optimal to run effort
firms when r∗ ∈ (rˆp, r¯). Compared to the socially optimal behavior, they thereby fuel r∗ and
Y ∗, but lower U∗.
Proposition 3.2 In an equilibrium with perfect information and a competitive loan
market, the return rate r∗ depends on aggregate wealth W :
(i) If pf 0 (W ) ≤ r¯, all agents choose the same high investment k (r∗) =W and exert effort.
Thus, r∗ = pf 0 (W ) with r∗ ∈ (1, rˆp].
(ii) If qf 0 (W ) ≥ r¯, all agents choose the same low investment k0 (r∗) =W and shirk. Thus,
r∗ = qf 0 (W ) with r∗ ∈ [r¯,∞).
(iii) Otherwise, a share of agents α∗ (W ) opens non-effort firms of size k0 (r¯) and (1-α∗ (W ))
effort firms of size k (r¯). Thus, r∗ = r¯.
However, the allocation only reaches first-best efficiency if W is sufficiently high or low, i.e.
if W is s.t. it entails r∗ /∈ (rˆp, r¯).
3.5 Equilibria under Imperfect Information
Following e.g. Diamond (1984), Piketty (1997), Aghion and Bolton (1997) or Gru¨ner and Schils
(2007), we now reintroduce asymmetric information (Subsection 3.5.1). Later, we add banking
market power and study a deposit monopsony (Subsection 3.5.2), loan monopoly (Subsection
3.5.3), double-sided monopoly (Subsection 3.5.4) and two-sided competition (Subsection 3.5.5).
3.5.1 Competitive Loan Market
Like in the benchmark case, we consider Bertrand competition among banks.
3.5.1.1 Competitive Financial Contracts and Individual Decisions
Taking rD and CD (w) = (rD) as given from a competitive deposit market, banks compete by
their offer of loan contracts until in equilibrium (as stated in Lemma 3.4) they end up only
trading zero-profit contracts with rC := rD = rL.
Definition 3.4 Given a return rate r∗C ≤ r¯, deposit contract CD (w) = (r∗C), beliefs B(Cˆ (w))
and Lemma 3.3, CL (w) = (wc, t) is a Bertrand equilibrium effort loan contract, if it
solves the problem of an agent i with wi < k (r∗C):
max
wc,t,kL
vi (r∗) = pt− r∗wc − 1 s.t. (k, e,wD, wS) = B(Cˆ (w)),
(3.4) IRBL : ΠL,ji = 0, (3.9) IC, (3.13) IRL2 and (3.15) Nc.
(3.19)
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For the same reason as in the benchmark case, a standard effort debt contract with t =
f (kL) − r [kL − wc] /p and wc = wi induces participation. It enables agents to employ kL =
k (r). However, with the effort input being invisible, the bank must ensure beforehand that
contract terms also prevent borrowers from future opportunistic behavior. Rewriting (3.9) IC
p [f (k (r))− r [k (r)− wi] /p]− 1 ≥ q [f (k (r))− r [k (r)− wi] /p]
reveals that effort provision only pays off for borrowers, who own at least
wi ≥ ω (r) := p/r (p− q)− [pf (k (r))− rk (r)] /r. (3.20)
ω (r) amounts to the difference between the expected discounted costs of moral hazard and the
project’s net present value.15 It is a strictly increasing and concave function in r. This owes to
the fact that the higher r, the larger the fraction of marginal returns from effort the borrower
has to share with his lender and so the lower his incentive to actually provide costly effort.
On the other hand, ω (r) becomes zero for with r
¯
∈ (1, rˆp).16 The need to break even prevents
banks from further improving contract terms for borrowers.
Figure 3.3: Solution to an individual agent’s investment problem given r
On these grounds, Figure 3.3 summarizes agents’ occupational choices.
(i) For 1 < r ≤r
¯
, ω (r) ≤ 0, so that even have-nots with zero wealth prefer to provide effort
(area A). Thus, all agents open effort firms of size k (r).
(ii) For r
¯
< r ≤ r¯, self-financers still run effort firms (area B), since they stay full residual
claimants on all returns from effort. Banks, however, know that the fraction that borrowers
keep from their returns on effort is only sufficient to induce effort for those who can pledge an
equity contribution wc ≥ ω (r). Only they get effort contracts and open effort firms of size k (r)
(area C). Agents with wi < ω (r), instead, cannot guarantee the bank an expected return of
r. They get credit-rationed, i.e. banks refuse to provide them with sufficient funds for effort
15Measuring agents’ outside option, q indicates the toughness of credit rationing: dω (r) /dq > 0. Likewiese,
ω (r) < 0 for q ≤ 0, eliminating the commitment issue.
16The reason is that for r ≤ r
¯
, effort firms’ external effect on each other via their pressure on r is neither
sufficient to affect agents’ individual, nor the planner’s aggregate effort decision. However, the planner on top
internalizes a countervailing capital reallocation benefit. As he receives all marginal project returns, he benefits
from equalizing firm sizes in the presence of a decreasing MPC. Thus, αˆ (W ) becomes zero for rˆp >r
¯
. Also
note, that dr
¯
/dq < 0.
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firms.17 They are rather offered ample credit for non-effort firms of size k0 (r), since they are
unable to cheat more on the lender than e = 0. Agents with wi < ω (r) accept non-effort
contracts CL0 = (0, t0=f (k0 (r))− r (k0 (r) -wc) /q) (area D), except for if k0 (r) ≤ wi < ω (r)
(area E). These agents can afford to self-finance the low investment k0 (r) and prefer to deposit
any remainder wi − k0 (r) at rate r. Hence, there might not only be very rich depositors with
wi > k (r), but also some poor ones who are credit-constrained.18
(iii) For r > r¯, capital costs climb so high that effort does not pay off for anyone, even not
for self-financers. All agents choose e = 0 and k0 (r) (area F ).
Remember from Subsection 3.4.2, that under full information, competitive banks also em-
power effort firms in areas D and E. Altogether:
Lemma 3.6 For a given return rate r ≥ 1, the solution to the individual contracting prob-
lem with moral hazard and loan market competition is as follows:
(i) For r ≤r
¯
, agent i with w < k (r) borrows k (r)− wi at rate r/p.
(ii) For r
¯
< r ≤ r¯, agent i borrows k (r)−wi at rate r/p if ω (r) ≤ wi < k (r) and k0 (r)−wi
at rate r/q if wi < ω (r).
(iii) For r > r¯, agent i with wi < k0 (r) borrows k0 (r)− wi at rate r/q.
3.5.1.2 Capital Market Equilibrium and Aggregate Output
As laid out in Definition 3.2, D (r∗C) = S (r
∗
C) gives the equilibrium return rate r
∗
C . While gross
capital demand D (r∗C) equals the sum of all agents’ investments intended at rate r
∗
C , S (r
∗
C) =
W (with r∗C ≥ 1 ensued by r¯> 1 and (A2)).
Preconceive from Lemma 3.6 that D (r∗C) is unconstrained if W is sufficiently high [resp.
low] to push r∗C below r¯
[resp. above r¯]. All agents make the same high investment k (r) [resp.
low investment k0 (r)]. The equilibrium return rate r∗C and aggregate surplus U
∗
C therefore only
depend on aggregate wealth W : r∗C = pf
0 (W ) and U∗C = Y
∗
C − 1 with Y ∗C = pf (W ) [resp.
r∗C = qf
0 (W ) and U∗C = Y
∗
C = qf (W )]. Yet for intermediate levels of W , D (r
∗
C) is constrained
by credit rationing.19 A fraction of agents G (ω (r∗C)) is denied credit for k (r
∗
C) and so left to
invest k0 (r∗C) only. This makes r
∗
C and U
∗
C become a function of the entire wealth distribution
G (w):
r∗C = r
∗
C (G (w)) s.t. W = G (ω (r
∗
C)) k0 (r
∗
C) + [1−G (ω (r∗C))] k (r∗C) (3.21)
U∗C (G (w)) = G (ω (r
∗
C)) qf (k0 (r
∗
C)) + [1−G (ω (r∗C))] [pf (k (r∗C))− 1] . (3.22)
Being subject to the same informational constraints as competitive banks deters a non-
ominscient, non-repressive social planner from improving on the market outcome. Hence, unlike
the market outcome under perfect information in Subsection 3.4.2, that under imperfect infor-
mation is (constrained) Pareto-optimal:
17To see why (3.9) IC cannot be satisfied for any k below the optimal level k (r), recall the fact that an
entrepreneur’s payoff in the high output state is already maximal for the k (r). Hence, incentives to shirk
increase for any suboptimal investment level.
18Not accounting for autarkic production, Piketty (1997) obtains that for r < r¯, agent i with wi < k (r) is
always a net borrower.
19Notice that D0 (r)=G (ω (r)) k00 (r)-[k (r)− k0 (r)]G0 (ω (r))ω0 (r)+[1-G (ω (r))] k0 (r) < 0.
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Proposition 3.3 In a capital market equilibrium with moral hazard and Bertrand
competition, the rate of return r∗C is as follows:
(i) If either pf 0 (W ) ≤r
¯
or qf 0 (W ) ≥ r¯, first-best efficiency obtains: r∗C only depends on
aggregate wealth W and Proposition 3.1 applies accordingly.
(ii) Otherwise, constrained efficiency obtains: credit rationing ω (r∗C) > 0 makes r
∗
C s.t.
D (r∗C) = W dependent on aggregate wealth W and its distribution G (w): A share of agents
G (ω (r∗C)) shirkingly invests k0 (r
∗
C), whereas all others diligently invest k (r
∗
C). If G (ω (r
∗
C))
equals the first-best share of non-effort firms αˆ (W ), constrained and first-best efficiency coin-
cide. If G (ω (r∗C)) > αˆ (W ) [resp. G (ω (r
∗
C)) < αˆ (W )], too many [resp. few] non-effort firms
dampen [resp. fuel] r∗C relative to the first-best return rate rˆ.
Another difference to the full information market outcome is the existence of credit rationing.
It unfolds a dampening effect on credit demand, the equilibrium return rate and aggregate out-
put,20 but a boosting effect on aggregate surplus. In fact, an omniscient planner and uninformed
competitive banks resemble in that they avoid excessive aggregate effort provision, although for
very different reasons. While the first apportions effort contracts to maximize aggregate surplus
by internalizing effort firms’ external effects, the latters ration effort contracts in order to break
even. They also differ in that with competitive banks, the identity of effort entrepreneurs and
thus agent i’s project profit becomes wealth-dependent: qf (k0 (r∗C))− r∗Ck0 (r∗C) if wi < ω (r∗C)
and pf (k (r∗C))−r∗Ck (r∗C)−1 if wi ≥ ω (r∗C). With k (r∗C) > k (r∗) > k0 (r∗C), credit-constrained
agents realize a lower project profit. All others even earn more, if an increase in project profit
outweighs a decrease in gross capital income.
Interestingly, the higher wealth inequality,21 the lower the scope of credit rationing and so
the higher r∗C and Y
∗
C . Although this makes the outcome converge towards the full information
market outcome, it might not always be efficiency-enhancing in that it also increases U∗C .
Comparing the share of non-effort firms with the planner αˆ (W ) and with competitive banks
G (ω (r∗C)) for r
∗ ∈ (r
¯
, r¯), reveals that depending on the dispersion of wealth levels G (w), there
can be more, the same or less effort firms than under first-best. But as deviations to either side
incur an efficiency loss, they leave scope for efficiency-enhancing distributive policies. Lowering
inequality would then help to reduce aggregate effort costs via an increased scope of rationing
(and vice versa).
3.5.2 Monopsony Deposit Market
Suppose that the economy is split up in n identical regions.22 Populated with a single bank and
a continuum of agents, each region j ∈ [1, n] disposes of aggregate wealth Wj = W/n. Whilst
taking the loan rate rL and hence loan contracts CL (w) as given from a national competitive
loan market, each bank controls its regional deposit market. As a monopsonist, it chooses a
deposit rate rD,j := rD,j (rL) with rD,j ≤ rL and deposit contracts CD (w).
20Also in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the competitive equilibrium involves credit rationing, if the ”Walrasian
return rate” is s.t. there exists a lower r for which bank profits are higher.
21In this paper, higher inequality means a larger mass of agents complying with (3.20) ω (r).
22Although fixed and finite, the exact number of regions does not affect the results.
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3.5.2.1 Monopsony Financial Contracts and Individual Decisions
On the national competitive loan market, monopsony banks are presented with the op-
timization problem stated in Definition 3.4. Thus, Lemma 3.6 reapplies, but for diverging
deposit and loan rates: rD,j < rL. With self-financers being geared to rD,j and borrowers to
rL, (A1) must also be rewritten for either rate and so entails r¯D,j and r¯L ≤ r¯D,j . Accordingly,
for rD,j ≤ r¯D,j [resp. rL ≤ r¯L], self-financers’ [resp. borrowers’] optimal effort investment is
k (rD,j) s.t. pf 0 (k (rD,j)) = rD,j [resp. kL = k (rL) s.t. pf 0 (k (rL)) = rL]. Borrowers need to
fill their financing gap through a standard debt contract with t = f (k (rL))− rL [k (rL) -wi] /p.
Qualitatively, credit rationing remains unaltered. Albeit as a function of the loan rate, wealth
constraint (3.20) ω (rL) recurs. Owing to rD,j ≤ rL, agents a fortiori prefer to pledge all they
have, so that wc = wi.
On the regional monopsony deposit market, each bank then freely chooses the deposit
rate rD,j given rL. rL adjusts firms’ national net capital demand D (rL) = nDj (rL) and
depositors’ net capital supply nSj (rD,j).
Definition 3.5 Given a loan rate r∗L ≤ r¯L, demand Dj (r∗L) and contracts C∗L (w) and C∗L0 (w),
non-effort borrowers i with wi ∈ [0,min {ω (r∗L) , k0 (r∗L)}) and effort borrowers i with wi ∈
[ω (r∗L) , k (r
∗
L)], beliefs B(Cˆ (w)) and Lemma 3.3, contract CD (w) = (rD,j (rL)) is a monop-
sony equilibrium deposit contract, if it solves the following problem of bank j:
max
rD,j
Πj = [r∗L − rD,j ]Dj (r∗L) s.t. (3.5) ACB: Dj (r∗L) ≤ Sj (rD,j) ,
(k, e, wd, ws) = B(Cˆ (w)), (3.3) IRBD, (3.4) IR
B
L , (3.10) IRD1, (3.11) IRD2, (3.14) ND.
However, the observability of agents’ wealth by banks constitutes discriminating banking
power and so calls for a distinction of cases.
3.5.2.1.1 Case 1: Simple Monopsony Forgoing discriminating power, a monopsony bank
offers a constant return rD,j < rL on each unit of deposit.
Qualitatively, the return rate wedge adds a further segment of individual behavior. For
r¯L < rL < r¯D,j , leveraged effort firms do no longer pay off, but self-financed effort firms do.
It then follows from rD,j (r¯L) ≤ r¯L, Lemmata 3.1, 3.2 and 3.6 that k0 (r¯L) ≤ k0 (rD,j (r¯L)) <
k (rD,j (r¯L)) and that
k0 (r¯L) < ω (r¯L) < w˜ < k (r¯L) < k (rD,j (r¯L)) . (3.23)
Moreover, (A1), rD,j < rL and dy/dr < 0 establish y (rD,j (r¯L)) − y0 (rD,j (r¯L)) > 1 and even
more notably
y (r¯L)− 1 < y0 (rD,j (r¯L)) . (3.24)
Despite k0 (rD,j) < k (rL) and p/q > rL/rD,j for rL ≤ r¯L, the relative position of k0 (rD,j (r¯L))
is not universally trackable. Depending on the parameter constellation,23 three possibilities
remain (each represented by a dashed-dotted line and dotted areas in Figure 3.4): k0 (rD,j (r¯L))
23As derived in the Appendix, the position depends on the magnitude of the return rate spread
¡
rL − rD,j
¢
and its relation with the success probability margin (p− q).
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can be (i) below ω (r¯L), (ii) between ω (r¯L) and w˜ or (iii) above w˜ (but below k (r¯L)). In any
case and for any given rL, there will be autarkic production (light grey-shaded areas), leveraged
production (white area plus the checked grey area of credit-constrained agents) and self-financed
production combined with depositing (dark grey-shaded area).
Figure 3.4: Solution to an agent’s investment problem given rL
Quantitatively, the larger the return rate spread, the larger the fraction of autarkic firms
and so the lower the volume of intermediated funds. In order to deduce how far to optimally
cut rD,j below rL, the simple monopsonist must sectionwisely sum up agents’ capital supply
and demand:
(i) For 1 ≤ rL ≤r
¯
, all agents exert effort. A share of agents G (k (rL)) leverages k (rL). In
contrast, [1-G (k (rD,j))] self-finances k (rD,j) and deposits any remainder. All others autarki-
cally invest wi.
(ii) For r
¯
< rL ≤ r¯L, credit rationing arises. A fraction of agents [G (k (rL)) -G (ω (rL))]
diligently leverages k (rL), whereasG (min {ω (rL) , k0 (rL)}) operates leveraged non-effort firms
of size k0 (rL). Whilst depositing any remainder, [1-G (k (rD,j))] opens self-financed effort firms
of size k (rD,j) and [G (ω (rL)) -G (min {G (ω (rL)) , k0 (rD,j)})] self-financed non-effort firms of
size k0 (rD,j). Finally, [G (min {ω (rL) , k0 (rD,j)}) -G (k0 (rL))] runs autarkic non-effort firms
and all others autarkic effort firms of size wi.
(iii) For r¯L < rL ≤ r¯D,j , as opposed to self-financed and eventually some autarkic firms,
leveraged firms are no longer profitable with effort. Depositing any remainder, a share of agents
[1-G (k (rD,j))] diligently self-finances k (rD,j) and [G (k (rD,j)) -G (k0 (rD,j))] shirkingly invests
k0 (rD,j). Then, G (k0 (rL)) shirkingly leverages k0 (rL). [G (k0 (rD,j)) -G (min {w˜, k0 (rD,j)})]
autarkically invests wi with effort and [G (min {(k0 (rD,j)) , w˜}) -G (k0 (rL))].
(iv) At last, for rL > r¯D,j , effort becomes unprofitable and all agents shirk. A share of
agents G (k0 (rL)) leverages k0 (rL). [1-G (k0 (rD,j))] self-finances k0 (rD,j) and deposits any
remainder, whereas all others autarkically invest wi.
Consequently, e.g. for rL ≤ r¯L, we obtain a deposit supply Sj (rD,j) ofZ ω(rL)
min{k0(rD,j),ω(rL)}
[w − k0 (rD,j)] g (w) dw +
Z w¯
k(rD,j)
[w − k (rD,j)] g (w) dw.
3.5. EQUILIBRIA UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION 39
Substituting (3.5) ACB into the object function in Definition 3.5 gives
Πj = [rL − rD,j ]Sj (rD,j) . (3.25)
An interior solution24 satisfies dΠj/drD,j = −Sj (rD,j) + [rL − rD,j ]S0j (rD,j) = 0. Looking at
the FOC, Figure 3.4 and borrowers’ wealth levels stated in Definition 3.5 exhibits the simple
monopsonist’s trade-off: increasing the volume of intermediated funds is feasible, but only at
the cost of leaving more to depositors. A reformulation yields an intuitive pricing formula:
given rL, the optimal deposit rate r∗D,j is determined by
r∗D,j + Sj
¡
r∗D,j
¢
/S0j
¡
r∗D,j
¢
= rL. (3.26)
Accordingly, the marginal total costs of attracting an additional unit of deposit (LHS) must
equal rL, i.e. the given revenue from lending out an additional unit of loan (RHS). With the
supply curve Sj (rD,j) sloping upwards, an increase of the deposit volume calls for depositing
entrepreneurs to reduce their firm sizes, which in turn requires a rising deposit rate. But as
the monopsonist must pay a higher deposit rate on all units of deposit and not only on the
marginally attracted one, each further unit of deposit costs more than the average. For the
marginal deposit costs to be rising in rD,j , it must be assumed that the deposit supply is
sufficiently steep and its slope sufficiently slowly increasing in rD,j :25
Assumption 3: d
£
rD,j + Sj (rD,j) /S0j (rD,j)
¤
/drD,j > 0 (A3)
This constitutes:
Lemma 3.7 For a given loan rate rL ≥ 1, the solution to the simple monopsonist’s prob-
lem is to set a deposit rate r∗D,j = rL−Sj
¡
r∗D,j
¢
/S0j
¡
r∗D,j
¢
if rL−Sj
¡
r∗D,j
¢
/S0j
¡
r∗D,j
¢
≥ 1 and
r∗D,j = 1 otherwise.
Rearranging terms in (3.26) gives Blair and Harrison’s (1993, p. 48) buyer power index. It
measures the percentage markup over price, which in optimum equals the reciprocal elasticity
of supply ε, i.e. £
rL − r∗D,j
¤
/r∗D,j = Sj
¡
r∗D,j
¢
/r∗D,jS
0
j
¡
r∗D,j
¢
= 1/ε. (3.27)
The intermediation margin (and thus the deviation from the competitive price r∗C), is the higher,
the lower ε - i.e. the smaller the responsiveness of the deposit supply to changes in the deposit
rate (essentially, the greater S0j
¡
r∗D,j
¢
or the flatter the supply curve).26 An upper limit of the
percentage markup over price finally follows from taking advantage of (3.26) and p/q > rL/rD
for rL < r¯L:
1/ε < (p− q) /q (whereby (p− q) /q > 1).
24Despite Πj ’s discontinuity, we can neglect corner solutions without loss of generality.
25Note that d [ rD,j+Sj
¡
rD,j
¢
/S0j
¡
rD,j
¢
] /drD,j = 2 − Sj
¡
rD,j
¢
S00
¡
rD,j
¢
/ [ S0j
¡
rD,j
¢
]2, where
S0j
¡
rD,j
¢
>0 and S00j
¡
rD,j
¢
>0.
26The monopsony result qualitatively also holds for a Cournot oligopsony. Then, the RHS of (3.27) is
multiplied with the squared sum of market shares (also called the Herfindahl concentration measure), so that
frictions increase with higher concentration.
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3.5.2.1.2 Case 2: Discriminating Monopsony Unlike a simple, a discriminating monop-
sonist is able to push depositors down to their reservation utility. (3.10) IRD1 and (3.11) IRD2
become binding, if each unit of deposit is just paid its simple storage return of 1 or the MPCe
it would have generated if it had been autarkically invested. Hence, in return for depositing
wi − k (rD,j), agent i with wealth wi > k (rD,j) claims a total deposit remuneration R (w) of
R (w) = p [f (k (1))− f (k (rD,j))] + max {0, [w − k (1)]} . (3.28)
Owing to f ’s strict concavity and the storage option, the average remuneration per unit of
deposit is non-increasing in wealth. It equals at least 1 and at the most rD,j (which now
denotes the deposit rate paid on the cut-off unit of attracted deposits). Irrespective of the
wealth distribution G (w), it is therefore profit-maximizing for bank j to increase the deposit
volume by rising rD,j until the profit margin is completely shrunk away: r∗D,j = rL. With
the return rate wedge fading, the effort and non-effort investment curves in Figure 3.4 become
congruent again, so that Figure 3.3 finally reoccurs.
Lemma 3.8 For a given loan rate rL ≥ 1, the solution to the discriminating monopsonist’s
problem is to fix r∗D,j = rL and:
(i) if 1 ≤ rL ≤ r¯, to pay depositors (i.e. all i with wi > k (rL)) a total deposit return
R∗ (w) = p [f (k (1))− f (k (rL))] + max {0, [wi − k (1)]}.
(ii) if rL > r¯, to pay depositors (i.e. all i with wi > k0 (rL)) a total deposit return R∗ (w) =
q [f (k0 (1))− f (k0 (rL))] + max {0, [wi − k0 (1)]}.
3.5.2.2 Capital Market Equilibrium and Aggregate Output
The equilibrium loan rate r∗L clears the competitive national loan marketD (r
∗
L) = nSj(r
∗
D,j (r
∗
L)).
The very existence of credit rationing makes r∗L and aggregate output dependent on W and
G (w) again.
A simple monopsony additionally involves a wealth-distribution-dependent return rate
wedge r∗L − r∗D,j (r∗L) > 0.27 It not only incites the formation of autarkic, but also of leveraged
firms that are smaller in size than self-financed firms. This depresses deposit supply relatively
more than loan demand. Unlike the competitive regime in Subsection 3.5.1, a simple monopsony
regime is therefore associated with a higher loan rate, which in turn tightens credit rationing.
As besides, the MPCe varies across firms, aggregate output slumps. The income effect differs
across agents. Borrowers earn less, whereas depositors’ higher project profit might not outweigh
the lower deposit yield. For autarkic agents, it depends on whether they would have been bor-
rowers or depositors in a competitive regime. Interestingly, higher wealth inequality c.p. tends
to depress the percentage deviation of the loan from the deposit rate. For this to see, imagine
that wealth redistribution lowers the mass of credit-constrained agents. The ensued surge in
capital demand and thus in r∗L directly translates into an equal rise of r
∗
D,j (dr
∗
D,j/dr
∗
L = 1 > 0),
so that the relative magnitude of the return rate spread (3.27) decreases. That is how higher
inequality ameliorates output losses owing to monopsony power, which in turn makes equilib-
rium values tend towards those of the competitive outcome in Subsection 3.5.1. Altogether, the
27As the outcome’s central driver is the return rate wedge, simple intermediation costs would also give rise
to Figure 3.4 for a competitive setting like in Subsection 3.5.1.
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return rate spread prevents the allocation from achieving first-best and constrained efficiency.
However, an exception makes a particular parameter constellation characterized below, in which
the constrained efficient aggregate surplus can be reached or even surpassed. The fact that the
scope of rationing accrues as the beneficial driver, again assigns a role to distributive policies.
In contrast, the discriminating monopsony eliminates the return rate spread. Only
the impact of moral hazard remains, so that the competitive equilibrium of Subsection 3.5.1
reemerges. Autarkic firms are inexistent and the MPCe is the same across all production
units. Figure 3.3 and Proposition 3.3 reapply. The equilibrium return rate is given by (3.21)
and aggregate surplus by (3.22). Yet, the allocation of the surplus differs. While borrowers
earn the same, the bank now skims the whole net depositor rent. When there is [resp. is no]
credit rationing, the outcome reaches constrained [resp. first-best] efficiency.
Proposition 3.4 In a capital market equilibrium with moral hazard, a monopsony
deposit and competitive loan market, the deposit and loan rate r∗D,j and r
∗
L are as follows:
(i) In case of a simple monopsonist, the return rate wedge r∗D,j (r
∗
L) − r∗L < 0 and r∗L
s.t. D (r∗L) = nSj(r
∗
D,j (r
∗
L)) depend on aggregate wealth W and its distribution G (w). The
allocation neither reaches first-best, nor constrained efficiency - except for if r∗L ∈ (r¯ , r¯L] [resp.
r∗L ∈ (r¯L, r¯D,j ]] and if there are too few non-effort firms under competition relative to first-best
G (ω (r∗C)) < αˆ (W ). Then, constrained-efficient aggregate surplus obtains if efficiency gains
from the higher share of non-effort firms G (ω (r∗L)) > G (ω (r
∗
C)) [resp. G (w˜) > G (ω (r
∗
C))]
outweigh efficiency losses from the return rate wedge.
(ii) In case of a discriminating monopsonist, r∗D,j = r
∗
L. Thus, Proposition 3.3 reap-
plies.
3.5.3 Monopoly Loan Market
The economy is composed of n identical regions. Each region j ∈ [1, n] features a single bank, a
continuum of agents and aggregate wealth Wj = W/n. A nationwide competitive deposit and
regional monopoly loan markets coexist.
3.5.3.1 Monopoly Financial Contracts and Individual Decisions
On the national competitive deposit market, the deposit return rate rD arises from aligning
depositors’ net capital supply S (rD) with entrepreneurs’ net capital demand nDj (rL,j) from
the n regions: S (rD) = nDj (rL,j). Consequently, rD fixes deposit contracts CD (w) and the
group of depositors i with wi ∈
£
k¯1 = min {k0 (rD) , ω (rL,j)} , ω (rL,j)
¤
∪ [k (rD) , w¯]. Bank j
takes these as given, when it sets a loan rate rL,j := rL,j (rD) ≥ rD and loan contracts CL (w)
and CL0 (w) on the regional monopoly loan market.
Definition 3.6 Given a deposit rate r∗D ≤ r¯D, supply S (r∗D), contract C∗D (w) = (r∗D), beliefs
B(Cˆ (w)) and Lemma 3.3, CL0 (w) = (wc, t0) and CL (w) = (wc, t) are monopoly equilibrium
non-effort and effort loan contracts, if they solve the following problem of bank j: maximize
total expected profits Πj by assigning input levels kL0 and kL and a loan rate rL,j to non-
effort borrowers i with wi ∈
£
0, k¯1:=min {k0 (r∗D) , ω (rL,j)}
¤
and effort borrowers i with wi ∈
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£
ω (rL,j) , k¯2:=k (rL,j)
¤
, of whom π (w)=1 get credit and π (w)=0 do not.
max
π(w),t,t0,rL,j ,wc,kL,kL0
Πj =
R k¯1
0
π (w) [qf (kL0)− r∗D [kL0-wc]− t0] g (w) dw
+
R k¯2
ω(rL,j)
π (w) [pf (kL)− r∗D [kL-wc]− t] g (w) dw
s.t. (k, e, wd, ws)=B(Cˆ (w)), (3.4) IRBL , (3.5) AC
B, (3.9) IC,(3.13) IRL2, (3.15) Nc.
The observability of initial wealth principally prepares the ground for the exercise of dis-
criminating market power, so again requiring a case differentiation.
3.5.3.1.1 Case 1: Simple Monopolist Doing without discriminating agents according
to their wealth, a simple monopolist enforces standard debt contracts. While effort contracts
comprise a transfer t = f (kL) − rL,j [kL − wi] /p and a high investment kL = k (rD) s.t.
pf 0 (kL (rD)) = rD, non-effort contract specify t0 = f (kL)−rL,j [kL − wi] /q and kL0 = k0 (rD)
s.t. qf 0 (kL0 (rD)) = rD. (3.9) IC then makes the wealth constraint (3.20) materialize as
wi < ω (rL,j) := p/rL,j (p− q)− [pf (k (rD))− rL,jk (rD)] /rL,j . (3.29)
It is for two reasons that a simple monopolist fixes a higher rationing threshold than competitive
banks. First, it sets a comparably higher loan rate and second, a higher amount of credit (as it
inflicts a larger firm size on borrowers than those would have chosen on their own).28 rD < rL,j
not only ensures that per-contract profits are always non-negative (so that π (w) = 1), but also
that agents prefer to invest their entire wealth into their own project wc = wi.
Figure 3.5: Solution to an agent’s investment problem given rD
Qualitatively, the pure existence of a return rate wedge presents agents with a similar
contractual decision problem under simple loan monopoly as under simple deposit monopsony.
The findings of Subsection 3.5.2 therefore directly allow to construct Figure 3.5. Quantitatively,
it then remains for the simple monopolist j to ascertain how much to lift rL,j above a given rD
by determining aggregate capital needs based on agents’ optimal behavior:
28If borrowers decided upon the firm size themselves, they would optimize k based on rL,j and, for rD ≤
r¯L,j (rD), choose k
¡
rL,j
¢
with k
¡
rL,j
¢
≤ k (rD) because of rL,j ≥ rD.
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(i) For 1 ≤ rD ≤r
¯
, all agents exert effort. A share of agents G (k (rL,j)) leverages k (rD),
whereas [1-G (k (rD))] self-finances k (rD) and deposits any remainder. All others autarkically
invest wi.
(ii) For r
¯
< rD ≤ r¯L, there is some credit rationing. Therefore, a fraction of agents
G (min {ω (rL,j) , k0 (rL,j)}) is left to leverage non-effort firms of size k0 (rD) only. While
[G (ω (rL,j)) -G (min {G (ω (rL,j)) , k0 (rD)})] self-finances non-effort firms of size k0 (rD) and de-
posits the remainder, [G (min {ω (rL,j) , k0 (rD)}) -G (k0 (rL,j))] runs autarkic non-effort firms of
size wi. [1-G (k (rD))] diligently self-finances k (rD) and deposits the rest. Finally, [G (k (rL,j)) -
G (ω (rL,j))] leverages k (rD). All others autarkically and diligently invest wi.
(iii) For r¯L < rD ≤ r¯D, leveraged effort firms do not pay. That is why a share of agents
G (k0 (rL,j)) shirkingly leverages k0 (rD). [G (k0 (rD)) -G (min {w˜, k0 (rD)})] runs autarkic effort
and [G (min {(k0 (rD)) , w˜})−G (k0 (rL,j))] autarkic non-effort firms of size wi. Depositing any
remainder, [1-G (k (rD))] diligently self-finances k (rD) and [G (k (rD)) -G (k0 (rD))] shirkingly
self-finances k0 (rD).
(iv) For rD > r¯D, all agents shirk. A share of agents G (k0 (rL,j)) leverages k0 (rD), whereas
[1-G (k0 (rD))] self-finances k0 (rD) and deposits any remainder. All others autarkically invest
wi.
Sectionwisely summing up loan demand Dj (rL,j) allows to rewrite the object function in
Definition 3.6 as
max
rL,j
Πj = [rL,j − rD]Dj (rL,j) . (3.30)
It displays the monopolist’s trade-off: increasing the loan rate rL,j at the cost of not only
minimizing the pool of loan applicants (think alone of dk¯2/drL,j < 0), but also worsening
the mix of loan applicants (ω0 (rL,j) > 0). Effort provision pays off for fewer agents than
before, so that the monopolist diminishes their capital input by k (rD)− k0 (rD).29 Therefore,
D0j (rL,j) < 0 for all rL,j . The interior solution satisfies the FOC dΠj/drL,j = 0. It simplifies
to an intuitive pricing formula for choosing r∗L,j as a function of rD:
r∗L,j +Dj
¡
r∗L,j
¢
/D0j
¡
r∗L,j
¢
= rD. (3.31)
Thus, the monopolist’s loan demand soars until the marginal total return from lending out an
additional unit of loan (LHS) just equals rD, i.e. the given cost of raising an additional unit
of deposit (RHS).30 As Dj
¡
r∗L,j
¢
/D0j
¡
r∗L,j
¢
< 0, the monopolist always realizes a positive,
wealth-dependent intermediation margin - even with the marginal borrower. (3.4) IRBL holds,
so ensuring that all borrowers get financed (π (w) = 1). However, in view of the downward
sloping demand curve Dj (rL,j), an increase in the loan volume must be accompanied by an
increase in the number or size of leveraged firms. For both, rL,j must decline. Yet, as it equally
applies to all units of credit, each further marginal unit of credit costs less than the average.
For the marginal loan return to really be decreasing, it must be assumed that the loan demand
is convex in rL,j :31
Assumption 4: d
£
rL,j +Dj (rL,j) /D0j (rL,j)
¤
/drL,j < 0 (A4)
29If rL,j > r¯L, the second effect is missing, while the first is still present (dk¯1/drL,j < 0).
30Being an atomistic price-taker on the deposit market, the bank can always satisfy (3.5) AC.
31(A4) yields 2−Dj
¡
rL,j
¢
D00j
¡
rL,j
¢
/ [ D0j
¡
rL,j
¢
]2 and is negative if D00j
¡
rL,j
¢
> 0.
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Lemma 3.9 For a given deposit rate rD ≥ 1, the solution to the simple monopolist’s prob-
lem is to set a probability of financing π∗ (w) = 1, a loan rate r∗L,j = rD−Dj
¡
r∗L,j
¢
/D0j
¡
r∗L,j
¢
,
capital input levels k∗L = k (rD) and k
∗
L0 = k0 (rD), loan contracts CL (w) = (wi, f (k (rD)) −
r∗L,j [k (rD)− wi] /p) as well as CL0 (w) =
¡
wi, f (k (rD))− r∗L,j [k (rD)− wi] /q
¢
and a mini-
mum equity contribution ω
¡
r∗L,j
¢
= p/r∗L,j (p− q)−
£
pf (k (rD))− r∗L,jk (rD)
¤
/r∗L,j.
Furthermore, rewriting (3.31) gives the Lerner index of market power, according to which
a percentage markup of price over marginal costs equals one divided by the negative elasticity
of demand η, i.e. £
r∗L,j − rD
¤
/r∗L,j = Dj
¡
r∗L,j
¢
/r∗L,jD
0
j
¡
r∗L,j
¢
= −1/η. (3.32)
That is why the intermediation margin, and thus the deviation from the competitive price r∗C ,
increases with |η|, i.e. with a more inelastic and thus flatter demand schedule.32 Finally, (3.26)
and p/q > rL/rD for rL,j < r¯L restrict the percentage markup over price to
1/η < − (p− q) /p (whereby 0 > − (p− q) /p > −1).
3.5.3.1.2 Case 2: Discriminating Monopolist Not having to take into account the
price-volume relation of the simple monopolist, a discriminating monopolist adapts the loan
rate to the refinancing cost of rD that it takes as given from the national deposit market:
r∗L,j = rD. (A1) applies to self-financing and leveraged entrepreneurs alike, so that for e.g.
rD ≤ r¯, agent i with wi < k (rD) is put in the position of a potential borrower. For him, the
monopolist endogenously derives contractual agreements CL (w) and CL0 (w).
Having all the bargaining power and wanting to leave as few as possible to borrowers, the
discriminating lender chooses the maximal feasible initial contribution and the smallest feasible
transfer. He therefore makes (3.15) Nc and (3.13) IRL2 just binding and so comes up with a
take-it-or-leave-it offer to borrowers: kL = k (rD), wc = wi and t = f (wi). The bank appears
as the residual claimant of all marginal returns from leveraged projects. But substituting this
loan contract into (3.9) IC gives f (wi) ≥ 1/ (p− q) or
wi ≥ ew := f−1 (1/ (p− q)) . (3.33)
Accordingly, twi≥ ew = f (wi) only induces effort provision by borrowers who can put up wi ≥ ew.
All others shirk, which leaves the bank with three options for them: (i) assign k (rD) and
incite effort with twi< ew = 1/ (p− q) in order to satisfy (3.9) IC; (ii) assign k0 (rD) and accept
shirking with twi< ew,0 = f (wi) < twi< ew in order to further only satisfy (3.13) IRL2 or (iii) deny
a contract. As already ΠL,ji0 ≥ 0, the third option deprives the bank of non-negative profits,
which induces it to maximize the occurrence of financing (i.e. π (w) = 1). Given rD ≤ r¯, bank j
prefers the first to the second option for agent i with wi < ew, if it generates more per-contract
32The monopoly result qualitatively also holds for a Cournot oligopoly. Then, the RHS of (3.32) is multiplied
with the squared sum of market shares, implying that the higher the Herfindahl concentration measure, the
greater deviations from the competitive outcome.
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profits,33 i.e. if ΠL,ji ≥ ΠL,ji0 or
pf (k (rD))− rD [k (rD) -wi]− p/ (p-q)
≥ qf (k0 (rD))− rD [k0 (rD) -wi]− qf (wi) .
(3.34)
On top exploiting that p/ (p− q) = pf (w˜) = qf (w˜) + 1, yields
y (rD)− y0 (rD) ≥ 1 + q [f (w˜)− f (wi)] . (3.35)
We see that the lower rD and the higher wi respectively, the rather (3.35) holds for wi < ew.34
Rearranging (3.35) gives
ψ (rD) := wi ≥ f−1 (f (w˜)− [y (rD)− y0 (rD)− 1] /q) (3.36)
as the critical wealth level ψ (rD) ≤ w˜, above which the bank offers effort contracts to wi < ew.
ψ (rD) behaves like (3.20) ω (rD) and also cuts the abscissa for some r
¯
ψ > 1. As however r
¯
ψ <r
¯
(so that ω(r
¯
ψ) < 0) and ψ (r¯) = w˜ (so that ψ (r¯) > ω (r¯)), we get that ψ (rD) > ω (rD) for all
rD ∈
¡
r
¯ψ
, r¯
¤
. Overall, a discriminating monopolist exacerbates the rationing threshold relative
to competitive banks. The reason is that the discriminating monopolist’s return from an effort
contract with an agent, who would not provide effort in an autarkic firm, is increasing in his
wealth. Like the social planner, the discriminating monopolist also seeks to avoid excessive
aggregate effort provision among the entrepreneurs it finances, since it keeps their marginal
project returns. Yet unlike the social planner and irrespective of the wealth distribution, it
rations poor borrowers already on a per-contract basis for rD ∈
¡
r
¯ψ
, rˆp
¤
. This owes to the fact
that it fails to internalize the capital reallocation benefit stemming from the equalization of
MPCs across firms with a concave production function.
The solution to agents’ contracting problem can nevertheless be read from Figure 3.3, but
with ψ (rD) instead of the correlative ω curve. All in all, the bank behaves as follows:
Lemma 3.10 For a given deposit rate rD ≥ 1, the solution to the discriminating monopo-
list’s problem is r∗L,j = rD, w
∗
c = wi, π
∗ (w) = 1 and:
(i) If rD ≤ r
¯ψ
(with r
¯
ψ <r
¯
< rˆp), assign borrowers i with wi < k (rD) effort firms of size
k∗L = k (rD) only and pay t
∗
wi≥ ew = f (wi) to those with w˜ ≤ wi < k (rD) and t∗wi< ew = 1/ (p-q)
to all others.
(ii) If r
¯
ψ < rD ≤ r¯, implement rationing: only borrowers i with wi ≥ ψ (rD) are assigned
effort firms of size k∗L = k (rD), of whom those with wi ∈ [w˜, k (rD)) get t∗wi≥ ew = f (wi) and
all others t∗wi< ew = 1/ (p-q). Borrowers i with wi < ψ (rD) are assigned non-effort firms of size
k∗L0 = k (rD) and get t
∗
wi< ew,0 = f (wi).
(iii) If rD > r¯, assign borrowers i with wi < k0 (rD) non-effort firms of size k∗L0 = k0 (rD)
only and pay t∗0 = f (wi).
33The discriminating monopolist decides on a per-contract basis. Taking rD as given, it neither faces a
procurement problem, nor does it internalize effort firms’ pecuniary externality.
34It directly follows from (A1) that (3.35) holds for all wi ≥ ew.
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3.5.3.2 Capital Market Equilibrium and Aggregate Output
National deposit market clearing S (r∗D) = nDj
¡
r∗L,j (r
∗
D)
¢
determines an equilibrium deposit
rate r∗D. Owing to persistent asymmetric information, there is positive credit rationing. Hence,
r∗D and aggregate output depend on aggregate wealthW and its dispersion across agents G (w).
Beyond that, a simple monopoly drives a wealth-distribution-dependent wedge between
the deposit and the loan rate r∗L,j (r
∗
D) − r∗D ≥ 0. As compared to the competitive outcome
in Subsection 3.5.1, the spread induces autarkic production at inefficient scales and makes the
MPCe fluctuate across firms. The higher loan rate deteriorates credit rationing, whereas the
lower deposit rate scales up leveraged and self-financed firms. All that dampens aggregate out-
put. While the impact of banking market power on agents’ incomes is similar to that under
simple monopsony derived in Subsubsection 3.5.2.2, firm sizes vary less (as the bank makes
leveraged firms’ sizes dependent on its own refinancing costs rD). At last, higher wealth in-
equality c.p. tends to reduce the relative magnitude of the return rate spread. Distributive
policies augmenting the mass of agents above the critical wealth threshold make deposits rel-
atively scarcer and put an upward pressure on rD. This directly leads to an equal increase in
r∗L,j (dr
∗
L,j (rD) /drD = 1 > 0) and depresses (3.32). This improves the output loss resulting
from monopoly power, so that the outcome tends towards the competitive result in Subsection
3.5.1. However, the return wedge impedes first-best efficiency when there is no credit rationing
and constrained efficiency when there is credit rationing, except for in a unique parameter con-
stellation. As specified below, constrained efficient aggregate surplus can then be achieved or
even surpassed. There is again scope for distributive measures, as these affect the fraction of
agents who cannot comply with the crucial wealth requirement and thus get rationed.
A discriminating monopolist, instead, involves no return rate spread and no autarkic
firms, so that the MPCe gets equalized across production units. Even though only moral
hazard frictions remain, the equilibrium only qualitatively mimics the competitive equilibrium
summarized in Proposition 3.3. In quantitative relations, the rationing threshold gets reinforced,
so that ψ (rD) > ω (rD) dampens the equilibrium rate of return, aggregate output and aggregate
effort costs. Besides, the allocation of the output differs. While the total borrower rent accrues
to the bank, depositors earn lower capital, but higher project incomes. Taken altogether,
the allocation does not [resp. does] reach constrained [resp. first-best] efficiency in the presence
[resp. absence] of credit rationing. Even though the appropriation of all marginal project returns
makes the discriminating monopolist improve on the constrained outcome for r∗D ∈
¡
r
¯ψ
, r¯
¢
, it
still cannot always automatically achieve first-best. In fact, calculating on a per-contract basis
prevents it from taking into account the wealth distribution and from internalizing effort firms’
pecuniary externality on the return rate that it takes as given.
Proposition 3.5 In a capital market equilibrium with moral hazard, a competitive de-
posit and monopoly loan market, the deposit and loan rate r∗D and r
∗
L,j are as follows:
(i) In case of a simple monopolist, the return rate wedge r∗L,j (r
∗
D) − r∗D > 0 and r∗D
s.t. S (r∗D) = nDj(r
∗
L,j (r
∗
D)) depend on aggregate wealth W and its distribution G (w). The
allocation neither reaches first-best, nor constrained efficiency - except for if r∗D ∈ (r¯ , r¯L,j)
[resp. r∗D ∈ (r¯L,j , r¯D]] and if there are too few non-effort firms under competition relative to
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first-best G (ω (r∗C)) < αˆ (W ). Then, constrained-efficient aggregate surplus obtains if efficiency
gains from the higher share of non-effort firms G
¡
ω
¡
r∗L,j (r
∗
D)
¢¢
> G (ω (r∗C)) [resp. G (w˜) >
G (ω (r∗C))] outweigh efficiency losses from the return rate wedge.
(ii) In case of a discriminating monopolist, Proposition 3.3 applies, but with ψ (rD) >
ω (rD): If either pf 0 (W ) ≤r
¯
ψ (with r
¯
ψ <r
¯
< rˆp) or qf 0 (W ) ≥ r¯, the allocation reaches first-best
efficiency. Otherwise, it improves on constrained efficiency, but only reaches first-best efficiency
if G (ψ (r∗D)) equals the first-best share of non-effort firms αˆ (W ).
3.5.4 Discriminating Monempory
In the light of the previous results, we now immediately confine our attention to a discriminating
monemporistic bank.
3.5.4.1 Monempory Financial Contracts and Individual Decisions
As the monemporist is the only bank in the economy, it perfectly controls contract conclusion
with agents on the deposit and loan market alike.
Definition 3.7 Given aggregate wealth pf (W ) ≤ r¯, self-financers’ optimal investments k (r)
and k0 (r), beliefs B(Cˆ (w)) and Lemma 3.3, deposit contracts CD (w) = (R (w)) as well as effort
and non-effort loan contracts CL (w) = (wc, t) and CL0 (w) = (wc, t0) are discriminating
monempory equilibrium contracts if they solve the following problem of the bank: maximize
total expected profits Π by setting a cut-off return rate r to separate depositors i with wi ∈
(k (r) , w¯] from borrowers with wi ∈ [0, k (r)). On the deposit side, choose a total depositor
remuneration R (w). On the loan side, fix a wealth constraint υ (r) and contributions wc, the
identity of borrowers to be leveraged (π (w) = 1 and 0 if not), capital effort and non effort
inputs kL and kL0 as well as effort and non-effort transfers t and t0:
max
r,R(w),υ(r),t,t0,wc,kL,kL0,π(w)
Π =
R υ(r)
0
π (w) [qf (kL0)− t0] g (w) dw
+
R k(r)
υ(r) π (w) [pf (kL)− t] g (w) dw −
R w
k(r)R (w) g (w) dw
(3.37)
s.t. (k, e,wd, ws) = B(Cˆ (w)), (3.3) IRBD, (3.4) IR
B
L , (3.5) AC
B,
(3.9) IC, (3.10) IRD1, (3.11) IRD2, (3.13) IRL2, (3.14) ND and (3.15) Nc.
The monemporist’s calculus combines insights from Subsections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3: Being a dis-
criminating deposit monopsonist, the monemporist leaves depositors with their outside option
only. Thus, Lemma 3.8 applies w.r.t. R∗ (w). On top being a discriminating loan market monop-
olist, the monemporist also leaves borrowers with their outside option only. That is why Lemma
3.10 reemerges w.r.t. π∗ (w) = 1, k∗L = k (r), k
∗
L0 = k0 (r), t
∗
wi≥ ew = t∗wi< ew,0 = t∗0 = f (wi) and
t∗wi< ew = 1/ (p− q). The existence of double-sided market power, however, earns the bank an
additional advantage: it can freely choose r.
Against this background, (3.37) reduces to:
max
r,υ(r)
Π =
R υ(r)
0
[qf (k0 (r))− f (w)] g (w) dw +
R k(r)
υ(r) pf (k (r)) g (w) dw
−
R ew
υ(r) 1/ (p-q) g (w) dw −
R k(r)ew f (w) g (w) dw − R wk(r)R (w) g (w) dw (3.38)
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s.t. (3.5) ACB : W = G (υ (r)) k0 (r) + [1−G (υ (r))] k (r)
Irrespective of the wealth distribution, t∗wi≥ ew = t∗wi< ew,0 = t∗0 = f (wi) makes the monemporist
always fix the rationing threshold υ (r) at the most at w˜. But how much will the monemporist
cut υ (r) below w˜? For this to see, emanate from some r˙ and υ (r˙) = w˜. Then, relax rationing
by making a single borrower with wi < w˜ open an effort firm instead of a non-effort firm. On
the one hand, this generates additional expected gains from effort (p > q) and from the larger
capital input (k > k0). On the other hand, it causes additional costs from a higher expected
transfer t∗wi< ew > t∗wi< ew,0 as well as from the monemporist’s increased financial needs ensued by
this additional effort firm (k > k0). Yet, in order to attract more deposits, the monemporist
must induce agents to scale down their firm sizes. This requires him to raise r˙ to r¨ s.t. with
υ (r˙) > υ (r¨), it still holds that k (r¨) = [W −G (υ (r¨)) k0 (r¨)] / [1−G (υ (r¨))]. This, in turn, sets
free a capital reallocation benefit. Owing to the production function’s concavity, a higher r
reduces the difference in size between an effort and non-effort firm firm. What follows is a surge
in aggregate output Y and so also in the total output produced from the monemporist’s pool
of leveraged projects. That is how the discriminating monopolist follows the social planner in
internalizing effort firms’ pecuniary externality on the return rate and thus on the profitability
of effort provision.
Confronting the various effects gives
pf (k (r¨))− r¨ [k (r¨) -wi]− p/ (p-q) ≥ qf (k0 (r˙))− r [k0 (r˙) -wi]− qf (wi) , (3.39)
where r¨ > r˙. Substituting p/ (p− q) = qf (w˜) + 1, simplifies (3.39) to
y (r¨)− y0 (r˙) ≥ 1 + q [f (w˜)− f (wi)] . (3.40)
Consequently, the monemporist applies the following strategy: It sorts agents i with wi < w˜
according to their wealth endowments in descending order and, from the top down, assigns effort
contracts to agent after agent as long as (3.40) holds.35 In each round, gradually increasing net
effort transfers 1/ (p-q)−wi and cut-off financing costs r require the bank to adapt investment
levels k and k0 and to recalculate (3.40). That is how υ∗ (r) = argmaxΠ arises as the cut-off
wealth level for which (3.40) just becomes binding.36 υ∗ (r) becomes zero for r
¯
υ with r
¯
υ ≤ rˆp.
On these grounds, we obtain the optimal cut-off return rate r∗MM as the return rate that ensures
the satisfaction of the availability constraint (3.5).37
Lemma 3.11 The solution to the discriminating monemporist’s problem is to behave, on
the deposit side, as characterized in Lemma 3.8 and, on the loan side, as described in Lemma
3.10 - although for the following refinement: additionally choose υ∗ (r) = argmaxΠ and r∗MM
s.t. (3.5) ACB holds.
35The comparison of (3.40) with (3.35) shows that a double-sided discriminating monopolist sets a higher
rationing threshold than a one-sided, because it does not take r as given.
36The respective FOC is: dΠ/dυ=− [pf (k (r)) -qf (k0 (r))+f (υ (r)) -f ( ew)] g (υ (r)) υ0 (r) +
r
£
k0 (r)+k00 (r)
¤
g (w) + pf (k (r)) k0 (r) g (υ (r)) = 0.
37If at the edge, there are several agents with equal wealth, but only some of them shall get effort contracts,
the bank (in the sense of Definition 3.1) picks each agent with equal probability.
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On the one side, there is an upper bound of rationing: υ∗ (r∗MM ) ≤ w˜. On the other side, it
follows from (3.40) that υ∗ (r∗MM ) is the lower: (i) the larger the capital reallocation benefit (i.e.
the steeper f), (ii) the lower the effort-inducing transfer 1/ (p-q), (iii) the higher the wealth of
borrowers i with wi < w˜ for whom the participation-inducing transfer is lower than the effort-
inducing transfer (i.e. f (wi) < 1/ (p− q)), (iv) the higher W and (v) the higher the wealth of
depositors i with wi > k (r) (as that lowers total deposit and thus refinancing costs).
3.5.4.2 Capital Market Equilibrium and Aggregate Output
Simultaneously controlling both sides of the capital market allows the monemporist to choose
r∗MM and so to equalize the capitalization of all firms. In view of the effort costs it bears via
effort-inducing transfers, it chooses a positive rationing level. Depending on the parameter
constellation and as compared to the competitive outcome in Subsection 3.5.1, there can be
more, just the same or less credit rationing with the accordant impact on the equilibrium market
rate of return and aggregate output.
Yet unlike any other bank, the monemporist is able to take advantage of the capital re-
allocation benefit owing to f ’s concavity and of the internalization of effort firms’ pecuniary
externality on aggregate effort provision via their impact on the equilibrium return rate. This
makes the monemporist choose a scope of credit rationing G (υ∗ (r∗MM )) that improves on the
constrained efficient level G (ω (r∗C)) w.r.t. aggregate surplus. G (υ
∗ (r∗MM )) converges towards
the first-best efficient level αˆ (W ) and, depending on the wealth distribution, might even attain
αˆ (W ). That is how first-best efficiency might be restored by discriminating double-sided mar-
ket power despite asymmetric information and a coordination failure among borrowers. Having
to respect agents’ incentive and participation constraints, the monemporist essentially behaves
like a discriminating non-omniscient, non-repressive social planner.
Proposition 3.6 In a capital market equilibrium with moral hazard and a discrimi-
nating monemporist, the return rate r∗MM is as follows:
(i) If either pf 0 (W ) ≤r
¯
υ (with r
¯
υ ≤ rˆp) or qf 0 (W ) ≥ r¯, first-best efficiency obtains: r∗MM
only depends on aggregate wealth W and Proposition 3.1 reapplies accordingly.
(ii) Otherwise, there is credit rationing υ∗ (r∗MM ) > 0, which makes r
∗
MM dependent on ag-
gregate wealth W and its distribution G (w). A share of agents G (υ∗ (r∗MM )) shirkingly invests
k0 (r∗MM ), whereas all others diligently invest k (r
∗
MM ). Irrespective of G (w), the allocation im-
proves on constrained efficiency captured by the share of non-effort firms G (ω∗ (r∗C)). Although
contingent on G (w), the allocation tends towards or even reaches first-best efficiency captured
by the share of non-effort firms αˆ (W ). Thus, |αˆ (W )−G (υ∗ (r∗MM ))| < |αˆ (W )−G (ω∗ (r∗C))|.
Yet, efficiency gains do not come for free, but at the cost of agents being left with their
respective reservation payoffs only. Compared to all other banking regimes, monemporistic
bank profits are the highest and agents’ incomes the lowest. As average deposit costs are lower
than r∗MM and decreasing in inequality, total deposit costs are the lower, the more unequal the
distribution of wealth. With total loan costs similarly declining with richer self-financers, all
agents’ incomes are lower than under any other discriminating regime.
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3.5.5 Double-Sided Competition
Perceiving banks as intermediaries that, as Stewart (1770) puts it, ”buy and sell again from a
principle of gain”, draws attention to double-sided competition.38 Banks compete by simulta-
neously offering deposit and loan contracts, whilst ensuring to get both on board, depositors
and borrowers. This makes banks’ capacity constraint (3.5) binding and uncovers a chicken-
and-egg problem: a bank cannot loan out more funds than it acquired and makes losses if it
acquired more funds than it loans out. As derived by Yanelle (1989, 1997) and Stahl (1988),
this induces banks to corner one market in order to gain market power on the other. Unlike
with single-sided Bertrand competition, the equilibrium may then not be a Walrasian anymore.
Looking at our model through this strategic lens directly reveals that banks’ lending activity
is constrained by the total volume of available funds (remember (A2) W < k (1)). Any inter-
mediary therefore has an incentive to increase the deposit rate in order to capture the whole
supply of funds, so emerging as the only supplier of credit. This allows to charge monopoly
loan rates and, in turn, to pay higher deposit rates. For this reason, intermediaries overbid each
other until profits from intermediation are completely eroded. Only one intermediary survives
and is active in the end. Albeit making zero profits, it sets a deposit and a loan rate that both
exceed the competitive rate and hence the opportunity costs of funds. This also causes autarkic
production. After all, the outcome with a simple monopolist in Subsection 3.5.3 arises,39 but
with a different division of the surplus: bank profits are zero and the total surplus accrues to
depositors at the cost of creditors.
However, there are ways to disentangle the two markets in order to restore the Walrasian
outcome (and hence the outcome of Subsection 3.5.1). Ueda (2006) finds that the existence of
an interbank market and the possibility of free recontracting break the crucial link between the
source and the use of funds. By placing any excess deposits or raising deficit funds for credit, it
allows banks to smoothly satisfy their capacity constraint. Alternatively, one could assign the
task of a price-anchor to a state-owned bank. This requires endowing it with sufficient funds
for preventing the rD-rL-bidding-up-spirale from occurring. They deprive private banks of the
much needed margin for being able to bid-up rD (and in turn rL). In fact, the state-owned
bank could still loan out funds at rate rL = r∗ and subsidize the acquisition of funds at rate
rD > r∗.
3.6 Comparison and Policy Implications
The analysis offers valuable insights into the functioning of capital markets, especially for
r ∈ (r
¯
, r¯). The framework also allows to derive and evaluate policies that are of vital interest
to policy makers and regulators. Yet with outcomes crucially hinging upon a subtle interplay
of bank competition and wealth inequality, any policy advice can only be specific to either a
particular banking regime or the prevailing wealth distribution.
38As in Subsection 3.5.1, hitherto models typically study Bertrand competition on both markets separately,
respectively taking the outcome of the other market as given.
39If banks on top perfectly price-discriminated, the monemporist’s allocation in Subsection 3.5.4 would
reemerge. Yet, all bank profits would accrue to depositors only.
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3.6.1 Credit Rationing, Firm Sizes and Efficiency
In comparison to competition, simple market power -be it on the deposit or loan side- translates
into higher loan rates and so further aggravates credit rationing. High inequality and dis-
criminating market power, instead, may alleviate these effects. While the first cuts the scope for
price setting, the second removes the return rate wedge. After having equalized the deposit and
loan rate, a discriminating deposit monopsony rations credit as much as a competitive bank,
whereas a discriminating loan monopolist still rations more. There are, however, parameter
constellations, under which the juxtaposition of discriminative power on both sides of the mar-
ket results in a first-best level of credit rationing and so implements first-best effort provision.
Yet, unlike under first-best, the identity of effort entrepreneurs is wealth-dependent.
Besides that, agents’ willingness and ability to borrow determine firm sizes.40 Informa-
tional frictions cause credit rationing, which makes an effort and a non-effort firm size coexist
- just as under first-best for market return rates r∗C ∈ (r¯ , r¯). After having added simple market
power (or intermediation costs), the dispersion of firm sizes soars. The return rate spread not
only incites different capitalizations of self-financed and borrowing firms, but also encourages
the formation of autarkic firms of size wi. As discriminating market power involves no return
rate spread, there are no autarkic firms. Firm size variations subside to the competitive level
again.
Taken altogether, the existence of asymmetric information causes credit rationing under
competition. In substance, it works on efficiency like the social planner’s quotas for non-effort
firms. The allocation reaches constrained, but not first-best efficiency.41 Simple market power
regimes generally fall even short of achieving constrained efficiency (with monopsony power
being worse than monopoly power). Under certain parameter constellations, however, credit
rationing -especially if reinforced by banking market power- helps to improve allocative efficiency
since it boosts aggregate surplus. Contrariwise, a discriminating double-sided monopoly takes
into account the wealth distribution and so always improves on constrained efficiency. If it
fails to restore first-best efficiency, no other banking regime can do so without the correlative
distributive measures.
3.6.2 Incomes, Equity Concerns and Distributive Policies
Although high efficiency regimes create more aggregate surplus, they counteract high and fairly
distributed individual incomes. Banking market power cuts agents’ incomes. Due to a lower
outside option, it leaves the poor relatively more impoverished than the rich. That is how a
role for the state arises from the necessity to accompany the assignment of market power by
distributive policies of bank profits. Under certain conditions, it might pay off to establish
40Different firm sizes are in line with a core insight from the corporate finance literature: a firm’s value also
depends on the way it is financed (see e.g. Harris and Raviv, 1991).
41Remark that e.g. Piketty (1997) or Aghion and Bolton (1997) target efficiency in terms of aggregate output.
Then, moral-hazard-induced credit rationing and banking market power have adverse effects only as they both
refrain aggregate output. This, however, owes to the neglect of effort as a costly production input, so that
aggregate output indeed fails to capture productive efficiency across all production inputs.
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a state-owned bank as a discriminating monempory.42 Indeed, we saw that the monemporist
behaves like a discriminating social planner, who has neither access to perfect information, nor
the power to force agents to participate. It could not only improve on efficiency in order to
enlarge the pie,43 but also redistribute its profits via lump-sum transfers back to the agents.
This would on top meet equity concerns.
Moreover, this paper’s results imply that the impact of political wealth redistribution
on efficiency depends on the banking regime. Its use and design have to be geared to stimulate
aggregate surplus by making the scope of credit rationing copy the first-best quota of non-effort
firms. That is how aggregate effort costs can appropriately be managed. In this context, a
reduction in inequality (i.e. in the wealth held by the rich) would help to reduce aggregate effort
costs via an increased scope of rationing (and vice versa). Moreover, under simple monopsony
and monopoly, a reduction in inequality can be utilized to contain the bank’s market power
and so to lower the relative magnitude of the return rate wedge. Finally, under discriminating
monempory, wealth redistribution from the rich to the very poor decreases the lender’s costs
of inducing effort and may strengthen the lender’s effort contract supply to those otherwise
credit-constrained agents.
3.6.3 Growth
Dynamizing the model by linking generations via bequests (as done in Chapter 2 of this thesis
for a competitive capital market) emphasizes the role of the state outlined above. Credit
rationing, banking market power and unredistributed bank profits alike refrain growth, since
they dampen aggregate output. That hinders the creation and accumulation of wealth within
and over generations, which makes inequality become persistent. In the extreme, this might
even lead to poverty traps.44 This paper, instead, qualifies this conclusion, as it shows that high
aggregate output might not always be associated with high aggregate surplus. Thus, higher
growth might only be achievable at the expense of agents’ aggregate income. That is how the
competitive banking regime tends to imply inefficient growth because of an inefficient provision
of costly effort. Market power might then mitigate these adverse effects - provided that bank
profits are completely redistributed to the agents via lump-sum transfers. The outcome would
then also quicker attain first-best inequality.45 After all, any assignment of banking market
power loses its efficiency-motivated right to exist, as soon as W and G (w) are s.t. competitive
banks would always implement the first-best allocation of capital and effort.
In the light of this paper’s results, some growth-facilitating policies appear counterproduc-
42Needless to say that if all commonly enumerated deficiencies of state banks were taken into account (above
all e.g. an inefficient bureaucracy), these costs would have to be confronted with the benefits created in the
context modelled here.
43A coexistence of a state-owned discriminating monopoly bank with competitive private banks is pointless.
The first would be left with agents that got credit-constrained by private banks and could not break even from
serving them. That owes to these agents’ outside option: starting non-effort firms, for which they get sufficient
funds from private banks. Hence, private banks would have to be legally prevented from offering non-effort
contracts, so that the best outside-option of credit-constrained agents would be autarkic production.
44Unlike Piketty (1997), we find the existence of credit-constrained net lenders. As they profit of high interest
rates, which countervails the poor’s pauperization (see Chapter 2 of this thesis).
45Inequality will, however, never vanish, because project outcomes are stochastic.
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tive. For instance, promoting savings could have fatal effects with an uncompetitive interme-
diary sector. Similarly, credit market liberalization, which deprives banks of discriminating
power, could intensify credit rationing.
3.6.4 Bankruptcy Rates
Finally, in order to see that low bankruptcy rates do not necessarily go in hand with high
aggregate surplus, consider the aggregate level of bankruptcy b. Its first-best level amounts
to bˆ = αˆ (W ) (1− q) + (1− αˆ (W )) (1− p). With moral hazard in a competitive regime, its
constrained-efficient level becomes
b∗C (G (w)) = G (ω (r
∗
C)) (1− q) + [1−G (ω (r∗C))] (1− p) ,
which is lower [resp. higher] than first-best for αˆ (W ) > G (ω (r∗C)) [resp. αˆ (W ) < G (ω (r
∗
C))].
Across all banking regimes, b is negatively correlated with a reduction in the mass of agents
that comply with the wealth constraint ω and positively with banking market power.46
3.7 Conclusion
Wealth requirements are often taken as a generic property of credit markets afflicted with
asymmetric information. They provide the ground for wealth inequality to hamper the creation
of wealth and the spread of opportunities. This paper challenges this view by adding market
power as an additional source of friction and by studying their subtle interplay. Thereby, it
targets efficiency in terms of aggregate surplus, since -unlike e.g. aggregate output- it properly
includes visible and invisible production input costs alike. The findings highlight the sensitivity
of the credit rationing literature’s typical results to the targeted economic measures as well as to
assumptions about the capital market’s competitive structure. Consequently, Knight’s (1923)
causal trilogy of ”inheritance, luck and effort” must indeed be amended by banking market
power. Moreover, the paper implicitly explains varying firm sizes and bankruptcy rates.
The World Bank’s 2006 World Development Report argues that in the long term, efficiency
and equity are best seen as complements, not substitutes. Equity is identified as being ”impor-
tant not just for its own sake, but also because it can enhance growth and poverty reduction”.
This paper theoretically qualifies this view. It does not only help to put into perspective many
commonly propagated policies, but provides a new and concrete way of mitigating the under-
lying problem: imposing an appropriate competitivity structure of the capital market, whilst
taking care of the allocation of eventual bank profits back to the agents. Moral-hazard-induced
credit rationing thereby unfolds an efficiency-enhancing potential as it contains aggregate effort
provision and thus the aggregate costs of the unobservable production input. Already under
competition, the scope of credit rationing was found to be the more pronounced, the smaller
aggregated wealth, the more unequal the distribution of wealth, the steeper the production
function and the higher moral hazard costs. Simple banking market power tends to further
46Also Buraschi and Hao (2004) obtain that simple monopoly leads to less lending and higher entrepreneurial
bankruptcy rates than competition.
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tighten rationing, but also entails a deadweight loss owing to a return rate wedge. The net
effect on efficiency depends on the parameter constellation and the wealth distribution. Dis-
tributive policies might therefore help to manage aggregate effort provision and so to foster
aggregate surplus. While discriminating monopsony market power restores constrained effi-
ciency of the competitive banking regime, discriminating monopoly power improves on it. The
scope of improvement, however, crucially depends on the wealth distribution. In contrast, bene-
fitting from a capital reallocation effect and internalizing a pecuniary externality of effort firms,
a monemporist is induced to fully take into account the wealth distribution. Among all banking
regimes, it so improves the most on constrained efficiency for any given wealth distribution and
is the most likely to attain first-best efficiency.
How to incorporate further aspects of financial intermediation into this setting -e.g. multi-
tool contracts (i.e. contracts that also include e.g. project monitoring), adverse selection prob-
lems (e.g. heterogeneous, but not publicly observable production technologies), additional sources
of financing (e.g. direct financing, venture capitalists or informal moneylenders), multi-stage fi-
nancing or relationship lending- remains a challenge that needs to be met in future research.
For instance, heterogeneous project qualities would trigger a second-degree price discrimina-
tion role for the risky debt contract. In addition to perfectly discriminating agents according to
their initial wealth, the monopoly intermediary would then want to design a schedule of debt
contracts that induces self-selection by entrepreneurs. Moreover, the integration into a dynamic
setting could help to shed more light on the interdependence of the wealth distribution and the
banking system. This would not only enhance our understanding of the relation between the
real and the financial sector, but also of the evolution of financial systems and the derivation
of an optimal dynamic path of regulation.
Chapter 4
The Real Consequences of
Financial Market Integration
when Countries Are
Heterogeneous
4.1 Introduction
Retrospectively, international financial integration appears to have been the rule rather than the
exception over the last centuries. Temporary interruptions mainly arose from the major wars
and the Great Depression in the 1930s. While each time, the process was rather spontaneously
spurred on anew by the prospect of gains from trade, financial integration has just recently
gained a more powerful momentum. Ongoing regional financial integration (i.e. within the EU
or ASEAN), GATS negotiations under the auspices of the WTO and the burgeoning emergence
of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) including provisions on financial services trade have
not only put pressure on the speed of integration, but also on the broadening of the markets
involved, in terms of both, geographical scope and the number of financial assets.1
Despite this long history and growing interest among economists and policy makers alike,
external financial liberalization still constitutes a controversial issue. Based on assumed differ-
ences in the marginal product of capital across countries, standard economic theory promises
benefits for developing and developed countries alike. While the first use capital inflows to
speed up the convergence process, the second enjoy higher returns on capital and risk reduc-
tion through enhanced portfolio diversification (see e.g. Stulz, 2005 or Eichengreen and Mussa,
1998). On the other hand, financial openness bears many risks for financial stability and must
therefore be accompanied by a range of costly safeguard measures (see e.g. Schmukler, 2003 or
Fischer, 1997). All the more is it a matter of dispute that many of the predicted gains in welfare
1Also see e.g. Lothian (2001) and a survey by Chivakul, Cosse´ and Gerling (2007).
55
56 CHAPTER 4. FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION
and growth have not always come to pass. As examined by the European Commission (2006),
improvements in both, competition and efficiency have been limited despite a fully integrated
EU capital market and quasi unrestricted financial services trade since 1996. Also growth (see
e.g. the review by Edison et al., 2002) and the associated flows of capital from capital-abundant
to capital-scarce countries have picked-up less than expected. Prasad et al. (2003, 2006) obtain
that despite very few de jure restrictions to capital movements, effective external financing
remains at very low levels in most African countries. With their analysis suggesting a positive
correlation between a country’s state of financial development and access to foreign financing,
they conclude that a low financial development causes a lack of absorptive capacities for capital
inflows from abroad.
The purpose of this paper is to identify the origins of lacking absorptive capacities without
drawing on differences in the state of financial development or the degree of financial market
competition.2 Attempting to reconcile theory and evidence, it studies the impact of inter-
national financial integration coming not only from countries’ capital endowments, but also
from its distribution among residents in the presence of capital market imperfections. For this
purpose, this paper recurs to a simple capital market model featuring a concave production
technology and wealth heterogeneity among agents. These seek external financing to optimally
capitalize a venture. Yet, with credit relationships being subject to a variety of agency and con-
tractual enforcement problems, the lender can only recover a fraction of the project output if the
borrower defaults. The lender therefore requires the borrower to put up a collateral. Although
it ensures incentive-compatibility, it also makes the insufficiently wealthy agents credit-rationed.
They are denied credit and left to open self-financed firms at suboptimal scales. This dampens
aggregate capital demand and depresses the domestic equilibrium market rate of return. When
two countries now get financially integrated by mutually allowing their residents to borrow and
lend across their common borders without any restrictions, domestic market rates of return
get equalized. The associated domestic interest rate change gives rise to either reinforcing or
competing forces in the form of a firm size and a credit rationing effect. The first is negatively
correlated to the rate of return, whereas the second changes sign. That is why the parameter
constellation and the direction of the interest rate change matter for assessing the impact on
domestic net credit positions and aggregate productions. Their sum finally gives a country’s
GNP. Its change serves as an overall measure of the beneficence of financial integration.
Against this background, the paper studies, in which constellations it pays off for countries
to pursue financial integration. The main finding is that although it must be overall benefi-
cial, participating countries may still be adversely affected. Consequences occur through two
channels: international capital flows and, more unexpectedly, changes in the scope of domestic
credit rationing. That is why not only a country’s aggregate wealth, but also its distribution
matters, especially in comparison to its partner country. After having identified the pattern of
international capital flows and the allocation of capital, this paper shows that gains normally
2I thank Fernando Alvarez, Hans Peter Gru¨ner, Luigi Guiso, Hans Peter Lankes, Francesco Lippi, Fabiano
Schivardi, Elisabeth Schulte-Runne and Daniele Terlizzese as well as seminar participants at the Ente ”Luigi
Einaudi” for valuable discussions and helpful comments. Gratefully acknowledged are also the financial support
and hospitability of the Ente ”Luigi Einaudi” in Rome and the hospitability of the Trade Division in the Policy
Development and Review Department at the IMF in Washington D.C.
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only appear in a country, if financial integration sufficiently fosters capital exports or reduces
the level of efficiency-distorting credit rationing. That is how this paper also offers an expla-
nation of why widely observed large gaps in productivity and income per capita persist across
countries despite an equalization of the marginal return (see e.g. Banjeree and Duflo, 2005).
Moreover, this paper’s results are consistent with the consensus view in the literature on growth
and convergence that most of the income differences across countries can be attributed to differ-
ences in total factor productivity (also see Easterly and Levine, 2001 or Hall and Jones, 1999).
In this sense, this paper’s drivers are the either un- or equalizing force of the wealth-dependent
borrowing constraint and the equalizing force of the diminishing returns technology.
Five policy implications deserve emphasis. Financial integration might have ambiguous
welfare effects: first, across and second, within participating countries. Third, an optimal
theory of financial services trade liberalization arises, underlining that countries’ characteristics
might require different approaches to financial integration. Fourth, in order to avoid vicious
circles of beggar-thy-neighbor policies, all domestic policies affecting the level of credit rationing
must be banned or harmonized in supranational treaties on financial integration. Fifth, credit
rationing affects financial stability in integrated financial markets.
Altogether, this paper contributes to a growing literature on the costs and benefits of fi-
nancial integration. In a calibrated neoclassical model, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) receive
relative little welfare gains for a typical emerging market country. They conclude that large
effects might occur through other channels than capital flows. Others have presented possible
explanations for this phenomenon. Economic heterogeneity in the form of differing liquidity
across assets is at the root of the dual-liquidity model of emerging-market crisis presented by
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001). Emphasizing the interaction between domestic and inter-
national financial constraints, they show that entrepreneurs in less developed financial markets
tend to over-borrow and to under-provision collateral. This decreases foreign lenders’ incentives
to enter emerging markets and exacerbates the likelihood of financial crisis. Along similar lines,
Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2006) study how production efficiency depends on the degree of
capital account liberalization during the adjustment process after opening up. Whereas von
Hagen and Zhang (2006) identify unequal welfare implications to different domestic agents in a
small open economy. In order to smooth transition, they suggest a gradual sequencing of policy
implementation. Instead, this paper presents credit rationing and its impact on productive
efficiency as an additional effect of financial integration. It is therefore most closely related to
Matsuyama (2005, 2007). Extending earlier work by Gertler and Rogoff (1990), Barro et al.
(1995) and Boyd and Smith (1997), he was one of the first to consequently draw on capital
market imperfections as an explanation of why capital may be exported from poorer countries
in the South to richer ones in the North. This work however mainly differs in two respects.
First, in order to separate the impact of production non-convexities and capital market imper-
fections, it endogenizes the project size. Second, in order to study the macroeconomic impact
of wealth inequality, it allow for heterogeneous agents. This way accounting for the macroe-
conomic impact of wealth inequality allows to fill a gap in the hitherto literature on financial
integration. Empirical support also comes from micro level studies with financial integration
being found to affect entrepreneurship, firms’ capital costs and financing constraints (see e.g.
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Alfaro and Charlton, 2006; Chari and Herny, 2004; Harrison, Love and McMillian, 2004).
In contrast, the paper at hand abstracts from other channels that may affect the impact
of financial integration. Among these is e.g. the beneficial effect of risk sharing on the overall
efficiency of investment (see e.g. Obstfeld, 1994; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997 or Athanasoulis
and van Wincoop, 2000), capital mobility’s ability to mitigate the tragedy of the commons
on a common pool of resources (see Tornell and Velasco, 1992), policies enhancing openness
and competition (see e.g. Detragiache and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, 1999 or Kaminsky and Schmukler,
2003), foreign lender’s impact on the structure of lending contracts (see e.g. Alessandria and
Qian, 2005) or the impact of bank specialization on systemic risk via an integrated interbank
market (see e.g. Fecht, Gru¨ner and Hartmann, 2007).3
The paper is structured as follows. Based on the model presented in Section 4.2, Section
4.3 derives the capital market equilibrium under national autarky. Against this benchmark,
Section 4.4 assesses the impact of financial integration for a broad mix of country types. Section
4.5 extracts some policy implications, before Section 4.6 finally concludes. All Proofs are in
Appendix C.
4.2 The Model
Consider an endowment economy with a single good, which is populated with a continuum of
risk neutral agents i of mass one.
4.2.1 Agents, Endowments and Sequence of Events
The economy lasts for three dates. At date 0, agents are born as potential entrepreneurs,
who are endowed with initial wealth w and an investment project that requires a non-fixed
start-up cost k > 0. The first is the only source of heterogeneity among agents and assumed
to be continuously distributed according to G (w) on [0, w¯] ⊆ R+. Hence, aggregate wealth is
given by W =
R w¯
0
wg (w) dw and equal to average wealth. Aiming at maximizing their lifetime
income I, at date 1, agents can resort to the capital market: while some seek to raise further
funds for investment, others supply funds. At date 2, agents realize the returns of the initiated
investment projects and settle financial claims.
4.2.2 Production
The production technology F (K,L) exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to aggregate
capital K and labor L. All agents are prospective entrepreneurs. They can only work in their
own firm and have access to the same technology in order to undertake a single project, so that
F (K/L, 1) = f (k). It is strictly increasing and concave in the capital-labor ratio k = K/L (i.e.
f 0 > 0, f 00 < 0). It also satisfies the standard INADA conditions (i.e. f (0) = 0, f 0 (+0) = ∞,
f (∞) =∞ and f 0 (∞) = 0). Once sunk, k cannot be recovered.
3A more complete picture of the benefits and costs is e.g. provided by Age´nor (2003).
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4.2.3 Capital Market
Agents can always either remain self-financing entrepreneurs, who simply invest what they own
(i.e. k = wi), or costlessly store wealth. A capital market allows agents to smooth their financial
needs. On the one hand, there are borrowers, who are entrepreneurs that compete for others’
funds in order to leverage their firm’s capitalization (i.e. k > wi). On the other hand, there are
lenders, who are agents that seek to place funds that they do not want to store or to invest in
their own firm (i.e. k < wi).4
Given the prevailing market rate of return r, agents decide on how much to invest in the
project and on if to resort to the capital market. With a project profit of y (k) = f (k) − rk,
the optimal investment level, henceforth denoted k (r), amounts to
k (r) such that f 0 (k (r)) = r. (4.1)
Owing to f ’s functional characteristics, k (r) is strictly decreasing and convex in r. Also,
k (r)→ 0+ for r→∞, ensuring that y (k (r))→ 0+ for r →∞. Because of the storage option,
agents will never invest more than k (1) or lend for less than r = 1.
Also lenders take the market rate of return as given when they perfectly compete by their
offer of loan contracts. Hence, in equilibrium, only zero-profit contracts will be traded that
yield the same return to lenders: from investing k (r), a borrowing entrepreneur generates a
revenue f (k (r)), out of which he must pay r [k (r)− w] to the lender. Yet, capital market
efficiency is hampered by agency and enforcement problems. That is why a lender anticipates
that in case of the borrower’s default on his debt, he would only be able to capture a fraction
γ ∈ [0, 1] of the virtual project output f (k). γ can also be interpreted as the capital market’s
state of development. Moreover, limited liability prevents agents from ending up with negative
wealth at date 2. Thus, they cannot lend or invest more than they own or borrow more than
they produce.
The economy is closed, so that r arises from equalizing total capital demand D (r) and
supply S (r). Capital is scarce, i.e. aggregate wealth is not sufficient to let all agents make the
optimal investment in case of zero capital costs:
Assumption 1: W < k (1) . (A1)
4.3 Equilibrium under National Autarky
Based on individual optimal decisions, the capital market equilibrium is first derived for each
country under autarky. It then serves as a benchmark against which the outcome of full financial
integration will be assessed.
4.3.1 Credit Rationing and Individual Decisions
Given diminishing returns on capital investment and r ≥ 1, an agent i with wealth wi seeks to
become a borrower [resp. lender] if investing the last unit of his initial endowment would yield
4Neglect simultaneous borrowing and lending, since no agent can win from it in equilibrium.
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a higher [resp. lower] rate of return than that offered by the capital market. In view of the
participation constraint of the borrower (PCB) [resp. the lender (PCL)]
PCB: f 0 (wi) > r [resp. PCL: f 0 (wi) < 1 ≤ r], (4.2)
agents i with wi > k (r) will supply wi − k (r) at rate r on the capital market, whereas those
with wi < k (r) will want to raise k (r)− wi. Yet, the latter’s willingness to borrow might not
be sufficient to do so. Owing to capital market inefficiencies, they can only guarantee the lender
the effective rate of return r if the repayment is smaller than the recoverable output. That is
why a debt contract is only incentive compatible (IC) if
IC: r [k (r)− w] ≤ γf (k (r)) . (4.3)
Solving (IC) for the borrower’s wealth, gives
w ≥ ω (r) := k (r)− γf (k (r)) /r. (4.4)
ω (r) represents the borrower’s equity participation that the lender requires to break even. It
amounts to the difference between the sunk investment k (r) and the net present value (NPV )
of the pledgeable project output. As depicted below in Figure 4.1 and as derived in the Proof
of Lemma 4.1, ω (r) roughly resembles a parabola that opens downwards. It has a maximum
at r = r˙ , an inflexion point at r = r¨ and approaches the abscissa for r →∞.
Figure 4.1: Individual investment decisions given r and wi
Intuitively, ω (r)’s shape stems from two countervailing forces. First, as the fraction of the
project return the borrower has to share with his lender is increasing in r, his incentives to repay
the loan fall. This forces the lender to ask for a higher equity participation. Second, the higher
r, the smaller the optimal investment k (r) the agent is striving for, so that the smaller the
required external financing and thus the necessary stake of the borrower. It can be shown that
the first effect prevails as long as ηy,r < γ/ (1− γ) (and vice versa), where ηy,r > 0 denotes the
input price elasticity of output. Consequently, ω (r) is increasing in r as long as the percentage
change in output due to a percentage change in the market rate of return is sufficiently small.5
Likewise, ω (r) is found to become strictly convex as soon as ηy,r > 2/ [(1− γ) εk0,r/γ − 1],
5Remark that the better the capital market is developed (i.e. the larger γ), the smaller r˙.
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where εk0,r > 0 is the factor price elasticity of the optimal investment’s slope. Beyond that,
ω (r) → −∞ for r → 0, ω (r˙) > 0 and ω’s continuity in r fix a r (γ) ∈ (0, r˙) for any γ > 0
with dr (γ) /dγ > 0 such that ω (r) < 0 for r < r (γ). Assume for simplicity that γ and the
production technology are such that they ensure:6
Assumption 2: r (γ) > 1. (A2)
With regard to r and wi, agents decide as follows. Provided that r ≥ 1, agents i with wi ≥ k (r)
self-finance the optimal investment k (r) irrespective of r (area B) and lend any remainder.
Then, ω (r) ≤ 0 for 1 ≤ r ≤ r (γ), so that all agents i with wi < k (r) are empowered to
open firms at the efficient scale k (r) (area A). Whereas if r > r (γ), ω (r) > 0 and only
agents i with wi ≥ ω (r) get access to credit (area C). All others are credit-rationed (area
D), i.e. they are denied to tap other agents’ funds and find themselves hindered to realize the
optimal capitalization level.7 Note that these agents would have received sufficient credit under
first-best (i.e. in the absence of capital market imperfections when γ = 1). In view of (4.2)
PCB, credit-constrained agents still prefer running a self-financed firm of size k = wi < k (r)
to lending or storage. It makes them earn yc (r) = f (w)− rw. All in all:
Lemma 4.1 For a given market rate of return r ≥ 1, the solution to the individual financial
contracting problem has the following properties:
(i) For r ≤ r (γ), all agents i with wi < k (r) borrow k (r)-wi at rate r.
(ii) Whereas for r > r (γ), those with ω (r) ≤ wi < k (r) borrow k (r)-wi at rate r, but those
with wi < ω (r) are denied credit and therefore start self-financed firms of size wi < k (r).
In any case, k (r) s.t. f 0 (k (r)) = r and only agents i with wi > k (r) lend wi-k (r) at rate
r.
4.3.2 Capital Market Equilibrium
On these grounds, the capital market equilibrium can be derived.
Definition 4.1 A capital market equilibrium consists of a rate of return r∗ and individual
decisions as described in Lemma 4.1 such that decisions are optimal given r∗ and gross capital
demand D (r∗) equals supply S (r∗).
While S (r) amounts to aggregate wealth W minus the funds devoted to storage, D (r)
equals the sum of all agents’ investments intended at rate r. But owing to (A1), r∗ > 1, which
makes storage unattractive and S (r) =W . Thus, if f 0 (W ) ≤ r (γ), first-best arises. All agents
get sufficient credit to make the optimal investment k (r∗) =W . This entails r∗ = f 0 (W ) and
aggregate output P ∗ = f (W ). Yet, if f 0 (W ) > r (γ), D (r) is dampened by credit rationing,
so that r∗ also becomes a function of the wealth distribution G (w):
r∗ = r∗ (G (w)) s.t. W =
Z ω(r∗)
0
wg (w) dw + [1−G (ω (r∗))] k (r∗) . (4.5)
6Otherwise, there would be credit rationing even if capital costs were zero: ω (1) > 0 and no area A existed
in Figure 1. If the equilibrium market rate of return was then equal to 1, wealth U = W −
R ω(1)
0 wg (w) dw +
[1−G (ω (1))] k (1) would not be used, but get stored.
7As y (k (r)) net of repayment is maximal for k (r), it follows that if (4.3) IC does not hold for k (r), it will
also not hold for any k < k (r).
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That is how capital market imperfections lead to credit rationing. The rich over- and the poor
underinvest. Firm sizes and hence the marginal product of capital vary over production units.
This depresses aggregate output P ∗, which also constitutes gross national product (GNP ) Y ∗
under autarky:
P ∗ (G (w)) =
Z ω(r∗)
0
f (w) g (w) dw + [1−G (ω (r∗))] f (k (r∗)) . (4.6)
Proposition 4.1 In the autarkic capital market equilibrium, the market rate of return r∗ ≥ 1
and GNP Y ∗ (which equals aggregate output P ∗) are as follows:
(i) If f 0 (W ) ≤ r (γ), first-best obtains. All agents make the optimal investment k (r∗) =W .
r∗ and Y ∗ only depend on aggregate wealth W : r∗ = f 0 (W ) ≤ r (γ) and Y ∗ = f (W ).
(ii) Otherwise, there is some credit rationing ω (r∗) > 0. A fraction G (ω (r∗)) of the agents
is credit-constrained and only invests wi, whereas all others make the optimal investment k (r∗).
r∗ and Y ∗ depend on aggregate wealth W and its distribution G (w): r (γ) < r∗ < f 0 (W ) and
Y ∗ < f (W ).
4.3.3 Firm Size and Capital Rationing Effect
In order to ease the subsequent analysis of financial integration, the analysis goes on with
studying the main consequences of a change in r∗, which are a firm size and a credit rationing
effect. This, however, prerequires an inquiry into the origins of a change in r∗, which can be
classified into a net worth and a capital deepening effect.
The net worth effect captures any influence on agents’ ability to comply with (4.4) ω (r)
and so to make the optimal investment k (r). For instance, a higher γ increases the NPV of
borrowers’ projects and therefore lowers the critical threshold ω (r). Likewise, higher inequality
boosts [1-G (ω (r))], i.e. the mass of agents with w ≥ ω (r).8 Both result in an enhanced credit
allocation, which in turn improves productive efficiency and so implies a higher r∗.
Per contra, although a higherW makes agents benefit of the net worth effect, it additionally
releases a capital deepening effect. According to the latter, an increase in aggregate capital
supply translates into a surge in investment, which results in lower r due to diminishing returns.
Hence, the impact of ∆W > 0 on r∗ depends on which of the two countervailing effects prevails.
More directly, check if in equilibrium, ∆D (r∗) > 0 required by ∆W > 0 is achieved through a
rise or fall in r∗. Differentiating the RHS of (4.5) and reformulation gives
dD/dr ≥ 0 if g (ω (r))ω0 (r) ≤ − [1−G(ω(r))]k
0(r)
ω(r)−k(r) . (4.7)
For r∗ ≤ r (γ), credit rationing is absent. A higher rate of return then only causes a firm
size effect due to diminishing returns: k0 (r) < 0. Smaller optimal firm sizes lessen gross
capital demand (i.e. dD/dr < 0). In contrast, a credit rationing effect additionally accrues for
r∗ > r (γ): ω0 (r) > 0 if r < r˙ and ω0 (r) ≤ 0 otherwise. While for r < r˙, the firm size and
credit rationing effect reinforce each other, they otherwise oppose. The net effect is generally
still negative (i.e. dD/dr < 0) except for if condition (4.7) holds. Accordingly, an increase in D
from lower credit rationing outweighs the decrease from smaller firm sizes if, around the turning
8Abstract from higher inequality at the lower end only, leaving [1-G (ω (r))] unchanged.
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point at r = r¨, ω (r) is sufficiently steeply falling and g (ω (r)), i.e. the mass of agents just at
the rationing threshold, sufficiently large.9 In order to keep things simple, assume a typical
distribution of wealth:
Assumption 3: g (w) is a parabola that opens downwards. (A3)
It follows that if (4.7) is binding, then a single coherent reversal area of dD/dr ≥ 0 exists for
some r ∈ [rD1, rD2] (with rD1, rD2 > r˙ such that dD/dr = 0).10 After all, ∆W > 0 is only
associated with a higher r∗ (implying the prevalence of the net worth effect), if (4.7) holds. We
will later see, how this mechanism can redirect capital flows after integration.
Finally, a higher r∗ must not necessarily go in hand with a lower P ∗. Following the same
argumentation as for (4.7) dD/dr ≥ 0 yields
dP/dr ≥ 0 if g (ω (r))ω0 (r) ≤ − [1−G(ω(r))]f
0(k(r))k0(r)
[f(ω(r))−f(k(r))] . (4.8)
It depicts that dP/dr ≥ 0 appears for some r ∈ [rP1, rP2] (with rP1, rP2 > r˙ such that dP/dr =
0) if g (ω (r))ω0 (r) is sufficiently low. Then, efficiency gains from alleviated credit rationing
temporarily dominate the loss in production from smaller firm sizes. Otherwise, dP/dr < 0
prevails ∀r.
4.4 Equilibria under Financial Integration
From now on, the world consists of country A and several other countries j = {B,C...} of the
kind analyzed above. Countries l = A, j share the identical parameters, except for aggregate
wealth Wl and its dispersion Gl (w). While capital is perfectly mobile at no cost, agents and
thus production are not. Also the sequencing remains as before, but with one exception. At
date 0, countries can decide to become fully financially integrated by mutually allowing their
residents to borrow and lend across their common borders without any restrictions. All agents
will do so until the interest rates across countries are equalized, thus giving rise to a common
equilibrium market rate of return rˆ∗ and GNP s Yˆ ∗l (instead of r
∗
l and Y
∗
l obtained under
autarky).
Let’s assume that a country bases its decision whether to financially open up to another
country or not on the implied change of its GNP . As Lemma 4.1 does not lose its validity,
we can immediately turn to the capital market equilibria that arise from the various financial
integration scenarios.
9With dD/dr being continuous, dD/dr < 0 already for r < r (γ) andD→ 0+ for r →∞, so that dD/dr → 0−
for r →∞, (4.7) can only temporarily hold.
10Independent of the parameter constellation (that fixes the exact position of the interval): rD2 ≥ r¨ if
g0 (ω (r¨)) < 0. Then, an increase in r is associated with an increasing mass of agents at the rationing threshold
via ω0 (r) < 0. Similarly, g0 (ω (r¨)) > 0 fixes rD1 ≤ r¨. In the extreme, the reversal area might boil down to a
single point. Also remark that while a uniform distribution gives rise to r˙ < rD1 ≤ r¨ ≤ rD2, more complicated
shapes of g (w) could imply several rD1, rD2,..., in turn giving rise to more than one coherent reversal response
area.
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4.4.1 Exogenous Rate of Return
As a starting point, think of country A as being small relative to the rest of the world into whose
global capital market it seeks to integrate its own one. While this leaves the world unaffected,
A has to adopt the still prevailing global capital market rate of return rˆ∗ = r∗g . For rˆ
∗ > r (γ),
A realizes a GNP of:
Yˆ ∗A = rˆ
∗
h
WA −
R ω(rˆ∗)
0
wgA (w) dw − [1−GA (ω (rˆ∗))] k (rˆ∗)
i
+
hR ω(rˆ∗)
0
f (w) gA (w) dw + [1−GA (ω (rˆ∗))] f (k (rˆ∗))
i
,
(4.9)
where the first term represents the net credit position Xˆ∗A = rˆ
∗ [WA −DA (rˆ∗)] and the second
one aggregate output Pˆ ∗A. If, for instance, r
∗
A < rˆ
∗ ≤ r˙, then agents in A see a rise in the
market rate of return, scale-down their optimal investments, register tighter credit rationing
and start exporting capital to the world. While A loses from less domestic aggregate production
∆PA < 0, it wins from running a current account surplus ∆XA > 0.
In order to verify if integration makes A realize a higher GNP , subtract (4.6) from (4.9) to
obtain ∆YA = Yˆ ∗A − Y ∗A = ∆XA +∆PA with ∆XA = Xˆ∗A and
∆PA =
R ω(rˆ∗)
ω(r∗A)
f (w) g (w) dw + [1−GA (ω (rˆ∗))] f (k (rˆ∗))
− [1−GA (ω (r∗A))] f (k (r∗A)) .
(4.10)
Thereby, ∆PA reflects the change in production only, whereas ∆XA needs to be decom-
posed into a change in the per-unit remuneration ∆rA and in the quantity of traded capital
∆ [WA −DA (r)]. But as studied in Section 4.3.3, a firm size and a credit rationing effect in-
fluence ∆PA and ∆DA (r) (eventually even giving rise to reverse responses of dPA/dr ≥ 0 and,
ensued by dDA/dr ≥ 0, dXA/dr ≤ 0). That is why the sign of ∆XA and ∆PA, let alone the
aggregate effect of ∆YA, is not always immediately clear. Indeed, by the same argumentation
as for (4.8) dPˆ ∗A/dr, we get dXˆ
∗
A/dr = [WA −DA (r)]− rD0A (r) > 0 except for
dXˆ∗A/dr ≤ 0 if g (ω (r))ω0 (r) ≤
−[1−G(ω(r))]rk0(r)+[WA−DA(r)]
[ω(r)−k(r)]r . (4.11)
Quite alike, if (4.11) holds, it implies the existence of some rX1, rX2 > r˙ s.t. dXˆ∗A/dr = 0
and dXˆ∗A/dr ≤ 0 for r ∈ [rX1, rX2]. As follows from the comparison of (4.11) and (4.7), the
satisfaction of the second automatically implies that of the first for DA (r) > WA. Starting out
from the autarky allocation, the first can therefore never be fulfilled without the second. Thus,
(4.11) holds when lower credit rationing exceptionally dominates lower optimal firm sizes. It
fuels domestic capital demand, so that A becomes a capital importer despite r∗A < rˆ
∗.
Netting out dPˆ ∗A/dr and dXˆ
∗
A/dr finally gives dYˆ
∗
A/dr > 0 ∀r but for
dYˆ ∗A/dr ≤ 0 if gA (ω (r))ω0 (r) ≥ −
[WA−DA(r)]
[[f(ω(r))−rω(r)]−y(r)] , (4.12)
which holds when |∆XA| ≤ |∆PA| with dXˆ∗A/dr > 0 and dPˆ ∗A/dr < 0 and/or when, in the light
of the hitherto analysis, a reverse response area of not only dXˆ∗A/dr ≤ 0, but also dPˆ ∗A/dr ≥ 0
temporarily materializes for some r > r˙.
Definition 4.2 Call dY/dr ≤ 0 for r ∈ [rY 1, rY 2] = [rP1, rP2]∩[rX1, rX2] with rY 1, rY 2 > r˙ s.t.
dY/dr = 0 the GNP reversal response case (Y -RRC) and dY/dr > 0 for ∀r ∈ {R+|r ∈ [rY 1, rY 2]}
the standard response case (Y -SRC).
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This being said, the outcome of financial liberalization subtly depends on the parameter
constellation and the direction of the interest rate change. Table 4.1 summarizes some general
results that emerge if both market rates of return fall onto the same side of r˙ (either r∗A, rˆ
∗ ≤ r˙
or r∗A, rˆ
∗ > r˙) into the same response case (either Y -SRC or Y -RRC). Otherwise, no further
refined prediction can be made but that any outcome can materialize. Nevertheless, some well-
known results from standard economic theory get refuted: higher [resp. lower] interest rates
make net lending [resp. net borrowing] countries not always better off.
∆r∗A> 0: r
∗
A< rˆ
∗ ∆r∗A< 0: r
∗
A> rˆ
∗
r∗A, rˆ
∗≤ r˙: r∗A, rˆ
∗≤r
¯
(γ) ∆Y A> 0 ∆Y A> 0
otherwise ∆Y AR 0 if |∆PA|Q |∆XA| ∆Y A> 0
r∗A, rˆ
∗> r˙: Y -SRC ∆Y A> 0 ∆Y A< 0
Y -RRC ∆Y A≤ 0 ∆Y A≥ 0
Note that in all other r∗A-rˆ
∗-constellations (but for ∆rA = 0 when ∆Y A= 0),
any result can obtain: ∆Y A= ∆PA+∆XAQ 0.
Table 4.1: Beneficence of financial integration for country A
Unlike with first-best credit for r∗A, rˆ
∗ ≤ r (γ), higher interest rates r∗A < rˆ∗ do not necessarily
leave net lending countries better off with credit rationing. ∆YA R 0 when |∆PA| Q |∆XA|
for r∗A < rˆ
∗ ≤ r˙ (when ∆PA < 0 and ∆XA > 0). Only the parameter constellation decides on
if the improved credit position suffices to cover the loss in domestic production incurred from
tightened credit rationing and shrunken firm sizes. If so, A wins (even if no resident in A was
previously credit constrained) and otherwise loses from financial integration. All the more is
it remarkable that for r˙ < r∗A < rˆ
∗, diminishing credit rationing makes the generally expected
result of ∆YA > 0 reappear for sure in the Y -SRC. Whereas in the Y -RRC (when ∆PA > 0
and ∆XA < 0), ∆YA ≤ 0 obtains. The reason is that even though firm sizes decline, A’s credit
rationing around r¨ sufficiently decreases to increase its aggregate investment. This way, A turns
into a net borrower despite a surge in the interest rate. That is how a general result reemerges:
as a net borrower, A loses from higher interest rates. The improved efficiency from lower credit
rationing does not outweigh the losses from smaller firm sizes and from the negative net credit
position.
Also the contrary, i.e. that lower interest rates r∗A > rˆ
∗ make net borrowing countries better
off, might not generally be true. But for a start, it is true with first-best for r∗A, rˆ
∗ ≤ r (γ)
and for r˙ ≥ r∗A > rˆ∗ (when ∆PA > 0 and ∆XA < 0). ∆YA > 0 owes to the fact that
an interest rate drop induces more net borrowing firms with non-negative profits at a higher
efficient scale, which on top all generate higher profits than their credit-rationed counterparts.
For r∗A > rˆ
∗ > r˙, instead, worsened credit rationing hampers efficiency so badly, that the output
increase from higher optimal firm sizes cannot withal cover the negative net credit position.
Hence, ∆YA < 0 in the Y -SRC. Whereas in the Y -RRC (when ∆PA < 0 and ∆XA > 0
temporarily materialize), ∆YA ≥ 0. Despite a drop in the per-unit capital remuneration and
thus larger optimal firm sizes, A’s domestic gross capital demand falls, because of higher credit
rationing. Yet, against conventional wisdom, becoming a net lender then even allows A to win
from lower interest rates. Altogether:
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Proposition 4.2 After opening up as a small country to the world, A with r∗A and Y
∗
A takes
the globally prevailing rate r∗g = rˆ
∗ as given and realizes Yˆ ∗A.
(I) If r∗A, rˆ
∗ ≤ r (γ), there neither was, nor will be credit rationing. First-best arises. As
compared to r∗A, A wins from a higher and a lower rˆ
∗ (Y ∗A < Yˆ
∗
A).
(II) If rˆ∗ > r (γ), there will be credit rationing. (II.i) For r∗A, rˆ
∗ ∈ (r (γ) , r˙], A may win
or lose from r∗A < rˆ
∗ (Y ∗A Q Yˆ ∗A). Yet, A wins from r∗A > rˆ∗ (Y ∗A < Yˆ ∗A). (II.ii) In contrast,
for r∗A, rˆ
∗ > r˙, A normally wins from r∗A < rˆ
∗ (Y ∗A < Yˆ
∗
A), but loses from r
∗
A > rˆ
∗ (Y ∗A > Yˆ
∗
A).
However, the opposite obtains for r∗A, rˆ
∗ ∈ [rY 1, rY 2] if Y -RRC exists with rY 1, rY 2 > r˙ such
that dY/dr = 0. Y -RRC in turn materializes if ω0 (r) gA (ω (r)) is sufficiently low.
(III) In any other r∗A-rˆ
∗-line-up (and in case II.i), the parameter constellation decides on
the magnitude of ∆PA and ∆XA and thus on Y ∗A Q Yˆ ∗A.
4.4.2 Endogenous Market Rate of Return
Alternatively, country A thinks of pursuing financial integration with a country j at eye height,
i.e. with a partner that is not big enough to act as the world. This way, the market rate of
return rˆ∗ becomes endogenous to integration and follows from equating global capital supply
S (rˆ∗) and demand D (rˆ∗):
rˆ∗ s.t. WA +Wj =
R ω(rˆ∗)
0
wgA (w) dw + [1−GA (ω (rˆ∗))] k (rˆ∗)
+
R ω(rˆ∗)
0
wgj (w) dw + [1−Gj (ω (rˆ∗))] k (rˆ∗) .
(4.13)
Integration entails inter-country capital flows, whose direction and magnitude are entirely driven
by the differences in marginal productivity under autarky. Given e.g. r∗A > r
∗
j , A net borrows
from j until the marginal productivity is equated across the two countries. This does, however,
not always imply the elimination of differences in average marginal rates of productivity
ρl =
Z ω(rˆ∗)
0
f 0 (w) gl (w) dw + [1−Gl (ω (rˆ∗))] f 0 (k (rˆ∗)) with l = A, j. (4.14)
If S (rˆ∗) = WA +Wj is sufficiently high to ensure rˆ∗ ≤r
¯
(γ), there is no credit rationing and
the RHS in (4.13) reduces to 2k (rˆ∗). All agents make the same optimal investment k (rˆ∗),
so that also ρˆ∗A = ρˆ
∗
j . As depicted in Figure 4.2 below, starting from ρ
∗
A > ρ
∗
j (e.g. ensued
by ω (r∗A) > ω
¡
r∗j
¢
and k (r∗A) < k
¡
r∗j
¢
) in the autarky point T0 on the resource constraint
WA +Wj , capital will flow from j to A until rˆ∗ = f 0 (k (rˆ∗)) = ρˆ∗l in point T1.
In contrast, if S (rˆ∗) is so low that rˆ∗ >r
¯
(γ), there is credit rationing. A fraction [1-GA (ω (rˆ∗))]
of agents in country A and [1-Gj (ω (rˆ∗))] in j makes the same optimal investment k (rˆ∗). As
all other agents can only run self-financed sub-optimal firms, not only ρˆ∗l > rˆ
∗ persists, but
also ρˆ∗A 6= ρˆ∗j if GA (ω (rˆ∗)) 6= Gj (ω (rˆ∗)).11 In that sense, the higher ρˆ∗l − rˆ∗, the larger the
deviation of allocative efficiency from its first-best level. After all:
11This is consistent with the evidence reviewed in Bajeree and Duflo (2005). Also note how crucial the
immobility of agents and thus of production is for the outcome. FDI and free trade of the output would
eliminate any differences in ρl across countries. See e.g. Antra`s and Caballero (2007) on the complementarity
of trade and capital mobility.
4.4. EQUILIBRIA UNDER FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 67
Figure 4.2: Pattern of capital flows between country A and j
Proposition 4.3 After mutually opening up, country A and j face a market rate of return
rˆ∗ ≥ 1 and GNP s Yˆ ∗A and Yˆ ∗j with the following properties:
(i) If f 0 ([WA +Wj ] /2) ≤ r (γ), first-best obtains. All agents make the same optimal in-
vestment k (rˆ∗) = [WA +Wj ] /2. rˆ∗ = f 0 ([WA +Wj ] /2) ≤ r (γ), Yˆ ∗A and Yˆ ∗j only depend on
aggregate wealth WA +Wj. Financial integration is beneficial for A and j alike.
(ii) Otherwise, there is credit rationing ω (rˆ∗) > 0. A fraction [1-GA (ω (rˆ∗))] of agents in A
and [1-Gj (ω (rˆ∗))] of agents in j makes the same optimal investment k (rˆ∗), whereas all others
simply invest their initial endowment wi. r (γ) < rˆ∗ < f 0 ([WA +Wj ] /2), Yˆ ∗A and Yˆ
∗
j depend
on aggregate wealth WA +Wj and its distribution across countries A and j. This productive
inefficiency endangers the beneficence of financial integration for A and j.
As a matter of fact, financial integration must be production-enhancing on aggregate.12
However unlike for rˆ∗ ≤ r (γ), predictions about the benefits of financial integration for an
individual country and the pattern of ρl (highlighted by the arrows in Figure 4.2) require to
know the relation and position of all market rates of return for rˆ∗ > r (γ). These, however,
cannot be determined without taking into account the countries’ characteristics with respect to
their aggregate wealth Wl and its distribution Gl (w). Recall that in comparison to a partner
country, a country will be considered as richer if its aggregate wealth is higher and more unequal
if a larger fraction of its residents has access to credit.
In what follows, we therefore study the five most pertinent cases: A teaming up with a (1)
homogenous, (2) less unequal, (3) richer, (4) richer, less unequal as well as (5) richer, more
unequal country. The last four Wl-Gl-combinations are sketched in Figure 4.3.13 In each case,
equation (4.5) and Proposition 4.1 are used to determine the relation of autarkic market rates
of return r∗l . Afterwards, equation (4.13) as well as Propositions 4.1 and 4.3 allow to find out
where the market rate of return after integration materializes. Finally, the sign of ∆r∗l together
12Integration goes in hand with the equalization of domestic market rates of return, so that there remains a
single optimal investment level across countries (instead of two in autarky). This reduces the variation of firm
scales and therewith the variation of the marginal product of capital. With a concave production function, the
output then increases across countries.
13Moreover, switching indices allows A to derive the consequences of teaming up with just the opposite type
of country than laid out in Cases (2) to (5).
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with the location of r∗l and rˆ
∗ (above all vis-a`-vis r˙ and Y -SRC/Y -RRC) will enable us to read
the gains from financial integration from Proposition 4.2.
Figure 4.3: Graphical sketch of stylized Wl-Gl (w)-combinations studied
4.4.2.1 Case 1: Teaming Up with a Homogenous Country
Initially, emanate from the polar case of country A pursuing financial integration with an
identical country A˜: WA = WA˜ and GA (w) = GA˜ (w). It is obvious that r
∗
A = r
∗
A˜
under
autarky and that, with integration proportionally increasing gross capital supply and demand,
rˆ∗ = r∗A = r
∗
A˜
after integration.
Corollary 4.1 Financially integrating homogenous countries A and A˜ with WA = WA˜ and
GA (w) = GA˜ (w) is neutral with respect to GNP (∆Y
∗
A = ∆Y
∗
A˜
= 0). The domestic autarkic
equilibrium characterized in Proposition 4.1 persists.
4.4.2.2 Case 2: Teaming Up with a Less Unequal Country
A also faces the option of forming an integrated capital market with a less unequal country
B. Although the two dispose of equal aggregate wealth WA = WB, a relatively larger part of
it is in the hands of the poor in B. Given (A3), gA (w) < gB (w) for w < w˜ (and vice versa)
with w˜ ∈ (0, w¯) such that gA (w˜) = gB (w˜). Thus, not only B’s Lorenz curve, but also B’s
cumulative wealth distribution GB (w) first-order stochastically dominate those of A.
The study of comparative statics in Section 4.3.3 showed that∆ [1-G (w)] entails a net worth
effect only. Due to GA (w) < GB (w)∀w ∈ (0, w¯), gross capital demand is always higher in A
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than in B. With equal gross capital supply, this puts comparatively more pressure on the
equilibrium market rate of return in A, so that r∗A > r
∗
B and k (r
∗
A) < k (r
∗
B) under autarky. An
opening up then incites A to borrow abroad. Capital flows from B to the more unequal country
A, which establishes r∗A > rˆ
∗ > r∗B . Yet, despite a common single optimal firm size k (rˆ
∗) and
rationing threshold ω (rˆ∗), ρA < ρB continues to hold because of GA (ω (rˆ
∗)) < GB (ω (rˆ∗)).
Given rˆ∗, A has more absorptive capacities for productive capital than B, which would not be
the case in a first-best world. Concerning the implied change in GNP , Proposition 4.2 applies
for ∆r∗A < 0 and ∆r
∗
B > 0. For instance, if r
∗
A ≤ r˙, A wins, whereas this is only true for its
more equal counterpart B if |∆PB| < |∆XB |.
Corollary 4.2 The beneficence of financially integrating country A and a less unequal B with
WA = WB and GA (w) < GB (w)∀w ∈ (0, w¯) can be read from Proposition 4.2 on the basis of
r∗A > rˆ
∗ > r∗B.
4.4.2.3 Case 3: Teaming Up with a Richer Country
Things get more complicated when country A and a richer country C mutually open up. Sup-
pose that every agent in C owns α times as much wealth as his respective counterpart in
A, i.e. wCi = αw
A
i with α > 1. That is why the graph of gC (w) appears as a horizontal
dilation of gA (w) to the right. Even though this leaves C with a higher aggregate wealth
than A (i.e. WC = αWA), the countries’ relative wealth dispersion is identical. Owing to
GA (w/WA) = GC (w/WC), A and C share the same Lorenz curve.
As seen in Section 4.3.3, ∆W triggers a net worth and a capital deepening effect. Hence,
the impact of ∆W crucially depends on the sign of dD/dr and we need to distinguish four
interest rate scenarios. The first is the standard scenario of r∗A and r
∗
C materializing where
dD/dr < 0. We know from the analysis of comparative statistics, that this yields the usually
expected autarky result of r∗A > r
∗
C . But even though integration sets free capital flows from C
to the poorer A, which lead to r∗A > rˆ
∗ > r∗C , ρA > ρC persists. The reason is that a relatively
larger fraction of agents in A still remains too poor to comply with the wealth requirement:
GA (ω (rˆ∗)) > GC (ω (rˆ∗)). This lets A register less capital inflows than expected on the grounds
of the differences in the optimal investments’ marginal rates of productivity and the equality
of the state of financial development (i.e. γA = γC). With ∆r
∗
A < 0 and ∆r
∗
C > 0, Proposition
4.2 allows to draw the respective conclusions concerning ∆YA and ∆YC .
Just the contrary obtains in the reversal scenario of r∗A and r
∗
C occurring where dD/dr ≥ 0.
It gives r∗A < r
∗
C in autarky. Remember that this owes to the fact that here, ω (r
∗
A) > ω (r
∗
C)
exceptionally outweighs k (r∗A) > k (r
∗
C) in terms of gross capital demand. Against conventional
wisdom, integration then makes the relatively richer country C become a net borrower of the
poorer A, so that r∗A < rˆ
∗ < r∗C . The redirected capital flows further widen the gap between
ρA and ρC (with the first further increasing). As in the light of Definition 4.2 and the Proof
of Proposition 4.2, the reversal scenario of dD/dr ≥ 0 falls into the Y -RRC, Proposition 4.2
offers a clear prediction for ∆r∗A > 0 and ∆r
∗
C < 0: A always loses and its richer partner C
always wins from financial integration.
Unfortunately, in the two mixed scenarios, when r∗A > r
∗
C with either only r
∗
A or r
∗
C being
located where dD/dr ≥ 0, no general prediction is possible. The parameter constellation alone
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will determine if rˆ∗ emerges where dD/dr ≥ 0 or dD/dr < 0. However, this anchor is needed
for deriving the direction of capital flows as well as ∆YA and ∆YC . Still, we can conclude, that
principally and in contrast to standard economic theory, any outcome is possible here.
Corollary 4.3 The beneficence of financially integrating country A and a richer C with WC =
αWA (α > 1) and GA (w/WA) = GC (w/WC) can be read from Proposition 4.2 on the basis of
r∗A > rˆ
∗ > r∗C ∀r. There is only one exception: if dD/dr ≥ 0 exists and r∗A, r∗C ∈ [rD1, rD2],
then r∗A < rˆ
∗ < r∗C .
4.4.2.4 Case 4: Teaming Up with a Richer, Less Unequal Country
Furthermore, A could choose a richer, less unequal partner E. For this purpose, suppose that
every agent in E owns κ > 0 units of wealth more than his counterpart in country A. The graph
of gE (w) follows from a simple horizontal shift of gA (w) to the right by κ, WE =WA+κ. Yet,
GA (w/WA) < GE (w/WE) obtains, letting the Lorenz curve of E stochastically dominate that
of A. The reason is that adding κ has a relatively larger impact on the wealth of the poor than
on that of the rich and so reduces inequality in E.
As this setting appears as a combination of the two cases studied before, the analysis is
straightforward. Starting out again with the standard scenario of r∗A and r
∗
E arising where
dD/dr < 0, yields r∗A > r
∗
E . In fact, compared to r
∗
E , supply and demand side forces reinforce
each other and drive up r∗A. A has an absolutely lower gross capital supply, since its aggregate
wealth is lower. Besides that, it registers a relatively higher gross capital demand, since a higher
fraction of its residents has access to credit. After opening up, E therefore exports capital to
the poorer, more unequal A and r∗A > rˆ
∗ > r∗E . Nevertheless, capital flows remain lower than
under first-best and ρA > ρE . This stems from the result that because of their lower personal
wealth, relatively more agents remain credit constrained in A (i.e. GA (ω (rˆ∗)) > GE (ω (rˆ∗))).
Given ∆r∗A < 0 and ∆r
∗
E > 0, Proposition 4.2 predicts the sign of ∆YA and ∆YE .
On the other hand, in the reversal scenario of r∗A and r
∗
E materializing where dD/dr ≥ 0,
r∗A > r
∗
E reemerges in autarky. In fact, the credit rationing effect (ω
0 (r) < 0) temporarily
dominates the firm size effect (i.e. k0 (r) < 0). This makes gross capital demand even higher
than in the respective standard scenario case before. Given the still lower gross capital supply,
this additionally puts relatively more pressure on r∗A, so that r
∗
A > r
∗
E again. Yet, when the
two countries now open their borders to capital flows, they see r∗A > rˆ
∗ > r∗E and E starts net
borrowing from the poorer, less unequal A. ρA and ρE further depart. With, as laid out above,
the reversal area of dD/dr ≥ 0 falling into the Y -RRC, Proposition 4.2 shows that in view of
∆r∗A < 0 and ∆r
∗
E > 0, A’s GNP clearly rises, whereas E’s falls.
As for the two mixed scenarios, the findings of Case (3) apply.
Corollary 4.4 The beneficence of financially integrating country A and a richer, less unequal
E with WE = WA + κ (κ > 0) and GA (w/WA) < GE (w/WE) can be read from Proposition
4.2 on the basis of r∗A > rˆ
∗ > r∗E∀r.
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4.4.2.5 Case 5: Teaming Up with a Richer, More Unequal Country
At last, country A may choose to get together with a richer, more unequal country F . This
situation occurs e.g. when every agent’s wealth in F is a positive, increasing and convex mapping
of its counterpart’s wealth in A: wFi = h
¡
wAi
¢
with h0
¡
wAi
¢
> 0 and h00
¡
wAi
¢
> 0. The graph
of gF (w) looks like a dilation (in the presence of a fixed term also going in hand with a parallel
shift) of gA (w) to the right. Hence, F exhibits a higher aggregate wealth and a more unequal
wealth dispersion than A: WA < WF and GA (w/WA) > GF (w/WF ).
Again, the countries differ along both dimensions. Yet, this time, they differently affect (4.5)
r∗. That is why already in the standard scenario of r∗A and r
∗
F emerging where dD/dr < 0, no
general result obtains: r∗A R r∗F in autarky. Even though A indeed has a lower absolute gross
capital supply, it also has a relatively lower gross capital demand than F . For any r, a larger
fraction of its residents is credit constrained. It can therefore not generally be predicted, if this
on net translates into a higher or lower equilibrium market rate of return in A than in F . Thus,
capital flows can principally go either way and depend on the specific parameter constellation.
Also, ∆r∗A R 0 and ∆r∗F Q 0.
Similarly, no clear picture arises in the reversal scenario of r∗A and r
∗
F materializing where
dD/dr ≥ 0: again, r∗A R r∗F in autarky. Yet, contrary to the standard scenario before, the
supply and demand side forces on the equilibrium market rate of return might realign again.
Whilst A’s gross capital supply still remains lower, its gross capital demand picks up. Recall
that the latter originates from the credit rationing effect (ω0 (r) < 0) temporarily dominating
the firm size effect (i.e. k0 (r) < 0). Consequently, there are parameter constellations, in which
this jump in A’s gross capital demand even leads to A having a relatively higher gross capital
demand than E. With the supply and demand side forces reinforcing each other, we would
get r∗A > r
∗
F with the consequences described in the reversal scenario in Case (4). However, if
this happens depends on the magnitude of the effects, precluding any general forecasts. Thus,
∆r∗A R 0 and ∆r∗F Q 0.
Once more, as for the two mixed scenarios, the argumentation laid out in Case (3) reapplies
correspondingly.
Corollary 4.5 The beneficence of financially integrating country A and a richer, more unequal
F with WA < WF and GA (w/WA) > GF (w/WF ) cannot be read from Proposition 4.2 without
taking into account the exact parameter constellation. Only that can decide on not only r∗A R r∗F ,
but also ∆r∗A R 0 and ∆r∗F Q 0.
4.5 Policy Implications
The results imply manifold recommendations for all those, who attempt to progress with finan-
cial integration in the hope of tapping its benefits.
4.5.1 Winners and Losers
We have seen that there is noW -G (w)-combination that would principally disqualify a country
for financial integration - neither as an active proponent, nor as a potential team mate. Finan-
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cial integration rather appears as a menu of choices, whose benefits and costs across partner
countries depends on the country’s own characteristics and its counterpart’s. Beyond that,
there is no team constellation that does not seem appealing in at least one interest rate sce-
nario. The variation stems from the sign and relative magnitude of the credit rationing and the
firm size effect in either the Y -SRC or the Y -RRC. These also govern the pattern of capital
flows. And it is obvious that when capital flows remain below their first-best levels, the same
will be true for the benefits from financial integration. However, apart from the first-best case
for r∗A, r
∗
B ≤ r (γ), there are only two further interest rate scenarios that have the potential
to be beneficial for both countries at once: first, for r∗A, r
∗
B < r˙ (if ∆P + ∆X ≥ 0 also for
the country for which ∆r∗ > 0) and eventually second, in some parameter constellations in all
r∗A-rˆ
∗-constellations that cannot be generally studied (and that are therefore only mentioned
in the footer of Table 4.1 ). This being said, international financial integration should only be
observable in these three cases. Otherwise, other motivations must have played a role.
Indeed, unrational decisions of countries can most obviously be explained on the basis of
the result that financial opening bears opposite distributional implications for domestic agents.
This owes to credit rationing operating like an entry barrier. It constrains gross capital demand
and depresses the equilibrium market rate of return. This is good for borrowers and bad for
lenders. For instance, in the standard case for r ∈ (r
¯
(γ) , r˙], an interest rate drop makes
the middle class gain (because credit rationing decreases, in turn enabling them to reach the
optimal capitalization level), while the rich lose (because of the decreased remuneration of
capital) and the poor are equally off (because they anyway do not take part in either side of the
capital market). That is how residents are divided into supporters and opponents of financial
integration. Political economy considerations can then be put forward to explain the two sides
of the coin. First, why countries still pursue financial integration, even if they know the country
as a whole will lose from it. And second, why they do not do so, even if they know the country
as a whole would win from it. In the end, it might all depend on what group holds the political
power in its hands, so that it is able to convince the government to follow its best interests and
not the country’s as a whole.14
4.5.2 Optimal Financial Services Trade Liberalization
Altogether, the results lend novel theoretical support to the observation of why some countries
prefer a stepwise a` la carte approach to financial integration in the framework of preferen-
tial trade agreements (PTAs) rather than within the multilateral trading system of the WTO
(GATS).
First, in view of the results in Sections 4.4.1 as well as 4.4.2 and given its own characteristics,
a country might be better off by hand-picking the most suitable partner than by opening up to
the whole world. In that sense, this paper offers a first attempt of a theory of optimal financial
services liberalization (FSTL). Even though there are only few interest rate scenarios that
simultaneously increase GNP in both countries, political economy considerations can explain
why in all other scenarios, losing countries might still agree to pursue financial integration with a
14Alternative argumentations could be derived from dynamizing the model or extending it in the directions
pointed out in the Conclusion.
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winning country. Moreover, a winning country could promise to compensate the losing country
in order to win its consent to a mutual opening. Second, especially if seen in a more dynamic
perspective, a country’s needs evolve on its path of development with capital accumulation
and with the evolution of domestic inequality. In fact, the identity of winners and losers
determines the development of inequality across and within countries. Now losing countries
might anticipate that they will win in later periods and therefore find it optimal to open up
now on the basis of the sum of discounted profits. Likewise, teaming up later with the then
most appropriate partner through a PTA also appears as an appealing flexible policy tool for
counteracting unpleasant influences from previous integrations, current partners’ integrations
with third parties or adverse domestic interest rate shocks. However remark that once the
country has opened up and accumulated a non-zero current account position, the satisfaction
of (4.7) dD/dr ≥ 0 must no longer necessarily imply that of (4.11) dX/dr ≤ 0.15 Thus, this
paper’s predictions have to be slightly adapted when applied to already open countries that
look out for further partners. Third, a PTA allows countries to pursue an asymmetric a` la
carte approach (e.g. opening up the borrowing, but restricting the lending side and vice versa).
It leaves the countries prepared to prevent a detrimental reversal of capital flows in case the
Y -RRC occurs (e.g. after an interest rate shock or spill-overs from the other country teaming
up with a third party).
4.5.3 Strategic Use of Domestic Policies
Furthermore, the results offer important insights for supranational treaty design. These orig-
inate from the fact that at date 0, after the contract parties have resolved upon financial
integration, each member country still has the full range of domestic economic policies at its
disposal. These can be used to improve the country’s economic conditions with view to the
credit constraint (4.4) ω (r). In fact, each country can increase the share of its population being
eligible for a credit through e.g. political wealth redistribution, inflation or a capital market
reform that increases the state of financial development γ.
The mechanisms are already evident in the simplest case of two homogenous countries with
rA, rA˜ ∈ (r¯ (γ) , r˙] in Case (1) in Section 4.4.2.
16 The commonly received result that e.g.
inflation does not affect the real economy also holds under autarky in the model at hand based
on Proposition 4.1. This owes to inflation proportionally increasing demand and supply and so
leaving the equilibrium market rate of return unaffected. Whereas after integration, Corollary
4.1 implies that the same is only true for an equal rate of inflation πA = πA˜. For e.g. πA > πA˜,
instead, residents in A become relative wealthier than their counterparts in A˜. This enables
15If it does, mind the following: think e.g. of the Y -RRC in Case (3) in Section 4.4.2, where r∗A > rˆ
∗
0 > r
∗
C
made A the net borrower of the poorer C. An interest rate drop to rˆ∗1 with r
∗
A > rˆ
∗
0 > rˆ
∗
1 (ensued by e.g. A
additionally teaming up with a slightly richer C0 than C) would induce A to reduce its capital imports, but not
necessarily to directly turn into a capital exporter (as under autarky). Contrariwise, if it does not, (4.11) might
hold without (4.7) for net borrowers with D > W . That is why in the Y -RRC, the country may not immediately
see a total reversal of its flows, just a diminishment of its NCP (because lower capital imports would not be
sufficient to cover a higher per-unit remuneration of capital). Whereas for net lenders with D < W , (4.11) even
implies (4.7), whilst the second can again also hold without the first.
16It is straightforward how to adapt the analysis to all other settings in Section 4.4.2.
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more agents in A to put up the required collateral and increases gross capital demand. The
equilibrium market rate of return has to adjust upwards and induces a rise in the rationing
threshold. Still, more agents in A can overcome the rationing threshold than in A˜, so that the
first crowd out the latter and use them as lenders. Consequently, A’s GNP rises and A˜’s falls.
As the benefit A attains from manipulating the domestic scope of credit rationing comes at the
expense of A˜, the latter is forced to retaliate with similar measures.
In order to avoid such vicious circles of beggar-thy-neighbor policies, treaties on financial
integration should include a harmonization or ban of all domestic policies affecting the domestic
level of credit rationing.17
4.5.4 Resilience to Macroeconomic Shocks
Without drawing on risk diversification per se, this paper reveals credit rationing as a shock-
absorber or -amplifier. While credit rationing fosters financial stability in integrated financial
markets in the standard case, it triggers contagion in the Y -RRC.
For this to see, think again in terms of the simplest context of two homogenous countries
and the equilibrium characterized in Corollary 4.1 for rA, rA˜ ∈ (r¯ (γ) , r˙]. After integration, a
negative macroeconomic shock occurs in A in the form of e.g. a sudden decline in the business
climate. It makes all projects’ probability of success drop from 1 to p < 1. This entails a
decrease of the optimal firm size in A to k◦A (rˆ
∗) s.t. pf 0 (k◦A (rˆ
∗)) = rˆ∗. Hence, credit rationing
worsens at all levels of r with ω◦A (rˆ
∗) := k◦A (rˆ
∗)− γpf (k◦A (rˆ∗)) /rˆ∗. Lemma 4.1 prevails in A
but with ω◦A (rˆ
∗) > ωA (rˆ∗). As the business climate remains unaffected in the other country A˜,
firm sizes and the scope of credit rationing stay at their previous levels, so that k◦A (rˆ
∗) < kA˜ (rˆ
∗)
and ω◦A (rˆ
∗) > ωA˜ (rˆ
∗). It follows that gross capital demand in A decreases, whereas it remains
stable in A˜. The common interest rate has to fall and A starts exporting capital to A˜. While
A’s GNP drops because of the firm size and the efficiency effect, it still drops less than under
autarky because of A’s capital account surplus. Likewise, A˜’s GNP increases. Remark that for
rA, rA˜ > r˙, A still loses less in the Y -SRC than under autarky and A˜ wins.
Hence, integrated capital markets might indeed provide a shock absorbing capacity via the
impact of credit rationing in the two countries. Any macroeconomic shock ensuing a drop in
net capital demand in one country will be attenuated by the other country’s intact capital
demand. That is why the rate of return and the GNP under integration are still higher in the
country that experiences the shock than they would have been under national autarky. The
argumentation reverses in the Y -RRC.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper complements existing theories of financial integration with the impact of wealth
inequality in the presence of capital market imperfections. It draws on production inefficiencies
17It is obvious that no vicious circle can arise if A opened up to the world, because irrespective of the domestic
policy implemented, A cannot change the global market rate of return. Thus, no one would be affected and thus
incited to retaliate.
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due to credit rationing as a new cost, whose magnitude depends on a country’s aggregate wealth
endowment and wealth distribution relative to the country it opens up to.
On these grounds, a novel explanation arises for unconventional patterns of international
capital flows as well as for why financial integration might turn out welfare-enhancing in some
countries and welfare-deteriorating in others. These insights also allow to uncover winners and
losers within a country, so paving the way for political economy considerations. Finally, the
paper points out the implications of credit rationing for policy making, esp. for supranational
treaty design, optimal financial services trade liberalization and financial stability.
However, the paper only makes a start and so offers various roads for future research. First
of all, attention should be given to balancing out the effects of credit rationing induced by
wealth inequality against the typical costs and benefits of financial integration outlined in the
introduction. The paper also suggests various extensions. Countervailing effects to the impact of
wealth dispersion could e.g. be based on differing states of financial development γ,18 increased
domestic capital market competition ensued by the entry of foreign lenders or economies of scale
in banking. Following Iacoviello and Minetti (2006), domestic lenders could also be assumed
to be better at recovering value from a borrower’s default than foreign lenders, so requiring
less collateral. Above that, different technologies f can be expected to trigger a specialization
effect, and hidden heterogenous project qualities (asymmetric information) to give rise to an
additional quality effect in the pool of loans.19 Going one step further would also require to
study dynamic effects on capital accumulation and future equilibrium market rates of return20
as well as to derive an optimal dynamic path of successive integrations.
18With otherwise identical countries, the scope of credit rationing in the country with the higher γ would
decrease (dω/dγ < 0), so that it would attract capital flows from the other country. Additionally, γ could be
modelled to be driven e.g. by the scope of diversification opportunities (as e.g. in Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997
or Martin and Rey, 2004), the presence of foreign banks with superior efficiency (as e.g. in Levine, 1996 or Rajan
and Zingales, 2003) or taxed-financed financial infrastructure investments (as e.g. in Ando and Yanagawa, 2002).
19Dynamically put, progress could also be endogenized by making the technology switch dependent on sur-
passing financing hurdles (as in Horii, Yamamoto and Ohdoi, 2005).
20While Piketty (1997) or Chapter 2 of this thesis provide a dynamization with variable firm sizes, Matsuyama
(2004) studies the impact of financial integration on the set of steady states.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Proofs for Section 2.2
• Proof of Lemma 2.1:
See Piketty (1997).
• Proof of Lemma 2.2:
Given Lemma 2.1, two things remain to be proven.
(1) Checking the behavior and interplay of all relevant functions.
(1.1) To show: k (r) and k0 (r) are differentiable, strictly decreasing and convex functions
in r. Remember that k (r) is such that pf 0 (k (r)) = r and that y (r) is strictly concave in
k. Then, k0 (r) < 0 because f 0 (k (r)) is continuous and monotonously decreasing in k (r).
On top using that k0 (r) < 0, k → 0 for r → ∞ and k → ∞ for r → 0 gives k00 (r) > 0.
The same reasoning applies to k0 (r). Finally, k (r) > k0 (r) follows from f 0 (k)’s behavior
depicted above, p > q and the fact that in optimum pf 0 (k (r)) = qf 0 (k0 (r)) = r.
(1.2) To show: ω (r) is a strictly increasing and concave function in r for r < r¯ (q). From
(2.4) ω (r), we get
dω/dr = p [(p− q) f (k (r))− 1] / (p− q) r2 > 0 for r < r¯ (q) ,
since (p− q) f (k (r)) − 1 > 0 by (A1) for r < r¯ (q). This, in turn, is derived from
[pf (k (r))− rk (r)] − [qf (k (r))− rk (r)] > y (r) − y0 (r) (as y0 (r) is maximal for k0 (r)
and hence smaller for any other k (r)), and y (r) − y0 (r) > 1 for r < r¯ (q). By the same
argument and with k0 (r) < 0, the second derivative indeed gives
d2ω/dr2 =
£
(p− q) k0 (r) r2 − 2p [(p− q) f (k (r))− 1]
¤
/r3 (p− q) < 0.
(1.3) To show: k0 (r¯) < w˜ < k (r¯). On the one hand, as y (r) is maximal for k (r) and
hence smaller for any other k, it must be true for r ≤ r¯ (q) that
[pf (k (r))− rk (r)]− [qf (k (r))− rk (r)] > y (r)− y0 (r) . (A.1)
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Now focus on r = r¯ (q). Taking advantage of (A1) gives y (r¯) − y0 (r¯) = 1, which helps
to reduce (A.1) to f (k (r¯)) > 1/ (p− q). Then, it is assured by f ’s continuity as well
as monotonicity and by 1/ (p− q) = f (w˜) that k (r¯) > w˜. On the other hand equally
proceeding for k0 (r), gives
[pf (k0 (r¯))− r¯k0 (r¯)]− [qf (k0 (r¯))− r¯k0 (r¯)] < y (r¯)− y0 (r¯) = 1, (A.2)
resulting in f (k0 (r¯)) < 1/ (p− q) and thus k0 (r¯) < w˜. Consequently, k0 (r¯) < w˜ < k (r¯).
Then, given k (r)’s shape derived in step (i) and as k0 (r) < 0, k (0) = ∞ > w˜, k (∞) =
0 < w˜, w˜ > 0 and dw˜/dr = 0, it is that k (r˙) = w˜ for some r˙ > r¯ (q). Likewise, it follows
that k0 (r¨) = w˜ for some r¨ < r¯ (q).
(1.4) To show: k0 (r¯) < ω (r¯) < w˜ < k (r¯). First, in order to verify ω (r¯) < w˜, substitute
(2.4) ω (r) and reduce it to pf (k (r¯)) − r¯k (r¯) > p/ (p− q) − r¯w˜. Using (A1) to replace
y0 (r¯)+1 for y (r¯) on the LHS and inserting f (w˜) = 1/ (p− q) on the RHS, gives y0 (r¯) >
qf (w˜)−r¯w˜. It is satisfied, because y0 is maximal for k0 (r¯) and, due to its strict concavity,
less for any other capitalization (thus also less for w˜ > k0 (r¯)). Second, check k0 (r¯) <
ω (r¯). Proceeding as for ω (r¯) < w˜ before, yields qf (k0 (r¯)) < qf (w˜). This is true by
f ’s positive monotonicity, since we already proved that k0 (r¯) < w˜. Third, in order to
prove that ω (r¯) < k (r¯), again substitute (2.4) ω (r) to obtain qf (w˜) − rk (r¯) < y0 (r¯).
Then, use the definition of w˜ to insert pf (w˜) − 1 for qf (w˜) on the LHS, which yields
pf (w˜)− rk (r¯)− 1 < y0 (r¯). This holds, since the LHS is smaller than y (r¯) − 1 = y0 (r¯)
and since f (w˜) < f (k (r¯)).
(1.5) To show: Relative curve positions for r < r¯ (q). First, ω (r) < w˜, because of w˜ > 0,
ω (r (q)) = 0, ω (r¯) < w˜ and ω (r)’s strict monotonicity and concavity for r < r¯ (q).
Besides, as k00 (r) < 0, k0 (0) = ∞ > ω (0), k0 (∞) = 0 < ω (∞) and k0 (r¯) < ω (r¯), it
follows that k0 (r˜) = ω (r˜) for some r
¯
(q) < r˜ < r¯ (q) and k0 (r) > ω (r) for r < r˜ [resp.
k0 (r) < ω (r) for r > r˜]. By the same argument, it becomes obvious that k (r) > w˜ (and
that k (r) < w˜ only for some r > r¯ (q)).
(2) Deriving the occupational choice of agents who own less capital than necessary for the
optimal investment given r:
(2.1) For a start, emanate from an agent i, who does not want or get access to credit.
In order to determine his effort, investment and deposit level, three cases have to be
distinguished: (i) If r > r¯ (q), step (1.1) constituted that effort does not pay off for any
investment level, even not for the optimal level k0 (r). Agent i therefore chooses to shirk
too. Owing to qf 0 (wi) > r for wi < k0 (r) (remember that the profit function is concave
and that f 0 (0) =∞), he invests wi and does not deposit. He then earns qf (wi)−rwi > 0.
(ii) On the other hand, even if r ≤ r¯ (q), effort provision might not always be lucrative.
For similar arguments as for r¯ (q) from (A1) in step (1.1) above, (2.5) ICa implies a w˜
such that if wi < w˜ := f−1 (1/ (p− q)), effort does not pay off (and vice versa). Thus, if
wi < w˜, f (wi) < 1/ (p− q) makes the agent prefer shirking and invest his entire wealth
wi - except for if k0 (r) ≤ wi < w˜, when it yields more to invest k0 (r) s.t. qf 0 (k0 (r)) = r
and to deposit any remainder wi − k0 (r). (iii) Finally, if r ≤ r¯ (q) as well as wi ≥ w˜,
agent i will provide effort. With pf 0 (wi) > r for wi ≤ k (r), he also invest all he owns.
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(2.2) Now, we additionally allow agent i to ask for credit. This would make him earn
V = p [f (k (r))− ts] − 1 [resp. V0 = q [f (k0 (r))− ts0]]. If r ≤ r¯ (q) and wi < k (r), a
further refinement of wi entails three effort cases: (i) If ω (r) < w˜ ≤ wi, i accepts an
effort contract: V ≥ ya − 1 follows from the fact that the profit is maximal for k (r)
and less ∀wi 6= k (r). (ii) Also if ω (r) ≤ wi < w˜, i leverages his firm: V ≥ ya0 holds,
since y (r) − 1 ≥ y0 (r) is satisfied by (A1). The simplification is valid, since on the
RHS, ya0 ≤ y0 (r) and on the LHS, after substituting ts, V reduces to y (r) − 1. (iii) If
wi < ω (r) < w˜, i is credit constrained and it matters if wi R k0 (r). For wi ≥ k0 (r),
we already derived in step (2.1) that i self-finances k0 (r) and deposits any remainder.
Whereas if wi < k0 (r), the agent asks for a non-effort credit, because then, V0 ≥ ya0.
After having substituted ts0, this reduces to y0 (r) ≥ ya0. This is satisfied, since the profit
is maximal for k0 (r) and less ∀wi 6= k0 (r). (iv) On the other hand, if r > r¯ (q), shirking
dominates. For i with wi < k0 (r), a leveraged firm size of k0 (r) is best: V0 > ya0, since
the profit is maximal for k0 (r) and strictly less ∀wi 6= k0 (r).
A.2 Proofs for Section 2.4
• Proof of Proposition 2.1:
The Proof follows from the construction of (2.9) and Piketty (1997).
• Proof of Proposition 2.2:
For r < r˜ (q), k0 (r) > ω (r), so that there are no credit-constrained net lenders. Thus,
Piketty’s (1997) convergence result towards the second, i.e. the credit-constrained steady-
state remains intact. In contrast, Piketty (1997) himself points out in footnote 19 that
with k0 (r) < ω (r) the first condition stated above would not hold, in turn restoring
uniqueness, i.e. convergence towards the credit-unconstrained steady-state. As Lemma
2.2 constitutes that k0 (r) > ω (r) for r < r˜ (q), it immediately follows that the steady-
state interest rate is bounded above by r˜ (q) and hence rc∞ ∈ (r¯ (q) , r˜ (q)].
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Proofs for Section 3.3
• Proof of Lemma 3.1:
As in optimum, where pf 0 (k (r)) = qf 0 (k0 (r)) = r and dy/dr = −k (r) [resp. dy0/dr =
−k0 (r)], it also is that dy/dr < dy0/dr. With y (r) → 0 [resp. y0 (r) → 0] for r → ∞,
(A1) y (1)− y0 (1) > 1 implies an r¯ > 1 s.t. for all r ≤ r¯, it holds that y (r)− 1 ≥ y0 (r).
Thus, high effort (e=1) is individually optimal. Likewise, shirking (e=0) is individually
optimal for r > r¯.
In order to check k (r)’s shape, recall that k (r) is s.t. pf 0 (k (r)) = r and that y (r) is
strictly concave in k. Then, k0 (r) < 0, because f 0 (k (r)) is continuous and monotonously
decreasing in k (r). Using that k0 (r) < 0, k → 0 for r →∞ and k →∞ for r → 0, gives
k00 (r) > 0. The same reasoning applies to k0 (r). k (r) > k0 (r) finally follows from f 0 (k)’s
behavior depicted above, p > q and the fact that in optimum pf 0 (k (r)) = qf 0 (k0 (r)) = r.
Consequently, k (r) is steeper than k0 (r).
• Proof of Lemma 3.2:
We study the calculus of an agent i with wi < k (rD) for rD ≤ r¯ [resp.wi < k0 (rD) for
rD > r¯]. He cannot self-finance the optimal investment given rD, but also either does not
want or get credit to make the optimal investment given rL. In order to determine the
size of his necessarily suboptimally capitalized autarkic firm, deposits and effort, three
cases have to be distinguished: (i) If rD > r¯, Lemma 3.1 constitutes that effort does not
pay off for any investment level, even not for the optimal level k0 (rD). Agent i therefore
chooses to shirk too. Owing to qf 0 (wi) > rD for wi < k0 (rD) (remember that the profit
function is concave and that f 0 (0) = ∞), he invests wi and does not deposit. He then
earns qf (wi) − rDwi > 0. (ii) Even though rD ≤ r¯, effort provision might still not be
lucrative. For similar arguments as for r¯ from (A1) in the Proof of Lemma 3.1, (3.6) ICa
implies a w˜ s.t. if wi < w˜ := f−1 (1/ (p− q)), effort does not pay off (and vice versa).
Thus, if wi < w˜, f (wi) < 1/ (p− q) makes the agent prefer shirking and to invest his
entire wealth wi - except for if k0 (rD) ≤ wi < w˜, when it yields more to invest k0 (rD)
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s.t. qf 0 (k0 (rD)) = rD and to deposit any remainder wi − k0 (rD). (iii) If, finally, rD ≤ r¯
as well as wi ≥ w˜, agent i will provide effort. With pf 0 (wi) > rD for wi ≤ k (rD), he also
invests all he owns.
It remains to relate k0 (rD), k0 (rD) and w˜. On the one hand, as y (rD) is maximal for
k (rD) and smaller for any other k, we know that for rD < r¯:
[pf (k (rD))− rDk (rD)]− [qf (k (rD))− rDk (rD)] > y (rD)− y0 (rD) .
Taking advantage of (A1) y (r¯) − y0 (r¯) = 1 for rD = r¯, helps to reduce the equation to
f (k (r¯)) > 1/ (p− q). Replace 1/ (p− q) = f (w˜) and use f ’s continuity and monotony to
get k (r¯) > w˜. On the other hand, likewise proceeding for k0 (rD), makes
[pf (k0 (r¯))− r¯k0 (r¯)]− [qf (k0 (r¯))− r¯k0 (r¯)] < y (r¯)− y0 (r¯) = 1
reduce to f (k0 (r¯)) < 1/ (p− q). Thus, k0 (r¯) < w˜. Taking altogether and by Lemma 3.1,
we finally obtain k0 (r¯) < w˜ < k (r¯).
• Proof of Lemma 3.3:
First, that no agent can win from simultaneously borrowing and lending is obvious for
rD < rL. But in order to see this for rD = rL = r, think e.g. of an agent who borrows
more than he actually needs to invest k (r), say k (r)− wi + w˘ with w˘ > 0. Let the new
corresponding transfers be t˘f in case of failure and t˘s in case of success. The agent now
deposits w˘ and earns rw˘. Using that as equity contribution, t˘f ≥ −rw˘ and t˘s ≤ f (k)−rw˘.
Yet, instead of concluding separate deposit and loan contracts, pool them to get one
contract with net transfers 0 − rw˘ in case of failure and t˘s − rw˘ in case of success.
With the non-negativity restrictions having to hold, these net transfers satisfy the same
conditions as the initial borrowing contract.
On these grounds, the containment of the group of depositors and borrowers follows
straightforward from the participation constraints (3.10) to (3.13) as well as Lemmata 3.1
and 3.2. This, in turn, makes some constraints redundant. Provided that (3.4) IRBL holds,
(3.16) Ns holds too. The same applies to the non-effort forms. These two constraints can
thus always be omitted. From the violation of (IRD2) finally follows that if (3.13) IRL2
holds, (3.12) IRL1 holds too.
B.2 Proofs for Section 3.4
• Proof of Lemma 3.4:
As established by Bertrand, bank competition removes all intermediation profits. It im-
plies that there cannot be any equilibrium bank behavior but r∗ = rD = rL. Applying
a loan rate rL < r∗ would attract all credit demand, but cause the bank’s bankruptcy:
with rL < r∗, but a deposit rate r∗, it follows from (3.3) IRBD that the bank would make
a loss on each unit of capital intermediated. With rL > r∗, the bank could not operate,
since it would not attract any credit demand at all.
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• Proof of Proposition 3.1:
Two things have to derived: (i) rˆp and rˆq as well as (ii) (3.18) rˆ.
(i) rˆp [resp. rˆq] is s.t. (3.18) just holds for k (r) =W [resp. k0 (r) =W ]. For expositional
purposes, assume that the economy consist of two agents only.
First, we focus on rˆq: Single out the aggregate wealth level W
¯
that -optimally distribution
an effort firm and a non-effort firm- would generate a return of pf 0 (k (r¯)) = qf 0 (k0 (r¯)) =
r¯. Yet, we know by (A1) that at r¯, the surplus from equalizing firm sizes to k0 =W
¯
/2 is
larger than from running an effort firm of size k (r¯) and a non-effort firm of size k0 (r¯):
2qf (W
¯
/2) > [pf (k (r¯))− 1] + qf (k0 (r¯)) (B.1)
The reason is that compared to the LHS, the increase in expected output on the RHS does
not cover effort costs of e = 1: by (A1), the RHS reduces to 2qf (W
¯
/2) > 2qf (k0 (r¯)).
This, in turn, gives f (W
¯
/2) > f (k0 (r¯)), which must hold because of f ’s monotony and
W
¯
/2 > k0 (r¯). That is also why 2qf (W
¯
/2) > 2 [pf (k (r¯))− 1]. Although only running
equally large non-effort firms maximizes the economy’s aggregate output for W =W
¯
, it
lowers its return rate: qf 0 (W
¯
/2) < r¯. (A1) and f ’s concavity further ensure that (B.1)
must be true for all W <W
¯
, when the RHS declines. Hence, (B.1) implicitly defines a
rˆq < r¯, s.t. if W is so small that qf 0 (W/2) ≥ rˆq, only running non-effort firms of equal
size is optimal.
Second, we turn to rˆp: W¯= 2k (r¯) = 2k0 (rˆp) implicitly defines a rˆp with rˆp < rˆq. If W is
then so high that pf 0 (W/2) ≤ rˆp, running only equally large effort firms is optimal, i.e.:
2 [pf (W/2)− 1] ≥ [pf (k (rˆp))− 1] + qf (k0 (rˆp)) . (B.2)
(ii) Inserting α (W ) = [W − k (r)] / [k0 (r)− k (r)] into
U 0 = α (W ) qf 0 (k0 (r)) k00 (r) + (1− α (W )) [pf 0 (k (r)) k0 (r)]
and rearranging terms gives (3.18) rˆ.
• Proof of Lemma 3.5:
The Proof is straightforward from Definition 3.3, Lemmata 3.3 and 3.4.
• Proof of Proposition 3.2:
The Proof directly follows from the construction of D (r) and S (r), the equilibrium Def-
inition 3.2, (A2), rˆp > 1 and Lemma 3.3.
B.3 Proofs for Section 3.5
• Proof of Lemma 3.6:
On the grounds of Definition 3.4, Lemmata 3.3 and 3.4, the Proof follows from ω (r) and
the definition of r
¯
and r¯, whereby:
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(1st step) Checking that ω (r) is a strictly increasing and concave function in r for r < r¯:
From (3.20) ω (r), we get
dω/dr = p [(p− q) f (k (r))− 1] / (p− q) r2 > 0 for r < r¯,
since (p− q) f (k (r)) − 1 > 0 by (A1) for r < r¯. Thus, in turn, is directly derived from
[pf (k (r))− rk (r)] − [qf (k (r))− rk (r)] > y (r) − y0 (r) (as y0 (r) is maximal for k0 (r)
and hence smaller for any other k (r)), and y (r) − y0 (r) > 1 for r < r¯. By the same
argument and with k0 (r) < 0, the second derivative indeed gives
d2ω/dr2 =
£
(p− q) k0 (r) r2 − 2p [(p− q) f (k (r))− 1]
¤
/r3 (p− q) < 0.
(2nd step) Assessing the impact of q on ω (r): On the one hand, there is a q01 > 0
s.t. ω (1) < 0 for q > q01. q01 is derived from equalizing the net present value and moral
hazard costs for r = 1, i.e. [pf (k (1))− k (1)] = p/ (p− q01), and strictly positive by (A1);
otherwise there would be no commitment issue. On the other hand, there is a q02 > 0 s.t.
ω (r¯) > 0 for q < q02. First, for r = r¯,
(3.20) ω (r¯) = p/r¯ (p− q)− pf (k (r¯)) /r¯ + k (r¯)
is a continuous function of q with ω (r¯ (0)) = 0.
dω ( r¯) /dq = −p [(p− q) r¯0 − r¯] / (p− q)2 r¯2 + k0 (r¯) r¯0
− [pf 0 (k (r¯)) k0 (r¯) r¯0r¯ − pf (k (r¯)) r¯0] /r¯2
= ω0 (r¯) r¯0 + p/ (p− q)2 r¯,
On top, r¯ = [pf (k ( r¯))− qf (k0 ( r¯))− 1] / [k ( r¯)− k0 ( r¯)] from (A1), so that dr¯/dq =
−f (k0 ( r¯)) / [k ( r¯)− k0 ( r¯)], as well as k0 = 0 (and thus f (0) = 0) for q = 0. This being
said, finally allows to state that
dω ( r¯) /dq|q=0 = 1/p r¯ (0) > 0.
Mind that it follows from (A1) that for q −→ 0+, r¯ −→ ∞. Hence, there indeed is a
q02 > 0 s.t. for q < q02 it is that ω (r¯) > 0. With ω (r) being a continuous function
of r, it follows that for q < q02 there exists r
¯
< r¯, s.t. ω (r
¯
) = 0 and ω (r) > 0 for
r ∈ (r
¯
, r¯). Consequently, (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3.6 hold for r
¯
> 1, i.e. for q ∈ (0, q0) with
q0 = min {q01, q02}.
(3rd step) Scrutinizing the relative position of curves, especially k0 (r¯) < ω (r¯) < w˜ < k (r¯)
for r = r¯: First remember that we know from Lemma 3.2 that for r = r¯, k0 (r¯) < w˜ < k (r¯).
Then: (i) Show that ω (r¯) < w˜. For this to see, substitute (3.20) ω (r), which reduces to
pf (k (r¯)) − r¯k (r¯) > p/ (p− q)− r¯w˜. Using (A1) to substitute y0 (r¯) + 1 for y (r¯) on the
LHS and inserting f (w˜) = 1/ (p− q) on the RHS, gives y0 (r¯) > qf (w˜)− r¯w˜, which holds
as we know from Lemma 3.1 that the non-effort project’s benefit is maximal for k0 (r¯)
and, due to its strict concavity, less for w˜ > k0 (r¯). (ii) Check k0 (r¯) < ω (r¯). Proceeding
as for ω (r¯) < w˜ before, yields qf (k0 (r¯)) < qf (w˜), which is true as we derived k0 (r¯) < w˜
in Lemma 3.2. (iii) Verify that ω (r¯) < k (r¯), again by proceeding as with k0 (r¯) < ω (r¯)
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until we get qf (w˜)− rk (r¯) < y0 (r¯). Use the definition of w˜ to substitute pf (w˜)− 1 for
qf (w˜) on the LHS and get pf (w˜) − rk (r¯) − 1 < y0 (r¯). This is true, since the LHS is
smaller than y (r¯) − 1 = y0 (r¯) and since we know from Lemma 3.2 that w˜ < k (r¯). (iv)
Study the curves’ behavior for r < r¯. As w˜ > 0, ω (r) is strictly increasing, concave and
ω (r
¯
) = 0 as well as ω (r¯) < w˜, it is assured that ω (r) < w˜ for r < r¯. This being said,
as k00 (r) < 0, k0 (0) = ∞ > ω (0), k0 (∞) = 0 < ω (∞), it follows that k0 (r) > ω (r) for
r < r˜D < r¯ and k0 (r) < ω (r) for r > r˜D. By the same argument, it becomes obvious
that k (r) > w˜ and only falls below for some r > r¯.
(4th step) Studying (3.13) IRL2 in its respective form: Knowing that for r ≤ r¯, it holds
that ω (r) < w˜ < k (r), IRL2 must be checked for three cases: (i) If ω (r) < w˜ ≤ wi, the
agent either self-finances or is eligible for an effort credit and v ≥ ya − 1 follows from the
fact that for r ≤ r¯, the net profit is maximal for k (r) and less for ∀wi 6= k (r). (ii) If
ω (r) ≤ wi < w˜, the agent is again eligible for an effort credit. Then, v ≥ ya0 holds if
y (r)− 1 ≥ y0 (r) is satisfied (which is valid to do, since on the RHS, ya0 ≤ y0 (r) and on
the LHS, after substituting t and wc, v reduces to y (r) − 1). In fact, y (r) − 1 ≥ y0 (r)
holds, because of (A1). (iii) If wi < ω (r) < w˜, the agent is credit constrained and it
matters if wi R k0 (r). For wi ≥ k0 (r), we already derived in Lemma 3.2 that the agent
prefers to self-finance k0 (r) and to deposit the remainder. Whereas if wi < k0 (r), the
agent asks for a non-effort credit, because then v0 ≥ ya0. After having substituted t0 and
wc, this reduces to y0 (r) ≥ ya0, which is satisfied, as the net profit is maximal for k0 (r)
and less for ∀wi 6= k0 (r). At last, IRL2 must be assessed for r > r¯: If k0 (r) > wi, it must
be that v0 > ya0, which holds, since the net profit is maximal for k0 (r) and strictly less
for ∀wi 6= k0 (r).
• Proof of Proposition 3.3:
The Proof is similar to that of Proposition 3.1, but additionally requires the inclusion of
Lemma 3.6.
• Proof of Lemma 3.7:
Five things remain to be shown.
(1st step) Checking k0 (rD,j (rL))’s location: Recall that for rL > r¯L,
y (rL)− 1 < y0 (rL) < y0 (rD,j (rL)) , (B.3)
so that (3.24) y (rL) − 1 ≥ y0 (rD,j (rL)) could only hold for some rL ≤ r¯L. Then,
k0 (rD,j (rL)) and k (rL) would intersect if f 0−1 (rD,j/q) = f 0−1 (rL/p) ⇐⇒ rL/rD,j =
p/q. Substituting k (rL) for k0 (rD,j (rL)) into (3.24) gives
qf (k (rL))− rD,jk (rL) ≥ pf (k (rL))− rLk (rL)− 1. (B.4)
Using the fact that rL > rD,j , allows to reduce the inequality to f (w˜) ≥ f (k (rL)).
Thus, if k0 (rD,j (rL)) and k (rL) cross, it must be where w˜ = k (rL). Yet, k (rL)’s shape
(derived in Lemma 3.6) and (3.23) entails that this can only be the case for rL > r¯L.
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That is how it is ensured that for rL ≤ r¯L, (3.23) holds, k0 (rD,j (rL)) < k (rL) and so
that rL/rD,j < p/q, irrespective of an intersection.
(2nd step) Refining k0 (rD,j (r¯L))’s position: On the one hand, it follows from (B.4) that
if k0 (rD,j (rL)) = k (rL), then both also equal w˜ and k0 (rD,j (r¯L)) > w˜. On the other
hand, if there is no intersection and k0 (rD,j (rL)) < k (rL) ∀rL, (3.24) always holds
and k0 (rD,j (r¯L))’s position cannot further be contained, neither relative to w˜, nor to
ω (r¯L): As we know that (3.24) y (r¯L) − y0 (rD,j (r¯L)) < 1, it must all the more be with
k0 (rD,j (r¯L)) < k (r¯L) that
[pf (k0 (rD,j (r¯L)))− r¯Lk0 (rD,j (r¯L))]
− [qf (k0 (rD,j (r¯L)))− rD,j (r¯L) k0 (rD,j (r¯L))] < 1
⇔ f (k0 (rD,j (r¯L))) < f (w˜) + [r¯L − rD,j (r¯L)] k0 (rD,j (r¯L)) / [p− q] .
Hence, k0 (rD,j (r¯L)) ≶ w˜. As the second term on the RHS is positive, the position
of k0 (rD,j (r¯L)) relative to w˜ depends on the magnitude of the interest rate spread set
by the monopsonist (and thus ultimately also on G (w)), p, q and the steepness of the
production function. On top making use of the refined pricing formula (3.26) (i.e. of
rD,j/p > Sj
¡
r∗D,j
¢
/ (p− q)S0j
¡
r∗D,j
¢
) yields
pf (k0 (rD,j (r¯L))) < pf (w˜) + rD,jk0 (rD,j (r¯L)) ,
but still does not help to generally decide k0 (rD,j (r¯L)) ≶ w˜. A similar consideration
applies to k0 (rD,j (r¯L)) and ω (r¯L). Suppose k0 (rD,j (r¯L)) > ω (r¯L), which reduces (after
taking advantage of (A1)) to qf (w˜) − r¯Lk0 (rD,j (r¯L)) < qf (k0 (r¯L)) − r¯Lk0 (r¯L). This
holds for k0 (rD,j (r¯L)) > w˜ (whereas the opposite claim would only hold for k0 (rD,j (r¯L))
being sufficiently smaller than w˜).
(3rd step) Optimal behavior: With the calculus resembling the (4th step) of Lemma
3.6’s Proof, we restrict ourselves to the non-obvious cases for rL ≤ r¯L, where some
particularities are ensued from the two interest rates being at interplay with initial wealth.
(i) Look at i with wi ∈ [k0 (rD,j) , k (rL)] who prefers a leveraged effort firm not only to
pure depositing (because of rL > rD,j), but also to a self-financed non-effort firm with
depositing, since
pf (k (rL))− rL [k (rL)− wi]− 1 ≥ qf (k0 (rD,j)) + rD,j [wi − k0 (rD,j)] . (B.5)
Indeed, this reduces to ϑ (rL) := [y0 (rD,j)− y (rL) + 1] / [rL − rD,j ] as the critical wealth
level ϑ (rL) above which (3.24) reverses. Substituting wi = k0 (rD,j) into (B.5) gives
ya0 (rL) < y (rL)− 1. It holds for wi < w˜ because of the production function’s concavity
and ya0 (rL) ≤ ya (rL). Thus, ϑ (rL) ≤ k0 (rD,j) and for wi ≥ k0 (rD,j), (3.24) reverses
for sure.
(ii) ϑ (rL)’s magnitude does not need to be further refined, because already for wi ∈
[ω (rL) , k0 (rD,j)), self-financed non-effort production is unattainable. Thus, only lever-
aged effort or autarkic production remain to those agents. As for wi ≥ w˜, pf (wi)− 1 <
pf (k (rL)) − rL [k (rL)− wi] − 1 must hold by y’s concavity again, the same must
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be true for wi < w˜, because ya0 (rL) ≤ ya (rL) on the LHS. (iii) At last, consider
wi ∈ [k (rL) , k (rD,j)). As capital units wˆ = k (rD,j) − k (rL) yield rD,j on the cap-
ital market, but rL ≥ rD,j if invested in the project, it must be that pf (wi) − 1 >
pf (k (rL)) + rD,j [wi − k (rL)]− 1.
(4th step) The SOC is negative: (3.26) [rL − rD,j ] = Sj (rD,j) /S0j (rD,j) > 0 and (A3)
give rise to d2Πj/dr2D,j = −2S0 (rD,j) + [rL − rD,j ]S00 (rD,j) < 0.
(5th step) All relevant side-conditions in Definition 3.5 are also satisfied, including (3.10)
IRD1: this is the case, since rL ≥ r∗D,j ≥ 1 if the interior solution yields a r∗D,j =
rL−Sj
¡
r∗D,j
¢
/S0j
¡
r∗D,j
¢
≥ 1 and rL ≥ r∗D,j = 1 otherwise. In both case, (3.4) IRBL holds,
because rL ≥ r∗D,j causes that the monopsonist realizes an intermediation margin that is
always positive and so that he even earns a non-negative profit on the marginal contract.
• Proof of Lemma 3.8:
Based on Lemma 3.7, the satisfaction of all side-conditions in Definition 3.5 is straight-
forward.
• Proof of Proposition 3.4:
The Proof directly follows from Lemmata 3.7 and 3.8, Propositions 3.1 and 3.3 as well
as the analysis above, but for the following: r∗D,j ≥ 1 is ensured thanks to Lemma 3.7
and with r∗D,j = r
∗
C . r
∗
D,j ≥ 1 holds because of Proposition 3.3 and because autarkic
production reduces gross capital demand and supply by the same magnitude.
• Proof of Lemma 3.9:
Against the background of the monopsony results in Subsection 3.5.3, optimality follows
from the calculus above, since also the SOC is negative. This obtains, because in optimum
[rL,j − rD] = −Dj (rL,j) /D0j (rL,j) ≤ 0 and (A4) ensure that d2Πj/dr2L,j = 2D0j (rL,j) +
[rL,j − rD]D00j (rL,j) < 0.
• Proof of Lemma 3.10:
Two things are left to be verified. First, check that ΠL,ji0 ≥ 0 and the bank’s participation
constraint: With t0 = f (wi) for all wi < kL0 and kL0 = k0 (rD), it must be that
qf (k0 (rD))−rD [k0 (rD)− wi]−qf (wi) ≥ 0. Rearranging terms gives y0 (rD) ≥ ya0 (rD),
which holds by the profit function’s positive monotony for k0 (rD) ≥ wi. Hence, already
ΠL,ji0 ≥ 0 satisfies (3.4) IRBL , so that if ΠL,ji ≥ ΠL,ji0, ΠL,ji would do it the more.
Second, compare (3.36) ψ (rD) to (3.20) ω (rD): With (A1) y (r¯)−y0 (r¯) = 1 and d(y (rD)-
y0 (rD))/drD < 0 (see Proof of Proposition 3.1), (3.35)’s satisfaction depends on the size
of agent’s initial wealth wi. Like ω (rD), ψ (rD) is continuous, dψ (rD) /drD > 0 and
d2ψ (rD) /dr2D < 0, but ψ (r¯) = w˜. Thanks to the Proof of Lemma 3.6, we can thus
constitute that ψ (r¯) > ω (r¯). Moreover, with r
¯
ψ being defined s.t. ψ(r
¯
ψ) = 0, rewriting
(3.36) gives y(r
¯
ψ) − y0(r
¯
ψ) = 1 + qf (w˜) or y(r
¯
ψ) = pf (w˜) + y0(r
¯
ψ). As ω (r
¯
) = 0 for
y (r
¯
) = pf (w˜), y(r
¯
ψ) > y (r
¯
) and it immediately follows from y’s monotonous decline in r
that r
¯
ψ <r
¯
< rˆp and that ω(r
¯
ψ) < 0. Thus ψ (rD) > ω (rD) for all rD.
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• Proof of Proposition 3.5:
The Proof directly follows from Lemmata 3.9 and 3.10, Propositions 3.1 and 3.3 as well
as the analysis above.
• Proof of Lemma 3.11:
Based on Definition 3.7, Lemmata 3.8 and 3.10 as well as Propositions 3.1 and 3.3, the
Proof is straightforward from (3.38) and the derivation of (3.40).
• Proof of Proposition 3.6:
In the light of Propositions 3.4 and 3.5, Lemmata 3.8 and 3.10, the Proof follows from
the analysis above, Lemma 3.11 and Definition 3.2.
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Proofs for Section 4.3
• Proof of Lemma 4.1:
The Lemma directly follows from (A2), the derivation of k (r), ω (r) and r
¯
(γ). It remains
to assess the functional form of (4.4) ω (r), which is continuos and differentiable in r.
Using (4.1) f 0 (k (r)) = r gives:
ω0 (r) = [1− γ] k0 (r) + γf (k (r)) /r2. (C.1)
As the first term is monotonously increasing in r, whereas the second is monotonously
decreasing in r, there is a single r = r˙, such that ω0 (r˙) = 0. Then, ω0 (r) > 0 for
r < r˙ and ω0 (r) < 0 for r > r˙. This stems from the fact that r → 0, k0 (r) → 0− and
f (k (r)) /r2 → ∞. Whereas for r → ∞, k0 (r) → −∞ and f (k (r)) /r2 → 0+. Using
(4.1), simple algebra yields that (C.1) ω0 (r) ≥ 0 as long as
ηy,r := −rf 0 (k (r)) k0 (r) /f (k (r)) ≤ γ/ [1− γ] ,
where ηy,r > 0 is the input price elasticity of output. Likewise,
ω00 (r) = [1− γ] k00 (r) + [γ/r]
£
k0 (r)− 2f (k (r)) /r2
¤
. (C.2)
Against the background of ω (r)’s monotony and with the first term being positive,
whilst the second one being negative for all r, there must be a single r = r¨, such that
ω0 (r¨) = 0. Then, ω00 (r) < 0 for r < r¨ and ω00 (r) > 0 for r > r¨, since ω (r) → −∞
for r → 0, but ω (r) → 0 for r → ∞. By comparison of the terms in ω0 (r) and
ω00 (r), it must be that r˙ < r¨. Similarly, one can show that (C.2) ω00 (r) ≤ 0 for
ηy,r ≤ 2/ [(1− γ) εk0,r/γ − 1].where εk0,r > 0 is the factor price elasticity of the optimal
investment’s slope. Then, it follows from the fact that ω (r) is decreasing and concave for
γ/ [1− γ] ≤ ηy,r ≤ 2/ [(1− γ) εk0,r/γ − 1] that εk0,r ≤ 2 + γ(1−γ) .
• Proof of Proposition 4.1:
The Proof immediately follows from (A1) to (A3), Definition 4.1, Lemma 4.1 and the
construction of the demand correspondence.
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C.2 Proofs for Section 4.4
• Proof of Proposition 4.2:
Given (A1) to (A3), Lemma 4.1 and Proposition 4.1, first decompose the impact of ∆r
on A’s GNP into its impact on PA and XA:
dPˆ ∗A/dr = [f (ω (r)) -f (k (r))]ω
0 (r) g (ω (r)) + [1-G (ω (r))] f 0 (k (r)) k0 (r) (C.3)
There are two effects at play: a credit rationing and a firm size effect effect. While the
second is captured by the second term and always negative, the first is captured by the
first term, which is negative for r < r˙ and positive thereafter - owing to a change in sign
of ω0 (r). As Pˆ ∗A is decreasing in r if 1 ≤ r ≤r¯(γ), when credit rationing is absent (so that
only the firm size effect is effective), dPˆ ∗A/dr < 0 for r < r˙. Yet, this standard response
might not persist throughout r > r˙, since the firm size and credit rationing effect then
go into opposite directions w.r.t. aggregate investment. Instead, as derived in (4.8), the
opposite response arises if, around the point of inflexion at r = r¨, a sufficiently small
g (ω (r))ω0 (r) entails an investment-enhancing credit rationing effect that outweighs the
investment-depressing firm size effect. Besides:
dXˆ∗A/dr= [WA-DA (r)]+r [k (r) -ω (r)]ω
0 (r) g (ω (r)) -r [1-G (ω (r))] k0 (r) (C.4)
Starting out from autarky, the first term in (C.4) is positive if we are in the interest
rate region where D0A (r) < 0 (and negative if condition (4.7) holds). The second term
is positive if r < r˙ (and negative if not) and the third negative ∀r. For r ≤r
¯
(γ), the
second as well as third term vanish and D0A (r) < 0, so that dXˆ
∗
A/dr > 0. Otherwise, the
interest rate range and the magnitude of the terms matter. By the same analysis as for
dPˆ ∗A/dr, dXˆ
∗
A/dr > 0 ∀r except for if condition (4.11) holds. Given (A3), a market rate
of return span [rX1, rX2] then materializes for which dXˆ∗A/dr ≤ 0. Beyond that, it follows
from the comparison of (4.11) and (4.7), that the RHS of the first is larger than that of
the second for DA (rˆ∗) > WA. As both RHS are negative, the satisfaction of the first
is therefore automatically implied by that of the second as long as DA (r) > WA. The
contrary, instead, would require DA (r) < WA. Yet, this can never be true, since coming
from an autarkic equilibrium as characterized in Proposition 4.1 makes the satisfaction of
(4.7) equivalent to DA (rˆ∗) > WA. Thus, (4.11) dXˆ∗A/dr ≤ 0 cannot be fulfilled without
(4.7) dDA/dr ≥ 0 holding.
Now, sum up (C.3) dPˆ ∗A/dr and (C.4) dXˆ
∗
A/dr to get the derivative of (4.9) Yˆ
∗
A w.r.t. r.
Using (4.1) f 0 (k (r)) = r, dYˆ ∗A/dr = [WA −DA]− rD0 + P 0 reduces to
dYˆ ∗A/dr = [WA −DA (r)] + [[f (ω (r))− rω (r)]− y (r)]ω0 (r) gA (ω (r)) . (C.5)
Again, the first term is positive (except for if condition (4.7) holds) and approaches WA
for r →∞. In the second term, [f (ω (r))− rω (r)]−y (r) < 0 (since the profit is maximal
for k (r) and smaller for any other k 6= k (r)), so that the sign of ω0 (r) depicted in Lemma
4.1 becomes crucial once more.
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Thus, for r ≤ r˙, the signs of the two terms in (C.5) oppose. It is immediately clear
that for r ≤r
¯
(γ), when there is no credit rationing, dYˆ ∗A/dr > 0. Whereas for r¯
(γ) <
r∗A < rˆ
∗ ≤ r˙, dYˆ ∗A/dr R 0, depending on |∆PA| S |∆XA| with ∆PA < 0 and ∆XA > 0.
In contrast, dYˆ ∗A/drˆ
∗ > 0 for r > r˙ when both terms in (C.5) share the positive sign.
This is given in the Y -SRC characterized in Definition 4.2, when any losses from smaller
firm sizes become less burdensome relative to the gains in the net credit position and the
relaxed credit rationing. Whereas in the Y -RRC, the fulfillment of (4.7) makes A a capital
importer, so that the first term in (C.5) becomes negative. Then, (4.12) assures that any
dominance of the credit rationing over the firm size effect, which makes ∆PA and ∆XA
temporarily change sign, translates into ∆PA ≥ 0 remaining dominated by ∆XA ≤ 0.
Thus, dYˆ ∗A/drˆ
∗ ≤ 0 in the Y -RRC.
At last, because of [WA −DA (r)], there are scenarios, in which the direction of the interest
rate change becomes decisive. If A sees an interest rate decline (i.e. r˙ ≥ r∗A > rˆ∗), we get
∆YA > 0, because (4.12) cannot hold. This owes to the fact that ∆rA < 0 induces more
net borrowing firms with non-negative profits at a higher optimal scale, each generating
higher profits than their credit-rationed counterparts (y0 (r) < 0). That is how in the
aggregate, the first term in (C.5) gets dominated by the second. As soon as r∗A > rˆ
∗ > r˙
, instead, also the first term in (C.5) turns negative owing to tightened rationing. Hence,
∆YA < 0 in the Y -SRC. Contrariwise, (4.12) implies that in the Y -RRC, ∆YA ≥ 0,
because the effects just reverse. As (4.7) holds, A turns into a capital exporter, making
the first term positive. Then, (4.12) ensures again that the first term dominates the
second, so that the positive effect prevails.
• Proof of Proposition 4.3:
The Proof follows from (A1) to (A3), Definition 4.1, Lemma 4.1, Propositions 4.1 and 4.2
as well as the construction S (r) and D (r).
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